Report on Matters Related to Intelligence Activities and Investigations Arising Out ofthe 2016 Presidential Campaigns Special Counsel John H. Durham Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.B(c)
INTRODUCTION
This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he ... shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions reached by the Special Counsel." In addition to the confidential report required by section 600.8(c), the Attorney General has directed that the Special Counsel, "to the maximum extent possible and consistent with the law and the policies and practices of the Department of Justice, shall submit to the Attorney General a final report, and such interim reports as he deems appropriate, in a form that will permit public dissemination." 1 This report is in fulfillment ofthese requirements and sets forth our principal findings and recommendations concerning the matters that were the subject of our review. Section I briefly describes the scope of our investigation, and Section II is an Executive Summary of this report. Section III describes the laws and Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") policies that applied to, or were addressed in, our investigation. Section IV summarizes the facts and evidence that we found and describes our prosecution and declination decisions. In Section V, we provide some observations on issues pertinent to our areas of inquiry. I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION In March 2019, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III concluded his investigation into the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, "including any links or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign." That investigation "did not establish that members ofthe Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities."2 Following Special Counsel Mueller's report, on May 13, 2019, Attorney General Barr "directed United States Attorney John Durham to conduct a preliminary review into certain matters related to the 2016 presidential election campaigns," and that review "subsequently developed into a criminal investigation."3 On February 6, 2020, the Attorney General appointed Mr. Durham "as Special Attorney to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 515."4 On October 19, 2020, the Attorney General determined that, "in light of the extraordinary circumstances relating to these matters, the public interest warrants Mr. Durham continuing this investigation pursuant to the powers and independence afforded by the Special Counsel regulations." Relying on "the authority vested" in the Attorney General, "including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, and 515," the 1 Office ofthe Att'y Gen., Order No. 4878-2020, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Matters Related to Intelligence Activities and Investigations Arising Out of the 2016 Presidential Campaigns ,r (f) (Oct. 19, 2020) (hereinafter "Appointment Order"). 2 1 Robert Mueller, Report on the Investigation into Russian lnteiference in the 2016 Presidential Election 1-2 (2019) (hereinafter "Mueller Reporf'); see also id. at 173. 3 Appointment Order (introduction). When Mr. Durham was asked to lead the review, he was serving as the United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut. Before May 2019, Mr. Durham had been asked by Attorneys General of both major political parties, namely Janet Reno, Judge Michael Mukasey, Eric Holder, and Senator Jeff Sessions, to conduct other sensitive investigations for the Department. 4 Letter from the Attorney General to United States Attorney John Durham (Feb. 6, 2020).
Attorney General ordered the appointment of the Special Counsel "in order to discharge the [Attorney General's] responsibility to provide supervision and management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of these matters."5 The Order stated: The Special Counsel is authorized to investigate whether any federal official, employee, or any other person or entity violated the law in connection with the intelligence, counter-intelligence, or law-enforcement activities directed at the 2016 presidential campaigns, individuals associated with those campaigns, and individuals associated with the administration of President Donald J. Trump, including but not limited to Crossfire Hurricane and the investigation of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III.6 "Ifthe Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate," the Order further provided, "the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from his investigation ofthese matters." The Order also provided that " C.F .R. §§ 600.4 to 600.10 are applicable to the Special Counsel." did not investigate every public report of an alleged violation of law in connection with the intelligence and law enforcement activities directed at the 2016 presidential campaigns. In addition to the Special Counsel, the Office has been staffed by experienced FBI and Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division Agents; Department attorneys and prosecutors; support personnel; and contractor employees. The Office's investigation was broad and extensive. It included investigative work both domestically and overseas. It entailed obtaining large document productions from businesses, firms, government agencies, universities, political campaigns, internet service providers, telephone companies, and individuals. The Office interviewed hundreds of individuals, many on multiple occasions. The Office conducted the majority of interviews in classified settings; for some interviewees and their counsel security clearances needed to be obtained. The Office conducted interviews in person and via video link, with the vast majority of the latter occurring after the COVID-19 pandemic-related closures began in March 2020. Although a substantial majority of individuals voluntarily cooperated with the Office, some only provided information under a subpoena or grant of immunity. Some individuals who, in our view, had important and relevant information about the topics under investigation refused to be interviewed or otherwise cooperate with the Office. As of April 2023, with two trials completed, the Office has conducted more than 480 interviews; obtained and reviewed more than one million documents consisting of more than six million pages; served more than 190 subpoenas under the auspices of grand juries; executed seven search warrants; obtained five orders for communications records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); and made one request to a foreign government under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.
The Office would like to express its appreciation to, among others, the FBI's Office of General Counsel ("OGC") and Inspection Division; the Litigation Technology Support Services Unit in the National Security Division ("NSD"); the eDiscovery Team in the Office of the Chiefinformation Officer of the Justice Management Division ("JMD"); and JMD's Service Delivery Staff. The NSD and JMD entities created and maintained the databases and technology infrastructure needed to organize and review the large amount of data we obtained. The Office would also like to express its appreciation to the Department's Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties for its guidance on appropriate information to include in a public report.
