“How strangely will the Tools of a Tyrant pervert the plain Meaning of Words!” ― Samuel Adams
The Statutory Rape of the Constitution
Any statute or executive order that is beyond or violates the terms of the Constitution is automatically null and void.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States.
The First Amendment
Congress make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting its free exercise. It protects freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and the right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
(Public Law 235 of July 26, 1947; 61 STAT. 496)
An Act To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Short Title That this Act may be cited as the “National Security Act of 1947”.
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/national-security-act-of-1947
Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In Katz v. United States,1 Justice Byron White sought to preserve for a future case the possibility that in national security cases electronic surveillance upon the authorization of the President or the Attorney General could be permissible without prior judicial approval.2 The Executive Branch then asserted the power to wiretap and to bug in two types of national security situations, against domestic subversion and against foreign intelligence operations, first basing its authority on a theory of inherent presidential power and then in the Supreme Court withdrawing to the argument that such surveillance was a reasonable search and seizure and therefore valid under the Fourth Amendment. Unanimously, the Court held that at least in cases of domestic subversive investigations, compliance with the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment was required.3 Whether or not a search was reasonable, wrote Justice Lewis Powell for the Court, was a question which derived much of its answer from the warrant clause; except in a few narrowly circumscribed classes of situations, only those searches conducted pursuant to warrants were reasonable. The Government’s duty to preserve the national security did not override the guarantee that before government could invade the privacy of its citizens it must present to a neutral magistrate evidence sufficient to support issuance of a warrant authorizing that invasion of privacy.4 This protection was even more needed in national security cases than in cases of ordinary crime, the Justice continued, because the tendency of government so often is to regard opponents of its policies as a threat and hence to tread in areas protected by the First Amendment as well as by the Fourth.5 Rejected also was the argument that courts could not appreciate the intricacies of investigations in the area of national security or preserve the secrecy which is required.6
The question of the scope of the President’s constitutional powers, if any, remains judicially unsettled.7 Congress has acted, however, providing for a special court to hear requests for warrants for electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence situations, and permitting the President to authorize warrantless surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information provided that the communications to be monitored are exclusively between or among foreign powers and there is no substantial likelihood any United States person will be overheard.8
Footnotes
Jump to essay-1389 U.S. 347, 363–64 (1967) (concurring opinion). Justices William O. Douglas and William William Brennan rejected the suggestion. Id. at 359–60 (concurring opinion). When it enacted its 1968 electronic surveillance statute, Congress alluded to the problem in ambiguous fashion, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), which the Court subsequently interpreted as having expressed no congressional position at all. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302–08 (1972).
Jump to essay-2See also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (
[O]ur opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.
).
Jump to essay-3United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred in the result and Justice Byron White concurred on the ground that the 1968 law required a warrant in this case, and therefore did not reach the constitutional issue. Id. at 340. Justice William Rehnquist did not participate. Justice Lewis Powell carefully noted that the case required
no judgment on the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country.
Id. at 308.
Jump to essay-4The case contains a clear suggestion that the Court would approve a congressional provision for a different standard of probable cause in national security cases.
We recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’ The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of crimes specified in Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government’s preparedness for some future crisis or emergency. . . . Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen right deserving protection. . . . It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases. . . .
407 U.S. at 322–23.
Jump to essay-5407 U.S. at 313–24.
Jump to essay-6407 U.S. at 320.
Jump to essay-7See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), appeal after remand, 565 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977), on remand, 444 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Truong Ding Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), after remand, 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1981); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Jump to essay-8Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1797, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811. See United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding constitutionality of disclosure restrictions in Act).
National Security
By Ojan Aryanfard
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1134/national-security
Despite the absolute language of the First Amendment, wars, threats of wars, and perceived risks to national security have prompted the government to, at times, restrict freedom of speech and other First Amendment freedoms throughout U.S. history.
Sedition Act is an example of a freedom restriction for the sake of national security
A prime example is the legislation passed only seven years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, in 1791. In 1798 the Federalist Congress, fearful of an impending, full-blown war with France, adopted the Sedition Act, which attempted to stifle any speech that criticized the president, who was conducting an undeclared conflict with France at sea. The Federalist Party justified the Sedition Act as a measure needed to prevent threats to national security from within the country.
Other wars have seen First Amendment restrictions to protect national security interests
During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in some parts of the North, especially those that were unstable, and the Confederate government acted in a similar fashion.
World War I saw the adoption of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, which led to the first Supreme Court decisions, among them Schenck v. United States (1919) and Abrams v. United States (1919), that punished political dissidents because their speech allegedly presented a clear and present danger to national security and war efforts.
During World War II, the government incarcerated Japanese Americans. That war and the Cold War that followed spurred adoption of the Smith Act (making it illegal to call for the overthrow of the U.S. government), intrusive congressional investigations into personal beliefs and associations, and other efforts to suppress domestic Communism.
