Security Failures on January 6, 2021
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION of Security Failures on January 6, 2021
FIRST THE DYNAMITE REVELATION HERE:
THE U.S. HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS WAS COMPROMISED BY POLITICS AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR VIOLENCE AT THE CAPITOL.
On February 9, 2022, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi said, “I have no power over the Capitol Police.” This is false. Documents provided by the House Sergeant at Arms show how then-House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving carried out his duties in clear deference to the Speaker, her staff, and other Democratic staff. The Speaker’s statement created uncertainty and confusion with respect to the historical reporting structure for the HSAA and USCP.
House Rules dictate in several circumstances that the Sergeant at Arms (SAA) is to report directly to the Speaker of the House, including when the House is in session for, the Sergeant at Arms is to “maintain order under the direction of the Speaker and other presiding officer” and “execute the commands of the House, and all processes issued by authority thereof, directed to the Sergeant at Arms by the Speaker.
Pursuant to the House Rules and for other reasons, the Sergeant at Arms in practice serves under the direction of the Speaker. Accordingly, the Speaker and other Democratic staff routinely have meetings with the Sergeant at Arms and staff. This dynamic is not unique to this Speaker or this House Sergeant at Arms. Indeed, because the Speaker is the highestranking Constitutional Officer of the first branch of Government, this structure is neither novel nor controversial. What is novel, however, is a Speaker who denies the relationship and ignores her office’s obligation to secure the Capitol, perhaps in an effort to shift blame.
Indeed, Speaker Pelosi exercised her authority with respect to the safety and security of the House of Representatives when she directed the use of magnetometers outside the House chamber in the name of safety. She announced the use of punitive fines for Members who refused to go through the metal detectors. Similarly, she required masks in the House chamber and around the House Office Buildings.
The Speaker also exerted influence on security protocols at the Capitol related to the perimeter fence. Following January 6, 2021, the fence was quickly erected and remained up until July of that year when Congressional leaders started getting pressure to take it down. She also oversaw the fencing that was erected for a purported rally on September 18, 2021, that never materialized, and the State of the Union in March 2022.
Finally, as the highest-ranking Constitutional Officer, Pelosi used her authority to tap Retired Lieutenant General Russel Honoré to “lead an immediate review of security infrastructure, interagency processes and command and control,” following the attack at the Capitol on January 6, 2021
A. The Speaker’s office was heavily involved in planning and decision-making before and during the events of January 6, 2021, and micromanaged the Sergeant at Arms.
https://rumble.com/v2en5uk-january-6-care-package.html — JANUARY 6 CARE PACKAGE | Capitol Police provocateurs pushing the crowd into the Capitol Building on Jan6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Leadership and law enforcement failures within the U.S. Capitol left the complex vulnerable on January 6, 2021. The Democrat-led investigation in the House of Representatives, however, has disregarded those institutional failings that exposed the Capitol to violence that day. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration conducted a bipartisan investigation in the months after the attack.
On June 8, 2021, the committees released their findings in a joint staff report (hereinafter, Senate Report). This report supplements the Senate Report and provides findings from the perspective of the House of Representatives regarding those areas of inquiry that the Democrat-led investigation has thus far ignored, specifically answering the important question of why the Capitol was left so unprepared.
This report is based on documents and communications obtained from key witnesses, and interviews with U.S. Capitol Police leaders and rank-and-file officers. Many of the witnesses who spoke to investigators are U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) sources. Some of the sources are current USCP officers and others are former officers. Several of the sources who sat for interviews are USCP intelligence analysts within the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division.
Additionally, investigators interviewed the Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police Tom Manger, the House Sergeant at Arms William Walker, and the Assistant Director of the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division Julie Farnam.
This report goes to great lengths to protect the identities of the line officers and analysts who participated in interviews. Sources who cooperated with this investigation described retaliation by USCP leadership for their participation in this investigation and other investigations into the events of January 6, 2021. Additionally, the Staff Director for the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, David Buckley, has a track record of acting in a retaliatory manner against whistleblowers. For those reasons, this report uses “USCP source” to cite or otherwise refer to conversations with USCP employees who are not in leadership positions.
There are several reasons the Capitol was left unprepared on January 6, 2021, including internal politics and unnecessary bureaucracy. Prior to that day, the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) had obtained sufficient information from an array of channels to anticipate and prepare for the violence that occurred. However, officers on the front lines and analysts in USCP’s intelligence division were undermined by the misplaced priorities of their leadership.
Those problems were exacerbated by the House Sergeant at Arms, who was distracted from giving full attention to the threat environment prior to January 6, 2021 by several other upcoming events.
Specifically, the leader of the USCP Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division failed to warn USCP leadership and line officers about the threat of violence, despite the fact that IICD analysts gathered intelligence that clearly indicated a need for a hardened security posture. In fact, IICD’s leader—Julie Farnam—spent the weeks leading up to January 6, 2021 attempting to overhaul the division, including by reassigning expert intelligence analysts to new roles and creating new processes for synthesizing threat data.
Information about planned protests and threats of violence were siloed and not properly analyzed and disseminated during this key period because of Farnam’s misplaced priorities. One IICD analyst testified to investigators: “That unit was disbanded by her almost on day one. We, at the time of January 6, we were not doing proactive searches of social media like we had been before. We were strictly reactive and responding to requests for information.” This is also substantiated by USCP’s own internal after-action report that was drafted in June of 2021.
Similarly, then-House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving—who served on the Capitol Police Board by virtue of his position—succumbed to political pressures from the Office of Speaker Pelosi and House Democrat leadership leading up to January 6, 2021. He coordinated closely with the Speaker and her staff and left Republicans out of important discussions related to security. As a critical member of the Capitol Police Board, the House Sergeant at Arms had an obligation to all Members, staff, and USCP officers to keep them safe by consulting stakeholders without partisan preference.
But rather than coordinate in a meaningful way, Irving only provided information to Republicans after receiving instruction from the Speaker’s office. In one case, Irving even asked a senior Democratic staffer to “act surprised” when he sent key information about plans for the Joint Session on January 6, 2021 to him and his Republican counterpart. The senior Democratic staffer replied: “I’m startled!”
To make matters worse, systemic issues have crippled the security apparatus for years. USCP line officers were under-trained and ill-equipped to protect the Capitol complex. One officer testified to investigators that he went into the fight on January 6, 2021 with nothing but his USCP-issued baseball cap. Even if every USCP officer had been at work that day, their numbers would still have been insufficient to hold off the rioters due to a lack of training and equipment. The USCP was set up to fail, and there have been scant signs of progress toward addressing these weaknesses. In fact, rather than address these systemic issues, USCP leadership ramped up its intelligence gathering work as it relates to private citizens who meet with Members of Congress and Senators, including extensive research on private residences and other meeting venues.
This investigation found that the information collected against private citizens exercising their constitutional rights with respect to meeting Members of Congress is not in fact used for security purposes in some cases. This issue, and others require additional scrutiny by the relevant committees of Congress.
The U.S. House Sergeant at Arms was compromised by politics and did not adequately prepare for violence at the Capitol. The Speaker’s office was heavily involved in planning and decision-making before and during the events of January 6, 2021, and micromanaged the Sergeant at Arms.
In the lead up to January 6, 2021, the House Sergeant at Arms was distracted, and the Capitol Police Board was dysfunctional. USCP failed to adequately prepare for the events of January 6, 2021
USCP lacks adequate equipment Systemic Department-Wide Training Failures USCP intelligence failures are directly to blame for the lack of preparedness on January 6, 2021.
There had not been an intelligence failure at this scale in the USCP Intelligence Division prior to the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.
Changes to the Intelligence Division after November 2020 caused the intelligence failures on January 6, 2021. Farnam undermined IICD analysts and downplayed important intelligence to USCP leadership.
IICD leadership reorganized the division to gather more intelligence on Members of Congress, staff, and constituents to the detriment of preparing for the Joint Session.
USCP leadership doubled down on their failed management approach and retaliated against officers and analysts who raised concerns.
USCP is withholding an internal report that confirmed many of the concerns raised by analysts and officers who testified to investigators.
EVENTS OF JANUARY 6, 2021
On January 6, 2021, criminal rioters assaulted police officers, broke into the U.S. Capitol, damaged property, and temporarily interfered with the certification of states’ presidential and vice presidential electors at the Joint Session of Congress—a typically pro forma event.
Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that each state “shall appoint” electors for President and Vice President in a manner directed by its state legislature. Article II, Section 1, clause 3 provides that such appointment should take place on a day determined by Congress. Congress determined that day to be Election Day, which occurs on the “Tuesday next after the first Monday in November” every fourth year. Congress also decided the date on which those electoral votes are counted in a joint session of Congress. The date has been set by law to be January 6 following each presidential election. Following the 2020 presidential election, the House and Senate prepared to count the electoral votes for the 2020 presidential election submitted by the states on January 6, 2021.
Threats against large-scale political and public events are common. For that reason, most “major public events such as presidential inaugurations, state of the union addresses, nominating conventions and Super Bowls are routinely designated National Special Security Events (NSSE) because of their perceived value as terrorist targets.” The 2021 Joint Session of Congress, however, was different.
In the lead up to the Joint Session, there were known threats against Congress. Some threats occurred as early as December, while others arrived just days and hours before the Joint Session started. However, the Department of Homeland Security did not put the U.S. Secret Service in charge of security planning, as in other NSSE events
Due to the scale of the protest activity scheduled for January 6 and the nature of the Joint Session, the Capitol and much of the city adopted an enhanced security posture. But it was not adequate to stop thousands of violent protesters determined to get into the Capitol building. Additionally, in the lead up to the Joint Session, General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then-Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy restricted the process for approving changes to National Guard missions, limiting the authority to approve such changes to “senior Pentagon leaders.”
Their decision to reduce the Pentagon’s alacrity with respect to mission changes led to delays in the National Guard’s response to the attack on the Capitol. Indeed, city leadership had asked the Guard to carry out only a narrow, unarmed mission to help handle traffic ahead of planned protests. Over the course of three hours, rioters stormed barricades surrounding the Capitol and overwhelmed the U.S. Capitol Police officers protecting the building, and lawmakers barricaded themselves in various congressional offices, while the Pentagon effectuated the change in the National Guard’s mission from traffic management to riot response.
On January 6, President Donald Trump planned to speak at a rally near the White House. City officials expected thousands of people to attend the rally. Before 9:00am that day, the U.S. Secret Service estimated over 10,000 people were lining up. A Secret Service alert warned of violence: “[S]ome members of the crowd are wearing ballistic helmets, body armor and carrying radio equipment and military grade backpacks . . . .