The prolonged U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and its high death toll prompted the eruption of protests nationwide, along with efforts to suppress them. Such issues were rekindled in the aftermath of the al-Qaida attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. responses to those events.
The Supreme Court has examined whether government can restrict speech to further national security
Periodically, the Supreme Court has examined whether the government can restrict speech to further the compelling interests of national security. In doing so, the Court has recognized that national security, as a governmental interest, does justify restrictions on First Amendment rights. In the landmark free press decision Near v. Minnesota (1931), the Court established a general rule against prior restraints on expression. However, the Court did note that the government could shut down a newspaper if it published military secrets: “No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”
Nevertheless, the government must provide proof that national security interests really are in play—that is, the government cannot simply use national security as a blank check to sidestep constitutional challenges. In New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), the majority of the Court rejected the government’s national security justifications for attempting to prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the Pentagon Papers, the top-secret history of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. In his concurring opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black explained that “the word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.”
War on Terror led to debate over the balance of liberty and security
The War on Terror that commenced after the September 11 attacks on the United States brought into focus the debate over national security and the proper balance between liberty and security. One controversy arose over certain provisions of the USA Patriot Act, which Congress passed forty-five days after the attacks, especially the widespread use by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of national security letters (NSLs) under Section 505 of the act.
A national security letter is an administrative subpoena instrument used by the FBI to compel recipients of the letter to comply with requests for various data and records on the person who is the subject of the subpoena. This instrument requires no probable cause or judicial oversight. It also contains a gag order preventing recipients from even acknowledging they have received an NSL. A 2007 Department of Justice audit revealed that in 2005, 47,221 requests applicable to 18,000 people were issued. Similar numbers were posted for 2003 and 2004.
"Secret evidence" is a questionable instrument used by the government in national security cases
“Secret evidence” is another questionable instrument sometimes favored by the government, especially in immigration cases. In 2003 Sami al-Arian, a tenured professor of computer engineering at the University of South Florida, was arrested, based on secret evidence, for his alleged ties to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The al-Arian case caused an uproar within academia because of its free speech and free association implications as well as his termination from his academic posting.
Despite the credible nature of the charges against him, several prominent academicians came to al-Arian’s defense, demanding an inquiry and reinstatement. Al-Arian was charged with seventeen separate counts, but as part of a plea agreement, he was convicted on one count of conspiracy and sentenced to nineteen months in jail beyond the fifty seven months already served. Al-Arian admitted that he had raised funds for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
"Outing" intelligence operatives is a controversial national security issue
Yet another national security issue that continues to generate controversy is the published “outings” of known intelligence operatives. The best-known case is that of career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative Philip Agee.
Agee served in Latin America but became disaffected by the CIA’s role there. He left the agency in 1968, a self-avowed socialist. In the 1970s, Agee published Inside the Company in which he named over 250 operatives and assets for the CIA in Latin America. In 1974 he announced a campaign against the CIA.
In response to Agee’s activities, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. revoked Agee’s passport. Agee countered by charging that his right to criticize the government under the First Amendment had been infringed by Secretary Haig’s action. In its 7-2 decision in Haig v. Agee (1981), written by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Supreme Court disagreed. Justices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall dissented.
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA) of 1982 was drafted in the wake of the disclosures made in part by Philip Agee and the assassination of CIA Station Chief Richard Welch by the Greek terrorist group 17 November after his identity was revealed in the magazine Counter-Spy. The IIPA has been invoked twice since its passage: in the 1985 case of CIA operative Sharon Scranage, the only person convicted thus far under the IIPA, and most recently in the Valerie Plame affair.
In 2003 newspaper columnist Robert Novak publicly revealed that Valerie Plame, the wife of Ambassador Joseph Wilson, a vociferous critic of the George W. Bush administration and the prewar intelligence on Iraq, was a nonofficial cover operative of the CIA. Later, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the former chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, was indicted by Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald under the IIPA for disclosing Plame’s name to journalists, who, in turn, disclosed her identity to the American public. On March 6, 2007, Libby was convicted on four counts of perjury and obstruction of justice. However, in the end he was not convicted under the IIPA.
Ultimately, policy makers are responsible for maintaining the delicate balance between the First Amendment and national security—a balance with which society continues to struggle in an age of international terrorism.
__________________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS -ACLU
The National Security Letter provision of the Patriot Act radically expanded the FBI's authority to demand personal customer records from Internet Service Providers, financial institutions and credit companies without prior court approval.
Through NSLs the FBI can compile vast dossiers about innocent people and obtain sensitive information such as the web sites a person visits, a list of e-mail addresses with which a person has corresponded, or even unmask the identity of a person who has posted anonymous speech on a political website. The provision also allows the FBI to forbid or "gag" anyone who receives an NSL from telling anyone about the record demand. Since the Patriot Act was authorized in 2001, further relaxing restrictions on the FBI's use of the power, the number of NSLs issued has seen an astronomical increase. The Justice Department's Inspector General has reported that between 2003 and 2006, the FBI issued nearly 200,000 NSLs. The inspector General has also found serious FBI abuses of the NSL power.