President Trump began speaking at noon and urged the rally goers to go to the Capitol and demonstrate “peacefully.” At 1:00p.m. the initial wave of protesters began storming the outer police barrier around the Capitol. Minutes later, Vice President Mike Pence gaveled in the Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote results.
At 1:49pm U.S. Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund called D.C. National Guard Commanding General William J. Walker to request immediate assistance. Shortly after 2:00pm, protesters broke the first windows of the Capitol and began climbing inside. Suspicious packages, later determined to be pipe bombs, were found outside the Republican National Committee and Democratic National Committee Headquarters between 1:30 and 2:00pm.
Around 2:20pm the Senate and House both recessed and the complex was locked down. Notably, the building was locked down almost an hour and a half after the first barrier was breached and almost a half hour after the first protesters began entering. At around 2:30pm President Trump tweeted “Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!”
Shortly before 3:00pm, protesters were led into the Senate chamber by two Capitol Policeman accompanied by Jacob Chansley aka The QAnon Shaman
They climbed on the podium, took selfies, and rifled through papers in the room. At 3:36pm White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany tweeted that President Trump ordered the National Guard to the Capitol. Just before 6:00pm, nearly five hours after the rioting started, police started to secure the Capitol and clear protesters
The slow response to the violence at the Capitol represents a multi-jurisdictional security breakdown. But the entity that is singularly tasked with protecting the Capitol complex failed to do just that on January 6, 2021.
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) was established as part of the Public Buildings Appropriations Act of 1828 “for the care, preservation, orderly keeping, and police, of those portions of the Capitol and its appurtenances, which are in the exclusive use and occupation of either House of Congress, respectively.” From an initial force of four officers, USCP has swelled to over 1,800 officers today. The USCP currently has a budget of $602.5 million and received a 20 percent increase in Fiscal Year 2022. USCP oversees a relatively small area of property given its budget, with only a few city blocks of continuous jurisdictional space, stretching from H Street to Potomac Avenue SE and from Third Street SW to Seventh St NE. Unlike most police forces, USCP is also tasked with personal protection for members of Congress in the Capitol and during travel, intelligence gathering for one of the most highly targeted institutions in the world, and operating as a protective force in addition to its policing requirements for members and staff alike. Also, unlike other police forces, USCP is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act.
A. Background on Recent Violence and Changes to USCP
Over the last three decades, political violence has shaped the USCP and its posture regarding security on the Capitol campus. The bombing in 1995 at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City led to physical security changes to Federal office buildings across the country, including House and Senate office buildings. The July 24, 1998 shooting of Officer Jacob Chestnut and Detective John Gibson in the U.S. Capitol shocked the Capitol campus.
In particular, the events of September 11, 2001, the 2001 anthrax attack, the 2011 shooting of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, and the 2017 shooting at the Republican baseball practice, led to major changes to security on and around the U.S. Capitol Complex, including legislative, administrative, and funding changes and a large increase in sworn officers. In 2002, the USCP Chief of Police was given the authority to “deputize members of the DC National Guard and duly sworn law enforcement personnel,” and the Senate Sergeant at Arms and USCP chief administrative officer were given the authority to enter into memoranda of understanding with relevant executive branch agencies to respond in case of an emergency. In 2003, the Chief was also given new permissions to increase recruiting incentives to bring in more officers. The same Act allowed:
In the ‘event of an emergency, as determined by the Capitol Police Board or in a concurrent resolution of Congress,’ the chief of the Capitol Police is authorized to appoint law enforcement officers from federal, state, and local agencies, and the armed forces (including the National Guard) to serve as Capitol Police officers.’
In 2011, Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and nineteen others were shot by Jared Lee Loughner in a politically-motivated assassination attempt, which led to a review of the USCP security protocols and raised concerns of political violence throughout the country. Concerns about member safety were renewed in 2017 when James Hodgkinson opened fire on Republicans practicing for the annual Congressional Baseball Game, resulting in serious injuries to four people, including Rep. Steve Scalise and a USCP officer.
These incidents of politically motivated violence led to a renewed emphasis on intelligence gathering, better coordination with congressional district offices and more recently, to the creation of regional USCP offices to provide better threat analysis and mitigation in coordination with other law enforcement agencies.
B. USCP Structure
USCP’s organizational structure is led by the Chief of Police. Directly under the Chief are the Chief Administrative Officer and two Assistant Chiefs: Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations and Assistant Chief of Police for Police and Uniformed Operations. There are five bureaus under the command of the two Assistant Chiefs. Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations Yogananda Pittman oversees the Protective Services Bureau (PSB) and the Security Services Bureau (SSB), while Acting Assistant Chief of Police for Police and Uniformed Operations Sean Gallagher oversees the Command and Control, Operational Services, and Uniformed Services Bureaus. The Chief Administrative Officer oversees the Training Services Bureau (TSB). Under those bureaus are 23 Divisions. PSB contains the Dignitary Protection Division (DPD), Investigations Division, and Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD).
On January 6, 2021, Steven Sund was Chief of Police. Sund held that position from 2019 until shortly after the attack on January 6, 2021, when Speaker Pelosi asked him to resign. Assistant Chief Pittman replaced Sund and became Acting Chief of Police. J. Thomas Manger became the permanent Chief of Police on July 23, 2021.
On January 6, 2021, Yogananda Pittman was the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations, and Chad Thomas was the Assistant Chief of Police for Police and Uniformed Operations. Thomas stepped down shortly after January 6. Sean Gallagher replaced Chad Thomas as Acting Assistant Chief of Police for Uniformed Operations. Assistant Chief Pittman remains in the position she held on January 6.
CAPITOL POLICE BOARD
The Capitol Police Board (the Board) consists of three voting members—House Sergeant at Arms, Senate Sergeant at Arms, and Architect of the Capitol—and the USCP Chief of Police as an ex officio, non-voting member. Each year, the Chair rotates between the two Sergeants at Arms. The Board is tasked with overseeing the operations of USCP to ensure the safety of the Capitol Complex. But unlike other police oversight bodies, the Board has an extraordinary level of involvement in the operations of USCP, including “designing, installing, and maintaining security systems for the Capitol buildings and grounds,” “setting standards for uniforms, furnishing belts and arms,” “addressing tort claims,” and until recently “designating emergency situations for the purpose of appointing special officers and accepting support services.”
The House Committee on Administration and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration oversee the Board. Following a stator change after the events of January 6, 2021, the two Committees are “authorized to jointly conduct oversight hearings of the Capitol Police Board and may request the attendance of all members of the Capitol Police Board” where all members of the Board shall attend.
The Capitol Police Board originated with the Civil Expenses Appropriations Act of 1867, when responsibility for the Capitol Police was transferred from the Commissioner of Public Buildings to the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms. Initially, the Board only consulted the Architect of the Capitol, but the Architect was later added as a formal voting member and the Board was officially recognized. The structure of the Board remained unchanged for more than one hundred years.
On January 6, 2021, Michael C. Stenger was the Senate Sergeant at Arms and Chair of the Board. He resigned the following day. Mr. Stenger was replaced by Acting Sergeant at Arms Jennifer A. Hemmingway until the current Sergeant at Arms, Karen H. Gibson, was selected.
On January 6, 2021, Paul D. Irving was the House Sergeant at Arms. He also resigned the following day. Mr. Irving was replaced by Acting Sergeant at Arms Timothy P. Blodgett until the current Sergeant at Arms, General William J. Walker, was selected. J. Brett Blanton was the Architect of the Capitol on January 6, 2021 and remains so today.
A. The Board has resisted long-standing calls for reform
In response to frustrations related to the opaqueness and bureaucracy of the Board, the House Committee on Appropriations in 2001 required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to perform an audit. The audit—which was issued in 2003—provided a measure of clarity on the Board’s innerworkings and operations. GAO recommended the Board should include the Chief of Police as a non-voting member and adopt a Manual of Procedures, among other things. The report further stated that “The continuing lack of Congressional and other key stakeholder input represents a major gap in the planning efforts’ usefulness to USCP, the Congress and others that will need to be addressed as USCP moves forward.”
At the time, the USCP indicated a willingness to implement GAO’s recommendations and to consult with outside experts to reform the Board’s governance structure. In July 2003, then Capitol Police Chief Terrance Gainer said, “Their criticisms are fair and their suggestions are solid, and we will be working with a vendor to tighten it all up.
The Board was required by the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003 to examine its mission and to assess the effectiveness and usefulness of its statutory functions. This effort culminated in a 2003 report by the Board to Congress that determined it must align with “corporate governance standards,” which broadly included accountability, transparency, and external communication. But, in a harbinger of events to come, the Board failed to implement its own recommendations.
A series of subsequent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews of the Board yielded a 2017 omnibus report, “Capitol Police Board: Fully Incorporating Leading Governance Practices Would Help Enhance Accountability, Transparency, and External Communication.” Law enforcement experts interviewed for the 2017 report described the Board’s responsibilities as “wide ranging” and “atypical.” The experts further stated that “typically, law enforcement oversight bodies focus exclusively on a narrow range of issues” that involve long-term strategic planning and budgeting, not interfering with daily operations.
The 2017 report also detailed an array of failures by the Board to implement the recommendations from its 2003 report to Congress. The GAO report recommended “the Board revise its Manual to fully incorporate leading practices, including evaluating its performance, and engage with stakeholders and incorporate their views, as appropriate, on any changes.”
The Board rejected several of GAO’s key findings and refused to make the recommended changes. In fact, the Board rejected GAO’s recommendations with respect to corporate governance as inapplicable because those recommendations were “geared towards private publicly-traded corporations” and defended the Board’s structure as “nimble” to allow the USCP to “perform their law enforcement mission with minimal hindrance.”
GAO eventually closed its recommendation related to corporate governance as unimplemented and declared the Board non-compliant, only to reinstate the recommendation following the January 6 attack. To date, the GAO recommendation is open.
B. The Board continues to operate in the dark
The Board similarly failed to address long-standing concerns about a lack of operational transparency and accountability. To date, Board meetings are closed to the public. Beginning in 2022, the Board began sending minutes of their meetings to the oversight committees, but they are months in delay.
The Board does not record how individual members vote on certain measures. More recently, members indicated the Board may begin to record its votes to come into compliance with recommendations in the 2017 GAO Report, but members of the Board were unwilling to commit to doing so during a hearing before the Committee on House Administration in May 2021. Notably, the 2017 GAO report explains that “[t]he six committee stakeholders who felt transparency could be improved said they lacked insight into the Board’s decision-making in areas where the committees have responsibilities, such as Capitol Police matters or campus-wide security.”
The Board has begun hosting a Capitol Police Board Forum where select members of their oversight entities and Congressional Leadership offices are invited to provide input and feedback to the Capitol Police Board directly.
THE U.S. HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS WAS COMPROMISED BY POLITICS AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR VIOLENCE AT THE CAPITOL.
On February 9, 2022, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi said, “I have no power over the Capitol Police.” This is false. Documents provided by the House Sergeant at Arms show how then-House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving carried out his duties in clear deference to the Speaker, her staff, and other Democratic staff. The Speaker’s statement created uncertainty and confusion with respect to the historical reporting structure for the HSAA and USCP.
House Rules dictate in several circumstances that the Sergeant at Arms (SAA) is to report directly to the Speaker of the House, including when the House is in session for, the Sergeant at Arms is to “maintain order under the direction of the Speaker and other presiding officer” and “execute the commands of the House, and all processes issued by authority thereof, directed to the Sergeant at Arms by the Speaker.
Pursuant to the House Rules and for other reasons, the Sergeant at Arms in practice serves under the direction of the Speaker. Accordingly, the Speaker and other Democratic staff routinely have meetings with the Sergeant at Arms and staff. This dynamic is not unique to this Speaker or this House Sergeant at Arms. Indeed, because the Speaker is the highestranking Constitutional Officer of the first branch of Government, this structure is neither novel nor controversial. What is novel, however, is a Speaker who denies the relationship and ignores her office’s obligation to secure the Capitol, perhaps in an effort to shift blame.
Indeed, Speaker Pelosi exercised her authority with respect to the safety and security of the House of Representatives when she directed the use of magnetometers outside the House chamber in the name of safety. She announced the use of punitive fines for Members who refused to go through the metal detectors. Similarly, she required masks in the House chamber and around the House Office Buildings.
The Speaker also exerted influence on security protocols at the Capitol related to the perimeter fence. Following January 6, 2021, the fence was quickly erected and remained up until July of that year when Congressional leaders started getting pressure to take it down. She also oversaw the fencing that was erected for a purported rally on September 18, 2021, that never materialized, and the State of the Union in March 2022.
Finally, as the highest-ranking Constitutional Officer, Pelosi used her authority to tap Retired Lieutenant General Russel Honoré to “lead an immediate review of security infrastructure, interagency processes and command and control,” following the attack at the Capitol on January 6, 2021
A. The Speaker’s office was heavily involved in planning and decision-making before and during the events of January 6, 2021, and micromanaged the Sergeant at Arms.
Consult Appendix A for a timeline that illustrates how Irving acted in deference to the Speaker and her staff, which was compiled from documents provided by current House Sergeant at Arms William J. Walker.
EARLY DEC 2020 > IRVING REMAINED IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH JAMIE FLEET, A SHARED STAFFER ON SPEAKER PELOSI’S STAFF AND THE STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, ABOUT PREPARATION FOR THE UPCOMING SWEARING-IN ON JANUARY 3, 2021, THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS ON JANUARY 6, 2021, AND THE INAUGURATION ON JANUARY 20, 2021. IRVING ALSO STAYED IN CONTACT WITH TERRI MCCULLOUGH, SPEAKER PELOSI’S CHIEF OF STAFF ABOUT THE PREPARATIONS.
DEC 8, 2020 > IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF FOR PELOSI, HOUSE ADMINISTRATION AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE WITHOUT REPUBLICAN STAFF PRESENT.
DEC 11, 2020 > MCCULLOUGH EMAILED A HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS STAFFER TO REQUEST A MEETING. THE EMAIL STATES, “[W]E HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CHOREOGRAPHY AND SAFETY FOR THE OPENING DAY AND ELECTORAL COLLEGE EVENTS. CAN WE GET TOGETHER WITH YOU AND YOUR TEAM EARLY NEXT WEEK TO MAP OUT WHAT WE THINK WE NEED GIVEN THE COMPLEXITIES PRESENTED?” THEY SCHEDULED A MEETING FOR THE FOLLOWING TUESDAY AT 10:00AM.
DEC 15, 2020 > MCCULLOUGH AND HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS TEAM MET. NO REPUBLICAN STAFF WERE PRESENT OR INVITED.
AFTER MEETING ON DEC 15, 2020 > A HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS STAFFER SENT IRVING A DRAFT “DEAR COLLEAGUE” LETTER WITH GUIDANCE ON HOUSE ACCESS TO THE CAPITOL FOR OPENING SESSION. IRVING THEN TEXTED JAMIE FLEET FOR CLARIFICATION ON WHO SHOULD REVIEW THE DEAR COLLEAGUE FROM HIS OFFICE. FLEET RESPONDED, SAYING THE INDIVIDUALS FROM THE MEETING EARLIER THAT DAY
Fig. 5: Text messages between HSAA and Speaker’s staff (Dec. 15, 2020)
________________________________________________________
Tue, Dec 15, 1:54 PM
Should we send the draft to just you (and Terri) or to the group that was on the call this am?
That group
OK, will be sent shortly
________________________________________________________
DEC 21, 2020 > IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF WITHOUT REPUBLICAN STAFF PRESENT.
JAN 3, 2021 > SERGEANT AT ARMS STAFF CIRCULATED A DRAFT DEAR COLLEAGUE WITH DETAILS FOR JANUARY 6, 2021. IN THE DRAFT, HSAA AND USCP ENCOURAGE MEMBERS AND STAFF TO ARRIVE EARLY, PARK IN GARAGES, AND USE ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO WALK THROUGH THE PROTEST AREAS. THE LETTER MENTIONS THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL POLICE ON CAMPUS THAT DAY AND PROVIDES KEY CONTACT INFORMATION.
JAN 4, 2021 > IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF WITHOUT REPUBLICAN STAFF PRESENT.
JAN 4, 2021 > JAMIE FLEET CONTACTED USCP CHIEF STEVEN SUND AND HSAA PAUL IRVING TO SET UP A MEETING WITH THEIR OFFICES AND CHAIRPERSON LOFGREN TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR JANUARY 6, 2021. THE EMAIL STATES THAT THE “BRIEF SHOULD INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF USCP STAFFING LEVELS, COORDINATION WITH OTHER DEPARTMENT, AND YOUR DETERMINATION TO EXTEND (OR NOT) THE PERIMETER AROUND THE CAPITOL.” IRVING RESPONDED, REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR REPUBLICANS TO JOIN THE BRIEFING. FLEET NEVER RESPONDED OVER TEXT.
JAN 4, 2021 > IRVING SENT THE DRAFT TO MCCULLOUGH AND FLEET AND REQUESTED “ANY EDITS, COMMENTS, OR CONCERNS.” MCCULLOUGH RESPONDED SHORTLY AFTER WITH EDITS. SHE SUGGESTED CLARIFYING PARKING AND EVENT TIMING, AND PROVIDES EDITS TO THE LANGUAGE REGARDING OFFICIAL BUSINESS VISITORS. MCCULLOUGH STATED THAT NOT ALLOWING GUESTS INTO THE CAPITOL (AS THEY PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, ACCORDING TO HER) “SENDS A MIXED SIGNAL.” LATER IN THE DAY, IRVING TEXTED FLEET, SAYING, “WE’RE MAKING TERRI [MCCULLOUGH]’S EDITS TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND IF YOU DON’T MIND, I’LL SEND IT TO YOU AND JEN [DAULBY, COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR] AS A HEADS UP, SO PLEASE ACT SURPRISED.” FLEET RESPONDED, “I’M STARTLED!”
JAN 5, 2021 > MEETING PROCEEDS WITHOUT REPUBLICAN REPRESENTATION.
JAN 5, 2021 > ANOTHER DRAFT DEAR COLLEAGUE WAS SENT FROM HSAA STAFF TO MCCULLOUGH, FOR MEMBERS AND STAFF REGARDING SECURITY CONCERNS ABOUT THE UPCOMING ELECTORAL COLLEGE COUNT. THE SERGEANT AT ARMS STAFF REQUESTED MCCULLOUGH’S FEEDBACK ON WHAT NEEDED TO BE CHANGED. MCCULLOUGH RESPONDED WITH EDITS
MORNING OF JAN 6, 2021 > IRVING AND HIS STAFF MET WITH DEMOCRATIC STAFF WITHOUT REPUBLICAN STAFF PRESENT.
JAN 6, 2021 > MCCULLOUGH CALLED IRVING 12:30 PM
12:33 PM > IRVING CALLED MCCULLOUGH
1:32 PM > FLEET MISSED A CALL FROM IRVING
1:40 PM > AFTER CHIEF SUND’S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL NATIONAL GUARD ASSISTANCE WAS DELAYED BECAUSE MR. IRVING SAID HE NEEDED TO RUN CHIEF SUND’S REQUEST FOR NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS ‘UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND,’IRVING APPROACHED MCCULLOUGH, AND OTHER STAFF MEMBERS IN THE SPEAKER’S LOBBY BEHIND THE HOUSE CHAMBER. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME MR. IRVING ASKED ABOUT PERMISSION TO SEEK SUPPORT FROM THE NATIONAL GUARD
1:49 PM > MCCULLOUGH SPOKE WITH IRVING TWICE
2:14 PM > FLEET CALLED IRVING
2:30 PM MCCULLOUGH CALLED IRVING AGAIN
As demonstrated, the HSAA had a pattern and practice of seeking and obtaining permission from the Speaker for all security decisions. This delayed the request for help from the National Guard. While McCullough passed the note to Speaker Pelosi and received her approval, doing so was not required by the Board – it had become required through years of practice. The Board could have called a meeting and issued an emergency declaration without prior approval from the Speaker. This conclusion is supported by a GAO report issued in February 2022, which states:
According to a senior Capitol Police official, the Chief of the Capitol Police was able to ask the Board to determine an emergency, and such a request could be made verbally or in writing. Per the version of section 1974 in place on January 6, 2021, the Board was not required to consult with congressional leadership to do so.
Once the Board determined that an emergency exists, the statutory language authorized the Chief of the Capitol Police to appoint officers to serve as special officers of the Capitol Police to provide law enforcement support in the policing of the Capitol complex.
The report issued by Army Lt. Gen Russel Honoré in March 2021 similarly found that the Board’s “deliberate decision-making process proved too slow and cumbersome to respond to the crisis in January, delaying requests for critical supplemental resources.”
There was also serious concern about optics leading up to and on January 6, 2021. Chief Sund testified that Irving said “optics” were the reason for not sending in the National Guard. Similarly, the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General said in a report that “MG [William J.] Walker told us while the DCNG was preparing [for a presentation on DCNG positioning on January 6], Mr. [Ryan C.] McCarthy and senior Army leaders talked about optics, and how DCNG personnel were not to be close to the Capitol.”