The ACLU has challenged this Patriot Act statute in court in three cases.
The first such lawsuit, Doe v. Holder, which resulted in numerous court rulings finding parts of the NSL statute unconstitutional, was settled in August 2010. As a result, the "John Doe" client, Nicholas Merrill, is finally able to publicly identify himself and his former company as the plaintiffs in the case.
Library Connection v. Gonzales, involved an NSL served on a consortium of libraries in Connecticut. In September 2006, a federal district court ruled that the gag on the librarians violated the First Amendment and the government ultimately withdrew both the gag and its demand for records.
Internet Archive v. Mukasey, involved an NSL served on a digital library. In April 2008, the FBI withdrew the NSL and the gag a part of the settlement of a legal challenge brought by the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
In addition, the ACLU has filed a number of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to learn more about the government's use of NSLs.
In 2003, the ACLU filed a FOIA request seeking information about the FBI's use of NSLs and after filing a lawsuit succeeded in obtaining a number of key documents.
In April 2007, the ACLU filed a FOIA request seeking information about the Department of Defense and CIA's use of National Security Letters. After filing a lawsuit, the ACLU received over 500 documents from its request.
In November 2007, the ACLU filed another FOIA request with the FBI seeking information about the FBI's issuance of NSLs at the behest of other agencies. After filing a lawsuit, the ACLU obtained the documents they were seeking. (More >>)
In Sumation:
In my view the results of the National Security Act of 1947 have proven disastrous for Liberty in the United States. Under the auspices of this statutory act, a corrupt administrative state has arisen that openly subverts the rights of the people of the United States. Further, in the last two years it has become obvious to anyone paying attention that this corrupt administrative state is in league with the DNC leadership in collusion with the corrupt mainstream corporatist media propaganda system as well as the high tech social media platforms, forming a cabal of oligarchs bent on ruling America as an authoritarian despotic syndicate.
Addendum:
Elon Musk Exposes Twitter’s Censorship of Former President Donald Trump
Journalist Matt Taibbi published the third volume of the so-called “Twitter files” on Friday, exposing the social media platform’s censorship and deplatforming of former President Donald Trump.
The latest disclosure revealed that Twitter executives used the platform’s formidable “visibility filtering” powers against Trump ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections and that engagement with the FBI intensified before Trump was permanently suspended.
Endorsed by Twitter’s new owner Elon Musk, the “Twitter files” have exposed the social media company’s censorship machine.
The new report, report titled “The Removal of Donald Trump,” is the first of three specifically examining the actions of Twitter executives during the period from October 2020 to when Trump was deplatformed on Jan. 8, 2021.
Internal Slack chats at Twitter reveal that engagement between the company’s executives and federal law enforcement and intelligence organizations surged during this period.
“Whatever your opinion on the decision to remove Trump that day, the internal communications at Twitter between January 6th-January 8th have clear historical import,” Taibbi wrote. “Even Twitter’s employees understood in the moment it was a landmark moment in the annals of speech.”
“Is this the first sitting head of state to ever be suspended?” one Twitter employee, whose name is redacted, asked in a Slack chat that day.
Banning Trump
The messages show that Twitter executives removed Trump in part because of what one executive called the “context surrounding” the actions of Trump and his supporters “over the course of the election and frankly last 4+ years.”
In a message to Vijaya Gadde, Twitter’s former head of legal policy and trust, one executive whose name is redacted provided a “quick take” formulated by internal researchers and external academics to help decide whether to censor a Trump tweet or use it “as a last straw” before banning him.
The executive said the “decision on whether to pull that particular tweet” or use it “as a last straw” for Trump depends on “the overall context and narrative in which that tweet lives.”
“Context matters and the narrative that Trump and his friends have pursued over the course of this election and frankly last 4+ years must be taken into account,” the executive said, according to a screenshot of internal messages.
Before Trump was banned, Twitter also created a new tool to censor the then-sitting president after the election when he was vocal with his claims of election fraud. Internally, executives referred to the tool as “L3 deamplication.”
The new tool was announced on Dec. 10, 2020, when “Trump was in the middle of firing off 25 tweets saying things like, ‘A coup is taking place in front of our eyes,'” Taibbi wrote
On Thursday, The Free Press editor Bari Weiss, another reporter handpicked by Musk as a conduit for releasing the files, published her report on the extent of Twitter’s tools for censorship, revealing the social media company’s secret blacklists. Her report noted that executives refer to “shadow banning” as “visibility filtering.”
https://www.theepochtimes.com/elon-musk-exposes-twitters-censorship-of-former-president-donald-trump_4915308.html
Great post, thanks. Seems like the rape of the Constitution and the rape of the mind and individual body is linked. It is out and out violent rape. Deep seated mental illness.