Later in the report, General James McConville is quoted at length, saying “the general feeling of all those involved [with approving the D.C. RFA] was that the military would have no role, and many people talked about the optics of having military at the Capitol.”
Concerns about the optics of military personnel close to the Capitol were shared by Democratic staff in the House of Representatives. On January 5, 2021, a Democratic staffer on the Legislative Branch Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee emailed Irving about the placement of National Guard troops. The Democratic staffer said, “I only ask to be ahead of any members who might question a photo or live tv shot that shows National Guard with the Capitol dome in the backdrop.”
The March 2022 GAO report states that USCP officers expressed various concerns related to the use of force at the Capitol, including “a concern with optics by leadership” and “several respondents stated that the concern with optics was related to leadership’s perception of the desires of Members of Congress."
THE U.S. HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS WAS COMPROMISED BY POLITICS AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR VIOLENCE AT THE CAPITOL.
The July 30, 2021 USCP OIG report also notes that “Several officers stated that they were deployed without all of their equipment because of ‘optics.’” Another officer explained that “at one point in the morning of January 6, they witnessed a USCP Captain ask another officer why they were wearing their helmet and carrying their PR24 baton, ordered the officer to take them off, and said it was ‘not the image we want to portray.’” Similarly, another officer told investigators, “there was a debate in [Civil Disturbance Unit] on January 6 about hard gear and ‘the officials stated there is going to be media so we don’t want you in hard gear.’”
The documents and communications show concerns about the public perception of military personnel at the Capitol and how the use of force by officers against violent protesters were well known among Irving, Democratic leadership, and USCP leadership. Those concerns diminished the capacity of USCP officers to effectively defend the Capitol and prevented the D.C. National Guard from responding to the violence at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
B. In the lead up to January 6, 2021, the House Sergeant at Arms was distracted, and the Capitol Police Board was dysfunctional.
In addition to preparing for the mounting security threats against the Joint Session on January 6, 2021, Paul Irving and his staff were involved in a number of preparations for other events, including the opening day of the 117th Congress. On December 9, 2020, Irving texted Jamie Fleet about the upcoming Member swearing-in on January 3, 2021: “Just FYI, we have a good plan for the issue you raised regarding opening day.” On December 11, 2020, the Assistant House Sergeant at Arms raised concerns with planned renovations to an alternative Chamber space on campus. The Assistant Sergeant at Arms stated:
[I]f the project were to proceed as scheduled, it would require CAO to make additional equipment purchases and install and configure it for use. This will take several weeks to months after the completion . . . . This leaves the House with no viable on-site alternate chamber option during two highly important event [sic] – Opening Day of the 117th and Joint Session for Electoral Count.
Later in the day Irving followed up to say that Jamie Fleet weighed in on the situation, agreeing that the work should be postponed. On December 15, 2021, Irving drafted the Opening Session Dear Colleague and requested input from Fleet.
In a text message exchange with a personal friend, Irving said: “when your text came in I was consumed with Opening Day and Electoral College logistics. The week of January 3 will be very challenging.
Irving was simultaneously planning for the Inauguration on January 20, 2021. Typically, the Inauguration is a heavy lift for security staff at the Capitol. It takes up significant resources and requires input from many stakeholders, especially the Chair of the Capitol Police Board, which Irving was prior to January 1, 2021. On December 18, 2020, USCP circulated an invitation to members of the Capitol Police Board to discuss the Inauguration in late January. Notably, Irving met with Chief Sund and law enforcement partners on January 5, 2021, to plan for the Inauguration.
The communications related to the aviation threat against the Capitol on January 5, 2021, show the ad hoc nature of the Board’s response to security events. Even if the various stakeholders had attempted to proceed more deliberately, they would have been stymied by a confusing web of authorities. GAO found the Capitol Police Board had to utilize “various different authorities to obtain assistance from about 2,000 personnel from outside agencies,” and they “lacked clear, detailed procedures to guide their decisions about which authority to use or the steps to follow in obtaining assistance.” The GAO also found issues with the Board’s operations are not limited to January 6, 2021. In their February 2022 report, GAO says that the Department and the Board lack “comprehensive, documented process to assess and mitigate risks,” meaning “there is no assurance that the Capitol Police and the Board are not overlooking potential security risks.”
USCP FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR THE EVENTS OF JANUARY 6, 2021
A. USCP lacks adequate equipment
USCP lacks adequate equipment to protect themselves and the Capitol from an attack like the one on January 6, 2021. This assessment is true today, as it was in various reports by the USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) and a March 2022 report by GAO. Many officers have outdated equipment, if they have any at all. In fact, according to one USCP source, many veteran officers who gave their equipment to new officers received nothing in return. For example, one Capitol Police officer testified:
Answer: When I first came on the department, they gave us full hard-squad, you know, the “turtle gear” is what we call it. So the plastic gear that you saw. When I got it issued to me, when I came on, 15 years ago, it was probably already 15 years old. Probably about seven years ago they took that equipment away from us to give to newer officers. Including the helmets, gasmasks, and every piece of equipment that went with that.
Question: What did you get when they gave it to the newer officers?
Answer: Nothing. Baseball cap. I mean, that’s pretty much our equipment now. Which I had on January 6, was nothing, was my baseball cap
USCP OIG also raised concerns about equipment deficiencies in a series of flash reports. For example, the OIG found the First Responders Unit (FRU)—responsible for the integrity of the perimeter around the Capitol buildings—“did not have the proper resources to complete its mission.” More specifically, the FRU was “not equipped with adequate less lethal weapons such as Pepper-Ball and Stinger-Ball weapon systems.” The USCP OIG found this equipment would have been helpful, “because of [its] ability to incapacitate a person or a group of people without directly escalating to lethal means” and “would be effective assisting officers when confronting violent crowds similar to the ones encountered during the events of January 6, 2021.”
Further, according to the OIG, what equipment the officers did have on January 6, 2021 was ineffective or compromised. According to the OIG’s second flash report, “officers witnessed riot shields shattering upon impact,” and crucial less-lethal weapons and munitions were not deployed because they were expired. In some cases, equipment was disregarded because USCP officers were not trained to use it. The lack of effective training is a longstanding, USCP-wide issue that contributed to confusion and dysfunction on January 6, 2021. The Office of Inspector General issued a series of flash reports—report nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7—that all describe specific concerns
These deficiencies are attributable in part to a high “officer utilization rate” and short staffing, but also because USCP has a decentralized training structure that lacks accountability to ensure training is completed. Because individual units are responsible for their own training, USCP is largely unable to track who is trained and when, and commanding officers are never held to account if training is not completed. According to information obtained by investigators, this issue has only gotten worse since January 6, 2021 because of dwindling resources. More specifically, officers are not being trained on how to use what little equipment is issued to them, and officers who move into leadership positions are not sufficiently trained to develop management skills. A USCP officer told investigators that training now occurs online, which is insufficient to prepare a police officer for real-world scenarios. USCP Chief Manger explained that the current shortage of officers limits the availability of officers to be pulled from assignments to receive training. One USCP officer testified:
Answer: [T]he baton I carried on January 6th, for instance, I got trained on in the academy. I haven't been trained on it since. So, obviously we do firearms twice a year, but that‘s about it for training on our equipment.
Question: What's your expectation of training with your baton?
Answer: Baton should be, at minimum, once a year, to every other year. I mean, it’s a piece of equipment where we could actually hurt or kill somebody with, and we’re never trained on it. We asked multiple times to be trained on it, we just were always told, never had the manpower or we just carry it. That’s pretty much what we’re told.
Question: And you were carrying that on January 6th? Answer: I not only carried it, I used it on January 6th, yes.
Question: Without any training from Capitol Police?
Answer: Not in 15 years, no.
Uniformed officers also raised concerns about the fact that certain segments of USCP leadership do not have experience in the jobs they command. A USCP source stated:
Answer: So we have different bureaus in our department. We have [Uniformed Services Bureau], which I am. We’re the uniform guys. And then we have the [Protective Services Bureau], which is the Protection. So, if you look at our regime right now, we have no upper management in the Deputy Chief position or up that has been a commander of USB. Not one. So, when it comes to our positions, which are roughly 1,200 to 1,300 officers –
Question: Out of how many?
Answer: I think we have 1,800 right now. Or less. I don’t even know what the numbers are now. But, we have someone in position who doesn’t know our job, because they’ve never commanded our job.
A shortage of officers, a lack of training, and insufficient equipment does not entirely explain the failures at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. But the documents and testimony make clear that more officers who were better equipped and trained could have effected a starkly different outcome.
Likewise, had USCP leadership and middle-management been adequately trained, USCP would have been better prepared and more capable of responding to the crisis. These vulnerabilities were well known—the USCP OIG and GAO identified these very concerns, repeatedly. Such longstanding and pervasive department-wide problems are consequences of the Capitol Police Board’s tendency to ignore recommendations from the OIG and GAO prior to January 6, 2021, among other things.
USCP INTELLIGENCE FAILURES ARE DIRECTLY TO BLAME FOR THE LACK OF PREPAREDNESS ON JANUARY 6, 2021.
Daily Intelligence Reports are sent to security leaders in the Capitol with information and analysis of relevant developments on and around the Capitol campus. Special Events Assessments focus on upcoming, high-profile events on and around the Capitol campus. USCP Leadership, the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms, and House and Senate leadership routinely consult IICD regarding upcoming events, threat alerts to the Capitol, and the threat environment more broadly. They also coordinate with relevant staff in USCP to make their intelligence operational, and they are responsible for ensuring intelligence is distributed up the chain of command. For IICD, this means passing information to the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations, the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms, and DPD.
But as the second USCP OIG flash report on the events of January 6, 2021 notes, intelligence is decentralized within the USCP. This fragmentation creates inefficiencies with respect to the distribution and consumption of intelligence products. Further, the report notes that distributing intelligence throughout the entire department was challenging before and during the events of January 6, and that guidance for IICD was “very ambiguous.”
The USCP OIG’s fifth flash report described the subsequent effect on preparation down the chain of command. In interviews conducted by the OIG, “one officer stated at one point in the morning of January 6, they witnessed a USCP Captain ask another officer why they were wearing their helmet and carrying their PR24 baton, ordered the officer to take them off, and said it was ‘not the image we want to portray.’”
A. There had not been an intelligence failure at this scale in the USCP Intelligence Division prior to the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.
During preparation for large events, IICD is typically tasked with collecting open-source intelligence about groups who may intend on causing a disruption, analyzing it, and passing it to USCP leadership so it can be operationalized.
For example, during the confirmation hearings of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, IICD relied on the expertise of their analysts and began scouring open-source social media posts of groups that are notorious for causing problems with such event. After gathering relevant intelligence, the IICD team typically designated a team lead to write an intelligence assessment that would be disseminated to Capitol Police leadership. The preparation in the lead up to the Kavanaugh hearings was illustrative. For example, one analyst described the process of gathering and disseminating the information for the Kavanaugh hearings:
We also worked on the special [event]/special permit assessments. They would come from Special Events to us and we would contact the organizer, the spokesperson and get some background information. We would look do they have a history of protesting or causing disruptions on Capitol Hill? And we would write all that up in an assessment and then send that up through our chain of command.
* * *
If we had stuff coming up during the week, we would send it out, either in email, or in assessment -- I believe we wrote an assessment . . . saying that we expected large crowds and disruptions to the confirmation hearings and, that we had a number of protests that were planned, some that were permitted. That they went through Special Events and found a permit for certain areas.
Preparation for such an event was a team effort that relied heavily on the expertise of the analysts. One analyst testified about how the information moved up and down the chain of command within IICD under then-IICD Director Norm Grahe:
Answer: Analyst would gather up, receive all the information. [They] would write up a draft of the intelligence assessment.
Answer: And then [they] would provide that to Mr. Grahe for review, and then there is a daily process. Mr. Grahe would say what they want. [They] would send him a draft. He would say, make these changes. It would come back down. So it’s a circle.
We collect information. It goes up the chains. It gets evaluated –
Question: Constantly getting updated.
Answer: Updated. There’s more questions. They say, okay. I see this information. It raises this question. And then it would be sent back down to us. And . . . they had daily meetings referencing, creating this intelligence assessment
IICD Director Norm Grahe held weekly intelligence briefings for Capitol Police leadership to include an “inspector and above meeting, and a meeting with captains and then . . . a meeting with both House and Senate Sergeant at Arms . . . to discuss . . . upcoming demonstrations and things of concern.” One IICD analyst testified:
Answer:
[The intelligence briefing] was every Tuesday, we had a weekly standing meeting in the SCIF conference room. At 10 o’clock we briefed inspectors and above. At 11 o’clock it was captains. And then at 12 o’clock it was the House and Senate Sergeant at Arms . . . .
* * *
So, we would get those people coming over and we would brief them. And it was a, death by Power Point. And I would go through, “Okay, these are the permitted events coming up for this week.“
Answer:
And then we would have them rated, whether it was going to be something of concern, if [it] was a remote possibility, or yeah, we were concerned about this. . . [W]e had the size, how many people were coming, what areas they were going to be in, what their mission statement was. So that way they understood.
Question:
In the lead up to Kavanagh, was it once a week, or did you have increased briefings?
Answer:
As we got more information, we would start sending it out ahead of time . . . .
* * *
I would think that there was an occasional email maybe the night before, saying, “Okay, we got information, this group’s going to assemble at this place.”
* * *
[Norm Grahe] had his distribution list that he would send it out to. But, if he had any questions or he wanted something clarified, he would send it back for a correction, which very rarely did I get anything back for a correction. And he would send it out to basically lieutenants and above, whoever needed that information.
Question:
And the assessments, like you said, were also rolling, they would come out when you had new information?
Answer: Yes. And I actually used to say, “Update number one . . .” and then put it on top of the previous of assessment. * * * Question: So, in the lead up to the Kavanagh hearings, how often, let’s say like the week of the hearings, how often are you sending out these assessments?
Answer: The assessment was probably sent out maybe once that week. But then we were on the phone verbally and we were, because I had various members, they would call me, the department members, . . . they would all be calling me, to say, “Do you have any more information.” And I would say, “Yeah, I was just getting ready to send this out to you guys.” And CDU, they would always call, whoever was commanding CDU would call me.
* * *
Question: And how would you grade the success of your, you know, your team, and what it was able to do at, with the Kavanagh hearings?
Answer: I think we were very successful, because the hearings were able to go on, we made almost 800 arrests that week. We were well aware of who was going to be where, what was going on, what was going to be expected, what the groups were planning. And so, our officers knew that
Grahe relied on his analysts—who are intelligence experts—to prepare the intelligence for the assessments. Grahe then sent out the assessments to USCP leaders and officers to help inform their decisions regarding how best to keep the Capitol safe. For example, one analyst testified:
Answer: [I]f I would have had a concern, which has happened numerous times, I would say, I would go to him and say, “This demonstration’s coming up and I’m having a bad feeling about it.”
Question: Right.
Answer: And he’d say, “Get me facts and I’ll go upstairs.”
Question: Okay.
Answer: And I would give him the facts, give them to him, and he would go up to the 7th floor and tell them, . . . we would sit in briefings and he would take me into some of the briefings, you know, and I could tell them, “I’m feeling bad about this because X,Y, and Z.”
Question: Right. So when he went to the 7th floor, who was he telling?
Answer: He was telling the assistant chiefs and the Chief. The upper management.
IICD prepared by constantly socializing the intelligence. Grahe and his team knew the more information USCP leadership had, the better they could prepare. That mentality also applied from the top down. The more information the analysts had, the more effective they could be at creating an intelligence assessment. A USCP source testified:
Answer: And [they] would come back into the office. We would all sit in a circle, and [analyst team lead] would say this is what came up during my meeting with Mr. Grahe. And then [analyst team lead] would send out assignments.
Question: So [they] would make sure everyone was informed on the updates, make sure that whatever was needed was assigned out, and everyone was on the same page?
Question: At what point is that then socialized with Capitol Police leadership or whoever needs to know up the chain? Is it happening the whole time?
Answer: Yes.
The analysts sought out and maintained relationships with outside agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Park Police, Washington D.C. Metro Police Department, and Secret Service. The IICD analysts kept an open line of communication with those agencies to share important information. A USCP source stated:
Between Mr. Grahe and commanders on the operational side, they were having daily side conversations through their personal connections. And so was [USCP analyst]. [USCP analyst] was with other agencies. [USCP analyst] has great relationships with Park Police, MPD, Secret Service Police. So daily conversations with all of these people. And then . . . everybody is in the know with the latest information.
Norm Grahe intended to retire after the November 2020 election and Jack Donohue and Julie Farnam were hired to replace him as the Director and Assistant Director respectively. Farnam joined just before the election and Donohue joined weeks later. In the lead up to January 6, 2021, Donohue and Farnam reported to Deputy Chief Kim Schneider, who was replaced by Sean Gallagher. Sean Gallagher reported to Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations Yogananda Pittman who reported to Chief Sund. Farnam’s only previous intelligence experience was in the Immigration Vetting Division of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because Farnam had no relevant intelligence experience, Grahe intended to remain on the job to train her. According to a USCP source who testified to investigators, Farham declined. In her new role as the assistant director of IICD, she attempted to remake the USCP.
B. Changes to the Intelligence Division after November 2020 caused the intelligence failures on January 6, 2021.
Prior to November 2020 when USCP prepared for a special event, the intelligence analysts in the open-source section worked together to gather intelligence and create an assessment for each event. The USCP Special Events section sends all permits to IICD. One analyst would typically be tapped to serve as de facto team lead. That analyst would assign work out to the team and had visibility into what each team member was working on. The team lead tracked and gathered all the information from the analysts and then prepared an intelligence assessment to send to the Special Events section to inform decisions about granting or denying the permit, and where to assign the group on the Capitol grounds. After November 2020—when Farnam took over for Norm Grahe—that process changed. The USCP OIG found that those changes left USCP worse off. According to the OIG, as of January 6, 2021, “IICD [lacked] comprehensive policies and procedures relevant to their open source intelligence gathering efforts,” and “IICD did not always include previous reporting into later assessments.”
In a May 2022, review, the USCP Inspector General found that “up until December/January 2020/2021, or possibly a little earlier, IICD was divided into an unofficial ‘Open Source Section (OSS)’ and ‘Intelligence Analysis Section (IAS),’” and that “IICD officials changed the process around that time, eliminated OSS, and made all [Intelligence Research Specialists] responsible for performing open source searches.” Even though there had not been an intelligence-based security failure prior to Farnam’s arrival, she believed the analyst team was not sufficiently performing its job. Upon her arrival, Farnam immediately began disassembling the open-source section. She described the team as “struggling with some of [the] taskings” she assigned. She testified, “I felt coming on board I had to do a lot of the analytic work myself. I’m not going to speak for Jack [Donahue], but I know the two of us did a lot of, like, the analyst type work in the beginning because the team didn’t have the capability.” The analyst team lead, however, described Farham as non-responsive and hostile to the analyst’s effort to provide support. The analyst testified:
Answer:
The special event permits would come to me, from Special Events and I would assign them out. I’d log them in and assign them out. So that way I could always tell where they were and I could go put my hands on them at any given time. . . . I would assign out a special event permit, and a half an hour later she would assign it to somebody else. So, I would send [Julie Farnam] an email and say, “You don’t have to worry about this, I take care of this, and we’ll get it done.” She never responded. In the [first] phone call [with Farnam] I was told I was insubordinate because I was explaining the process to her and no underling should ever tell a supervisory what to do.
* * *
And then I got written up over the weekend for that, because I was unprofessional and unwelcoming. So I got a 550 the following Monday morning.
Question: [Y]ou were written up because you were unwelcoming? Answer: Yes. And unprofessional.
Analysts and other USCP sources interviewed by the Committee described how the changes implemented by Farnam undermined their work. Analysts testified to investigators that the section became “nonfunctional” immediately upon Farnam’s arrival. One analyst testified that Farnam’s changes—which were not formally communicated—stripped experts out of the roles in which their experience could be leveraged. The analyst testified:
She basically didn’t come out and say, “I’m shutting out the open-source Section,” but she started assigning our taskings to other analysts upstairs, who were unfamiliar with what we did.
* * *
We have very specific lanes that we worked in, for a reason. I mean, because there’s so much one person can’t possibly keep up with everything. And we developed expertise in those areas. My expertise was with the groups that used to come up to the Hill to demonstrate all the time. I checked with their social media pages every day. I knew who the key players were. And I could tell, from experience, this is going to be a problem, or this isn’t going to be a problem.
Similarly, another analyst testified, “That unit was disbanded by her almost on day one. We, at the time of January 6, we were not doing proactive searches of social media like we had been before. We were strictly reactive and responding to requests for information.”
The analyst further stated that Farnam removed the open-source experts from the process to consolidate power for herself to the detriment of the safety and security of the Capitol. One analyst stated:
When we identified a threat, we would assess the threat and create a notification sheet and send it to the threat assessment section. But we would copy everybody in the division, so everybody had eyes on threats that were being made. And she changed that policy to say it would only be her and the director copied on the email sent to threats, not all of the analysts. So when in the lead-up to January 6, many people, many of the analysts weren’t even aware of the vitriol of threats that were coming through on social media.
Those changes had consequences. Due to the sudden changes to the structure of the opensource section, experienced analysts missed clear signs of violence and important information that indicated a threat to the Capitol. One analyst testified:
Answer: The standard procedure up to that is there would be an analyst assigned as the lead for that event, and that analyst would track the event from notification to the final assessment. And that analyst would receive all the information from the other analysts as the point person, and produce a draft assessment. And that draft assessment would go to the director. And as we mentioned before, it’s a cyclical process, going on from the time you know about it, until the final assessment. Whereas in this case, Ms. Farnham said herself was going to be the point person for the assessment. So all the information was sent to her. There was no analyst assigned to follow or track the event.
Question: What does it tell you as an expert if the same person is getting a permit for every spot around the Capitol? Would that raise a flag to you?
Answer: Absolutely.
* * *
I would point out that one of our duties in the intelligence unit is to conduct an event assessment that is predicated on the assessment permit. So special events section gets a permit. And while they are doing their job, they notify us, and we conduct an event assessment as well. And our final assessment goes back to special events section. And that would be all coordinated. Prior to that, it would come through [the analysts’ team lead]. So, if -- but in this case, it was being coordinated and everything was going through Ms. Farnham. So we had . . . no idea what permits were being applied for.
According to the analysts, Farnam regularly assigned tasks, reassigned tasks, and then locked the completed assessment files so the analysts could not access them, even as those analysts were working on the same issue. A USCP source told investigators:
She kept re-assigning things to people, different people, because that was her version of “cross-training” everybody, which she basically came in and said okay everybody up and change chairs immediately. And we became non-functional, because nobody knew what they were doing, and we had to learn the job. And we were trying to learn from the people that did it before, and it was just a lot of confusion and things were being written up in wrong formats. . . . Files were moved around. Files were re-named. There’s a locked file.
If Farnam received an assessment and was not satisfied with the final product, she rewrote it. Analysts never saw the final intelligence product. In some cases, Farnam locked the file and analysts could not access it. The final product was shared outside the division, but analysts still did not have access to the final version. One analyst stated:
The way we functioned before was, each section had our own case log, and we would put everything on there and draw the next case number. And we could easily go back and find—and it would be saved under the file name, you know, “21-O- --” we could easily go put our hands on that document. Now, we can’t put our hands on documents if we have to go back and research something. Files are constantly being moved around. Folder names are being changed all the time. So you’re always hunting for things.
The documents and testimony show that immediately upon joining the USCP, and without time to acclimate, Farnam began to dismantle the systems that had kept the Capitol safe for so long.
In fact, upon her arrival at IICD, Farnam reassigned analysts to projects outside the scope of their regular work and required analysts to perform jobs they had not been trained to do. One analyst described the breakdown of productivity. The analyst testified:
Answer: I mean, the one analyst, [USCP analyst], was told to monitor a protest and [they] had never done that before. So, [they] didn’t have a clue how to start to do that. And [they] didn’t have the accounts, the social media accounts established, to be able to monitor on social media. I mean, how functional is that? And I was getting assigned threats and things like that that I hadn’t worked on, it took me a while to knock the dust off to do that because I’d been so focused on demonstrations.
Answer: But I was one of the fortunate ones that I have kind of worked all those jobs in IICD, but some of those analysts hadn’t; they’d always been pigeon-holed. And they were being plucked out and stuffed into another chair. And it took a while to get our feet on the ground. And even now, I would say nobody’s 100 percent comfortable with their job. Because it’s constant, it’s a constantly changing environment. She’s changing forms. She’s changing names of things. She’s changing logs. It’s just a constant flux. You can’t ever get your feet on the ground, if that makes sense?
Question: And these changes began when she arrived in November?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Do you feel that the team had their feet on the ground by December, when the threats were escalating as it relates to January, or –
Answer: No, definitely not.
* * *
Because we were still being shifted around and assigned different projects and by December some of the analysts were being assigned ridiculous projects. There [were] three analysts at least that were working on an assassination project for her. They were told to research all political assassinations in the history of the world, worldwide. And I’m, when they told me that’s what they were assigned, I was like, “But that’s like a Ph.D. dissertation, that’s not an assessment document, or an intelligence document.” I said, and what is that, somebody being assassinated in 1700 in England, what does that have to do with us now? I could see if it was focused more on the U.S. political assassination attempts and things like that. But it was everything.
Question: And when was that assigned?
Answer: That was in December.
Question: And how many analysts were working on it?
Answer: Three. We had two analyst --
Question: How many analysts are there total?
Answer: I think there’s like eleven or twelve of us at that time. And one of them, it was two analysts and a light-duty officer who was functioning as an analyst. And they got 43 pages written, sent it to her for approval, and they’ve never heard anything else on that project.
Farnham discussed these “research projects.” She testified:
One of the projects was to look at assassinations and assassination attempts against elected officials because we have seen a huge surge in threats. . . . So, that information is helpful to see, you know, are there patterns . . . . So yes, there have – and there have been other projects. For example, we did an information paper on sovereign citizens.”
In the days leading up to a joint session of Congress, where every national law enforcement agency was on high alert, the head of intelligence for the USCP was assigning research papers with absolutely no nexus to the immediate threat environment.
C. Farnam undermined IICD analysts and downplayed important intelligence to USCP leadership.
During that period, IICD analysts completed a first special event assessment on December 16, 2020 and updated the assessment on three occasions to include new information. The December 16 assessment concluded there was “NO social media indications for specific threats or concerning comments directed at the Joint Session of Congress.” Analysts told investigators they were not advised about how to prepare for the imminent Joint Session until mid-December 2020. In one case, an intelligence assessment update for the event was tasked to an analyst on December 21, 2020, and the analyst only had 12 hours to complete it. The hastily prepared assessment was not published. The analyst testified:
Question: So, in the lead up to, let’s say mid-December, Capitol Police knows the Joint Session is happening. . . . In those weeks leading up to it, were you given any information?
Answer: Zero information. Zero. Even the day of, we were given zero information.
* * *
When it came time for the Joint Session, I was tasked, December 21st, to write an assessment on the Joint Session. . . . So, I did not see that until the 22nd when I logged in in the morning. I started writing it, she called me the next day, I think the next morning, and asked where the assessment was. And I said, “I’m still researching it.” She goes, “I need it by lunch time.” So, I had, basically had 12 hours to totally research this whole thing, which I would have been working on for at least a month. Totally research it and write it. And I admit that was awful assessment because I did not have the time to put into it, and research it. And I was not familiar with the subject matter.
Question: Right.
Answer: So I wrote that. As far as I know that was not published. The next week, [USCP analyst] was tasked with writing an assessment on the Joint Session. [The analyst was] not told that I had written one the previous week. But [the analyst] wrote an assessment. As far as I know, that was not published.
The next document shared by IICD was produced on December 21, 2020. The report signaled concerns about the Joint Session for the first time. The December 21 IICD Report attached a map of the tunnels of the Capitol complex that appeared online and indicated protesters could be “carrying firearms during the protest” and could “confront members of Congress.” Senate Committee investigators interviewed Yogananda Pittman, who was serving as Assistant Chief in charge of the Protective Intelligence Operation on January 6, 2021.
According to the Senate Report, “The December 21 IICD [intelligence] Report attached a map of the Capitol campus that was posted to the blog and noted: ‘several comments promote confronting members of Congress and carrying firearms during the protest.’”
This report was labeled 21-TD-159. Pittman told Senate investigators, “this report was distributed only to “command staff,” including the deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs.” Capitol police officers—according to Pittman—would have received that report. But USCP sources testified to investigators they never saw it, and never received it. According to the officers, Pittman lied to Senate investigators. One USCP source testified:
Answer: And everybody, every deputy chief, knew they didn’t get this email and that everybody had been lied to. So, like I said, that’s when people started like, did you get that? No. Did you get it? And they’re like, no.
Question: So you’ve confirmed with everyone that no one got that email? Answer: One hundred percent. Yeah. Everybody’s certain of that
Additionally, Farnam confirmed in her interview with investigators that the report was not shared with officers. A whistleblower similarly told House and Senate leaders that Pittman lied about whether her officers were prepared in advance for the brutality they faced on January 6. A USCP source told investigators that the entire USCP force acknowledges that Pittman did not testify truthfully to the Senate, and accordingly it will be difficult to trust her to lead and protect the rank-and-file.
IICD sent out several additional assessments after December 21, most of which were reproductions of previous information that did not indicate violence was a concern. The final Special Assessment was shared on January 3, 2021. This was the first assessment that mentioned Congress was the target of violence. The document, however, did not include that important fact in the “Bottom Line Up Front” portion on the first page, but rather buried it toward the end of the fifteen-page assessment.
Regarding the placement of that key portion of the assessment, the USCP Inspector General found, if one “does not read the [January 3 Special Assessment] in its entirety, they could draw an inaccurate conclusion since the [Bottom Line Up Front section] is not consistent with the rest of the document.” Jack Donohue and Julie Farnam tasked two analysts to write the final Special Assessment. Throughout mid to late-December, they drafted three versions and received edits from Donohue. The portion that stated Congress was the target of violence, however, was written by Farnam. The source of the intelligence that led Farnam to conclude the Capitol was a target is unclear. Indeed, Farnam testified that she drafted the final assessment.
The documents and testimony create the appearance that Farnam used the work of the analysts to cobble together the assessment to send to USCP leadership. One analyst described the process of writing the assessment during an interview with investigators. The analysts testified:
Answer: January 3rd, Julie [Farnam] writes the assessment. She took a little bit from mine, basically talking about how the Joint Session would work, the background, and the list of demonstrations that I’d found at that point, and she put that in there. And she took a little bit from [the other analyst’s]. And she composed the assessment that was published prior to 1/6, I think it was the 3rd or the 4th. And she put the BLUF in there, the bottom line up front, that did not say anything about violence. I, we didn’t get that until I would say, either late on the 4th or the 5th, when Jack Donohue sent it to us, after it had been published to other people
Question: So, you’re saying that her threat assessment that she sent out on the 3rd, was sent to you by Jack Donohue on the 4th or the 5th? Answer: Yes. Question: And did it include threats, possible violence in that version? Answer: It was the version that everybody’s talking about. I did not, when I read that document, and I’ve talked to the other analysts, they had the same impression from me, that that document tell anybody that it was, to expect violence that we experienced. There was nothing in there.
Answer: When I wrote my first assessment and I had all these demonstrations listed, she came back to me and said, “Well, these are all different groups, but there’s probably only going to be five, so we only need to be concerned about five demonstrations.” I said, “Those 40 demonstrations are people coming from all over the country, that tells us something, that’s important to know that we have 5 people coming from Alaska, and 20 people for Minnesota, and 500 coming from Maryland,” and that’s important information, and she did not see it that way. She just thought it’s five main demonstrations and these other groups are just going to join in those. I disagreed, but, like I said, she never really published [my version of the assessment] with her list, she copied and pasted, I believe, some of it, into the assessment.
On this issue, Farnam testified she was not concerned about the permits because “COVID protocols” only allowed 50 people per permit. This statement shows a staggering lack of awareness and concern, especially in light of more than a year of massive protests throughout the country where “COVID protocols” were ignored. Farnam testified that she and her team do not bear responsibility for what happened on January 6, 2021. She said “[IICD] provided leadership with information that it was going to be violent, that Congress was going to be targeted, that extremists would be there, that there were going to be thousands of protesters, and that intelligence was not operationalized.”
Farnam is relying on the portion of the January 3 Special Event Assessment that she sent up the chain of command that included the lines: “protestors have indicated they plan to be armed” and that “Unlike previous protests . . . Congress itself is the target on the 6th.” However, there was no relevant or underlying information along these lines in prior assessments, nor in three subsequent Daily Intelligence Reports. Farnam admitted she should “have given those reports more attention on January 4, 5, and 6.”
But Farnam also testified that concerns about the possibility of violence during the Joint Session developed much earlier, to late December. She stated:
Because remember, you know, the MAGA 2 March was December 12th, and so January 6 wasn’t even a thing until after December 12th. I didn’t learn of it until, you know, mid-December sometime, and it wasn’t until we got closer to the end part of December right around the holidays that we really started to see things pick up
Farnam’s testimony about the timeline of her concerns about the possibility of violence at the Capitol during the Joint Session is contradictory and alarming. The Joint Session to count the electoral votes was the focus of much national news in the weeks leading up to January 6, 2021. The Joint Session is a constitutionally mandated process; even under normal circumstances, the USCP’s preparation for a joint session of Congress should be a high priority for the department’s chief intelligence officer far in advance of the event. Farnam testified the first indicators of violence came around December 21, 2020. She stated, “around that time is when we started to see more worrisome intelligence coming in.” Farnam appears to be referencing the December 21 IICD report that mentioned the Capitol tunnels and the likelihood that protesters could be armed. But, according to her testimony, those concerns were neutralized by her confidence that COVID protocols only allowed 50 people per permit. Farnam further testified that she learned there would be thousands of people at the Ellipse rally and the Freedom Plaza rally around mid to late December. Even that information did not seem to register with Farnam, in terms of the heightened potential for violence during the Joint Session. Farnam testified that, even after learning about the larger-than-expected rallies in mid to late December, she did not develop concerns until “right around the new year.” She stated:
Question: You also told CBS you said, “I knew things were not going to be good that day.” Did you know that on January 3rd? Did you know that December 21st?
Question: When did you know things were going to be bad?
Answer: I’d say right around the new year.
So, while experienced and tenured analysts were alerting Farnam to the need to consider the fact that multiple events were coalescing in the vicinity of the Capitol, Farnam continued to incorporate “COVID protocols” into her overall threat assessment. The results were catastrophic.
While Farnam stated in a televised interview with CBS as a part of an anniversary special that she “knew things were not going to be good that day,” the day before the Joint Session, the entire team of intelligence officers of the USCP attended a mandatory training. When pressed about why she would send her staff to a training when she knew there could be violence the next day, she responded, “because the violence wasn’t happening on the 5th.” That day, the FBI’s Norfolk Field Office shared a Situational Information Report regarding online discussions of potential violence at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. One analyst described how USCP failed to register the FBI’s warning. The analyst testified:
We were so fragmented and nobody was really focused on that. If this would have been under a previous manager, Norm, it would have been all hands on deck as soon as we got inklings that there was going to be violence everybody would have been working on it, that would have been our focus. Instead we were being fragmented and moved around, so, yes, I could see where that information did not make it to the officers. . . . [W]hatever information they passed to Julie was not passed to us. We didn’t know about that information from the Norfolk office until after the event when it came out in the press is when we learned about it.
Such failures had consequences department-wide. The fifth USCP OIG flash report stated:
Many of the officers interviewed stated they received very little or no intelligence about events planned for January 6, 2021, or that it would be any different than previous MAGA events. For example, one officer stated they did not receive any intelligence that day and that social media was a better source of information because it forecasted the intensity and the number of people.
The documents and testimony show the abrupt changes to the processes for gathering and disseminating intelligence within IICD and USCP in late 2020 were counterproductive and ill-conceived in advance of a high-profile event. The processes that Farnam inherited had kept the Capitol safe for years. Farnam’s decision to overhaul the intelligence division amidst mounting evidence that various groups intended to direct violence at the Capitol during the upcoming Joint Session left the USCP under-prepared to perform its mission.
D. IICD leadership reorganized the division to gather more intelligence on Members of Congress, staff, and constituents to the detriment of preparing for the Joint Session.
One of IICD’s responsibilities is to produce Congressional Event Assessments (CEAs), which are assessments requested by the Dignitary Protection Division, Members of Congress, or House or Senate Sergeants at Arms. These assessments are specific to events that Members hold in their district or events outside of Washington, D.C. that they wish to have reviewed by USCP analysts. Julie Farnam overhauled the protocols for CEAs. Analysts interviewed for this investigation explained that a Member of Congress is encouraged to submit a list of all participants and the location of the event to the Sergeant at Arms. The Sergeant at Arms then transfers that information to IICD to run a check.
This check, also known as LECOR (Law Enforcement Coordination), is an open-source check on all the names provided by the Member of Congress via the Sergeant at Arms. Analysts assessed any derogatory information identified during the LECOR. USCP Chief Manager testified that USCP does not run record checks or criminal history checks.
He stated: “if there is nothing derogatory or nothing of concern, the information is not kept. If it—if there is something of concern, it’s put in the assessment.” House Sergeant at Arms William Walker also testified about the process for vetting the people who meet with Members of Congress.
He stated: You’re going to -- you name the place. You’re going to meet with people there. Who’s going to be there? Are they predisposed to violence? Do they have a criminal history? Are they violent? Do they have -- are they somebody that’s made a threat against you? Just want to understand who’s around you.
One analyst, however, described the process in more specific terms. The analyst testified that USCP also ran checks on Members of Congress and Senators, congressional staff, and donors. The analyst stated:
Answer: If we, when the form that we get from the Sergeant of Arms House or Senate, if they list Members that are, and other Members that are attending, staffers that may be attending, who they’re meeting with. If there’s names in there, we have to research them, and we have to go back and see -- look at their social media accounts. As an example, this summer I had numerous meetings. [Republican Senator], he was meeting with donors, and I had to background the donors. I had to go and look at their social media accounts, which most of them were elderly and didn’t have social media accounts
Question: Right.
Answer: I had to look at their residence. I had to see who owned the residence and where it was located. And most of them, they know, the Members know where they’re going.
In response to questions about researching a donor’s house, Walker testified: “I would hope a Member would want to know who has proximity to him, who’s within arm’s reach, who can reach out and cause alarm. I would hope.” But Walker did not answer whether Members knew that USCP was conducting such research on the people whose names they submitted to the Sergeant at Arms.
According to a copy of the template that Farnam created, analysts were directed to review the people meeting privately and publicly with members, and to describe “the backgrounds of the participants (other than [Members of Congress]) and attendees, if known.” Indeed, the security value of such research is further undermined by the fact that the resultant case file was not reviewed by Dignitary Protection agents. A USCP source testified:
Question: So, these new requirements, did Ms. Farnam create a form so that you have to basically fill it out, so you’re asked the same questions from every person, or how would these instructions relate to you?
Answer: She made a new form, and she sent it out, and it was, it would have the heading and she would put in parentheses what to put in there.
Question: So the form gets filled out. You do the work that is requested of you, and you send it up. And, you don’t know what happens to it next, is that fair?
Answer: No. That’s fair.
Question: And so how do you learn about whether or not all the information you’ve gathered and all this work that you’ve done is going to somewhere useful, or if it’s going into a file or a somewhere else?
Answer: Word of mouth.
Question: Word of mouth. And so, have you heard instances in which you know you did a big project on an event and then later you learned that the people who were actually working that event didn’t ever have the benefit of your work?
Answer: Yes, we’ve heard back from some of the DPD agents, the Dignitary Protection agents, that they have not seen what we wrote. So, it, I don’t know where this information’s going, and I feel like we’re almost spinning our wheels
If the information collected against private citizens exercising their constitutional rights with respect to meeting Members of Congress is not in fact used for security purposes by the officers responsible for securing those meetings, then the purpose of the program and the scope of the information collected needs to be reviewed. Similar concerns were covered in a January 2022 story in Politico, which stated:
“As a general practice Farman directed analysts to search for information about the events attendees, including donors and staff, “that wold cast a negative light” according to one person familiar with the workings of the departments intelligence office. This included searching for information about mayors, Hill staff, and state legislators.”
__________________________________________________________
On January 25, 2022, Republicans wrote a letter to the Capitol Police Board, demanding answers on these allegations. Chief Manger responded on January 27 in a letter detailing IICD’s processes and asked the USCP OIG “to review the USCP’s programs related to these security assessments . . . ” It is important to note that the USCP OIG as a matter of course does not review claims made by media outlets—it only reviews those by whistleblowers, Congressional stakeholders, or the USCP Chief of Police.
This is reflected in the USCP OIG’s May 2022 report on IICD, which does not address the claims in the Politico article. The report states in the methodology section that OIG “could not benchmark IICD processes and procedures against other protective agencies’ processes,” meaning the report fails to address the key allegations at stake in this matter. The specific constitutional and civil liberties concerns raised in the Politico story therefore remain unresolved by USCP and unaddressed by the USCP OIG, and they are reaffirmed by this investigation.
E. USCP leadership doubled down on their failed management approach and retaliated against officers and analysts who raised concerns.
Since the analysts in the open-source section came forward to speak with investigators and filed official complaints with the USCP Office of Inspector General, they have been retaliated against and, in some cases been terminated. For example, one analyst testified that he was asked to participate in the Select Committee’s investigation by USCP, and then written up for participating. He testified:
Answer: I was contacted by [Capitol Police attorney]. And she was the one who notified me that the January 6 Committee was interested in conducting an interview. She asked for some available times, and she was the one who actually scheduled the interview. In my response to her I requested that, you know, Capitol Police . . . not be present for the interview due to my complaints of ongoing retaliation, discrimination, harassment by my supervisor, Ms. Farnam. She said that was fine. I conducted the interview with the January 6 Committee. There was no Capitol Police presence.
Answer: I found out on Monday in speaking with [Capitol Police attorney] that she had contacted Ms. Farnam about my meeting with the committee. She would not say what they talked about. And then when I pressed her and asked about my request not to notify my supervisor because of ongoing retaliation, she said that -- she said, I cannot make demands of the Inspector General. I said, of course not. I understand. I am making a request. Can you just acknowledge if my request will be upheld or not? And her comment was that she cannot speak anymore about my request for the Capitol Police not to be notified.
Question: Did she give you a reason why she notified Ms. Farnam?
Answer: She did not. She said she could not talk about her conversation at all other than she had a conversation. A few hours after that, I was contacted by Ms. Farnam, and we had a teleconference where she issued me a CP-550, which is an administrative document. In the document, she cited mismanagement of my time and prioritization of resource -- of casework. Because during the day, she had given me two assessments to complete. But due to my two-and-a-half hours with the interview, I was only able to complete one assessment. So that was her justification for issuing me the administrative write-up.
Analysts testified that Farnam intentionally created a toxic environment. According to witnesses, Farnam’s strategy was to “create stress” in order to assess the adaptability and resilience of IICD analysts. One analyst testified:
Answer: She also said that she wanted to create stress, and so she could evaluate the adaptability of the analysts. Yet she has put in an email that there was a method to her madness, as she put it. Those are her words. That she wanted to see which analysts could adapt to new and difficult assignments.
Question: So she told you that she intentionally created stress to see if you were able to adapt under stressful situations?
Answer: Yes. She said this in an all-hands-on teleconference with everybody in the division. Because we had been sending so many complaints to our supervisors. Inspector Schneider was also on the call, and Chief Gallagher was on the call, and they, you know --
Question: Which are her supervisors, correct?
Answer: Correct. And they were on the call because they had been receiving so many complaints of us just gross mismanagement. We were essentially -- the military term is combat ineffective. We were not able to properly perform our jobs under the current conditions.
In response to this testimony, Chief Manger stated: “Well, certainly that’s not the way I would want a supervisor to conduct their day-to-day activities.” Manger also stated that he would not tolerate retaliation: “I will not tolerate people being mistreated, discriminated against, retaliated against. I have been doing this a long time. And there is -- there are times when I have, in fact, taken action because I felt that someone was mistreated or someone was retaliated against. I won’t tolerate it.” But in consideration of Farnam’s endeavor to disassemble the open-source section of IICD, reassign analysts to new tasks they were not trained to do, and purposefully create a stressful environment, Manger remained satisfied with the department’s direction. He said:
Answer: We are far and away much better. . . . I am not kept up at night by, oh, my God, could this -- you know, could intelligence be the problem again? We need to stay on top of it. Make no mistake. It’s not like I don’t think about it. I do. But I know that with the improvements we have made, that these improvements will be sustained for years to come.
Question: Okay. So it’s safe to say that you are satisfied with the changes that have been made in intelligence?
Answer: We are far and away much better. . . . I am not kept up at night by, oh, my God, could this -- you know, could intelligence be the problem again? We need to stay on top of it. Make no mistake. It’s not like I don’t think about it. I do. But I know that with the improvements we have made, that these improvements will be sustained for years to come.
Answer: There is more work to be -- yes, I am.
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The analyst sources who testified and assisted this investigation were subsequently separated from the USCP.
F. USCP is withholding an internal report that confirmed many of the concerns raised by analysts and officers who testified to investigators.
U.S. Capitol Police completed its After-Action Report on June 4, 2021.
Notably, this report was not shared with the Capitol Police Board and was only shared with the USCP Inspector General after he concluded his investigation. Further, USCP has not officially provided the After-Action Report to either Republicans or Democrats on the Committee on House Administration despite bipartisan requests, and they have yet even to inform the Committee that the After-Action Report is complete as of the writing of this report. The After-Action Report made several findings related to the Intelligence Division that align with the testimony of analysts who participated in this investigation. The AfterAction report was provided to investigators through concerned whistleblowers. The findings state:
1. Intelligence products must be updated and disseminated for appropriate planning and officer readiness.
2. Individuals with the most experience extrapolating open source material were not tasked with reviewing social media to glean intel related to the even.
3. IICD was urged in an email, to be sure that the Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF) was on all their documents.
4.This is put into an assessment to express urgency or concerns. The intelligence briefing that Hazardous Incident Response Division (HIRD) received differed from the official intelligence reports, causing confusion in preparation, postings, and overall response at the Capitol.
5. Minimal updates were provided by units in the field assigned to monitor demonstration activity prior to the arrival on U.S. Capitol Grounds.
The findings make clear that USCP’s After-Action Report confirmed what several analysts shared during transcribed interviews with investigators and tends to confirm the department’s dysfunction under the management of Julie Farnam. Farnam ignored these findings and the analysts who raised concerns were terminated by USCP.
This investigation found that the events of January 6, 2021 revealed structural and operational failures by the Capitol Police Board. To prevent a similar situation from happening again, and to ensure USCP is prepared to respond in case it does, it is imperative that Congress embraces the original intent of the Board: the separation of security decisions from politics. For that reason, the Board’s structure must be reformed. To do so effectively, distance must be created between congressional leadership and USCP so law enforcement and intelligence experts are making security decisions, not politicians. The Board must also demonstrate a commitment to functioning as an oversight entity, not an entity carrying out the partisan demands of the Speaker. The Board needs to drive transparency and accountability at USCP through proactive oversight with long-term objectives in mind, rather than taking a passive and opaque role beholden to the political winds of the day. The recommendations made below are intended to acknowledge the important role the Board plays, the structural failures that contributed to January 6, and the path forward for Capitol security.
A. Make the Capitol Police Board more transparent
There are necessary changes unrelated to the Board’s structure that must be made to ensure transparency and accountability at USCP and the Board. These changes could take place with or without changes to the Board’s structure to correct longstanding issues.
COMPEL THE BOARD TO SEND MEETING MINUTES TO THE RELEVANT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES
Require more consistency and timeliness from the Board in communication and sending meeting minutes to oversight entities - There has been a consistent lack of transparency from the Board regarding security decisions, recommendation implementation, timelines, and other oversight related requests. Due to pressure from House Republicans, the Board has taken steps to improve transparency, including providing the oversight committees copies of their Manual of Procedures, the Board’s monthly meeting minutes, and creating the Capitol Police Board Fora.
To increase oversight and accountability, it is important that the Board submit minutes to the House Committee on House Administration, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and House and Senate leadership offices in a consistent and timely manner.
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR THE CAPITOL POLICE BOARD TO PROFESSIONALIZE ITS SUPPORT STAFF
Administrative functions of the Board are often conducted by borrowed staff from the House Sergeant at Arms and Architect of the Capitol offices, used to supplement the needs of Board members. It is important to consider providing additional executive staff specifically to serve the Board to professionalize the Board’s functions, establish clear points of contacts, and ensure proper documentation and record keeping. There should also be consideration for more staff on the oversight committees with experience in policing and protective forces. The Board should also be compelled to meet before either committee at the call of the Chair. It is important that these committees have the resources to attract experienced security analysts capable of overseeing USCP and the Board. This will also inspire confidence from the Board in the expertise of the relevant oversight entities. Despite a statutory change after the events of January 6, 2021 requiring this to occur every Congress, no oversight hearing has been scheduled by the Democrat-majorities in the House or Senate.
CLEARLY DEFINE AND LIMIT THE BOARD’S AUTHORITY
The Board’s structure and responsibilities are an “anomaly” relative to peer security entities, according to the 2017 GAO report. The Board’s direct role in the day-to-day operations of the USCP hinders USCP’s mission and, as witnessed on January 6, dangerously handicaps USCP’s function. The Board’s focus should be limited to longterm strategic thinking and overseeing USCP’s budget. The Board also needs to prioritize its oversight responsibilities in relation to tracking and implementing the USCP IG’s recommendations.
MAKE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENT FROM THE BOARD
The USCP IG has testified before CHA four times since January 6, 2021. Though thorough in his investigations of the security shortcomings on January 6, the IG is limited and conflicted in his oversight role of the Board. His refusal to answer basic questions about the Board’s responsibilities and operations demonstrates that the IG is not able to conduct audits of the security posture of the Capitol when the Board holds much of the decision-making responsibilities and directs the actions of the IG. For this reason, we recommend that the authority to hire and remove the USCP IG be shifted to the relevant oversight committees, with three-fourths of the Chairs and Ranking Members of those committees sufficient to approve any personnel actions. The Inspector General’s budget should also be independent from the Board.
B. Reform the structure of the Capitol Police Board
The structure of the Board needs to change. It cannot be left to the two Sergeants at Arms to make all security decisions for the Board. Adding members from outside of the USCP and of the political chain of command would ensure less political influence and introduce new perspectives to USCP and the Board. Further, the Board needs to shift away from making day-to-day management decisions for USCP to overseeing its operations and ensuring coordination between various stakeholders, both on and off the Hill.
ADD TWO NEW MEMBERS TO THE CAPITOL POLICE BOARD
Two new members should be added to the Board whose full-time job will be oversight of USCP, long-term strategic planning, and identifying industry best practices. These new members should be appointed to staggered terms of four years. The appointing authorities should prioritize members with pre-existing relationships at relevant Executive Branch departments, including the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice, who can facilitate a direct line to those departments in circumstances like those on January 6, 2021. Prior experience as either a chief of police, police commissioner, or security director of a prominent state or federal protection agency should also be prioritized. Given its hybrid nature, USCP would benefit from protective and policing experience on the Board.
REPLACE THE CHIEF OF POLICE WITH THE COMMISSIONER ON THE BOARD
Currently, the chief of police’s role on the Board creates a conflict of interest. They are tasked with overseeing the department of which they are in charge. This position should be replaced by the newly installed commissioner who will liaise with the Board and the chief of police to inform the oversight goals of the Board. It will also make a clear division of oversight between the Board and the Department.
Read original report at this link":
https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2022 12/FINAL%20Report%20of%20Investigation.pdf