The Office has concluded its investigation into whether "'any federal official, employee, or any other person or entity violated the law in connection with the intelligence, counter intelligence, or law-enforcement activities directed at the 20 I 6 presidential campaigns, individuals associated with those campaigns, and individuals associated with the administration of President Donald J. Trump." This report is a summary. It contains, in the Office's judgment, that information necessary to account for the Special Counsel's prosecution and declination decisions and describe the investigation's main factual results. It then sets forth some additional observations. The Office made its criminal charging decisions based solely on the facts and evidence developed in the investigation and without fear of, or favor to, any person.
What is stated below in the Mueller Report is equally true for our investigation: This report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts. Conducting this investigation required us to consider U.S. criminal laws, the Constitutional protections our system provides to individuals, and the high burden placed on the government to prove every element of a crime "beyond a reasonable doubt." Moreover, the law does not always make a person's bad judgment, even horribly bad judgment, standing alone, a crime. Nor does the law criminalize all unseemly or unethical conduct that political campaigns might undertake for tactical advantage, absent a violation of a particular federal criminal statute. Finally, in almost all cases, the government is required to prove a person's actual criminal intent - not mere negligence or recklessness- before that person's fellow citizens can lawfully find him or her guilty of a crime. The Office's adherence to these principles explains, in numerous instances, why conduct deserving of censure or disciplinary action did not lead the Office to seek criminal charges. There are also reasons why, in examining politically-charged and high-profile issues such as these, the Office must exercise - and has exercised - special care.
First, juries can bring strongly held views to the courtroom in criminal trials involving political subject matters, and those views can, in turn, affect the likelihood of obtaining a conviction, separate and apart from the strength ofthe actual evidence and despite a court's best efforts to empanel a fair and impartial jury. Second, even when prosecutors believe that they can obtain a conviction, there are some instances in which it may not be advisable to expend government time and resources on a criminal prosecution, particularly where it would create the appearance - even if unfounded - that the government is seeking to criminalize the behavior of political opponents or punish the activities of a specific political party or campaign. At the same time, prosecutors should not shy away from pursuing justifiable cases solely due to the popularity of the defendant or the controversial nature of the government's case. The Principles of Federal Prosecution provide the following pertinent guidance on this point, which informed the Special Counsel's charging and declination decisions: Where the law and the facts create a sound, prosecutable case, the likelihood of an acquittal due to unpopularity of some aspect ofthe prosecution or because of the overwhelming popularity of the defendant or his/her cause is not a factor prohibiting prosecution. For example, in a civil rights case or a case involving an extremely popular political figure, it might be clear that the evidence of guilt viewed objectively by an unbiased factfinder-would be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, yet the prosecutor might reasonably doubt, based on the circumstances, that the jury would convict. In such a case, despite his/her negative assessment of the likelihood of a guilty verdict (based on factors extraneous to an objective view of the law and the facts), the prosecutor may properly conclude that it is necessary and appropriate to commence or recommend prosecution and allow the criminal process to operate in accordance with the principles set forth here.
The decision of whether to bring criminal charges in any given matter thus is a complicated one that is neither entirely subjective nor mechanistic. If this report and the outcome of the Special Counsel's investigation leave some with the impression that injustices or misconduct have gone unaddressed, it is not because the Office concluded that no such irJustices or misconduct occurred. It is, rather, because not every injustice or transgression amounts to a criminal offense, and criminal prosecutors are tasked exclusively with investigating and prosecuting violations of U.S. criminal laws. And even where prosecutors believe a crime occurred based on all of the facts and information they have gathered, it is their duty only to bring criminal charges when the evidence that the government reasonably believes is admissible in court proves the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Both Attorneys General Barr and Garland have stated that one of their most important priorities is to ensure the proper functioning and administration offederal law by government agencies. Indeed, the first goal of the Department's current Strategic Plan is to uphold the rule of law: We will continue our work to ensure that the public views the Department as objective, impartial, and insulated from political influence .... The Justice Department['s] ... foundational norms ... include the principled exercise of discretion; independence from improper influence; treating like cases alike; and an unwavering commitment to following the facts and the law. Reaffirming and, where necessary, strengthening the Justice Department policies that are foundational to the rule of law - many of which were initially adopted in the aftermath of Watergate - is essential to this effort. 16 In the aftermath of Crossfire Hurricane and the FISA surveillances of Page, the Department has adopted other important policies. We discuss them, and possible additional changes, in portions ofthe report that follow.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The public record contains a substantial body of information relating to former President Trump's and the Trump Organization's relationships with Russian businesses, Russian business people, and Russian officials, as well as separate evidence of Russia's attempts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election. These and related subjects are well-documented in the careful examinations undertaken by (i) the Department's Office ofthe Inspector General of issues related to the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation and its use of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") authorities, (ii) former FBI Director Robert Mueller as detailed in his report entitled "Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election," issued in March 2019, and (iii) the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence entitled, "Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US. Election. " The scope of these earlier inquiries, the amount of important information gathered, and the contributions they have made to our understanding of Russian election interference efforts are a tribute to the diligent work and dedication ofthose charged with the responsibility ofconducting them. Our review and investigation, in turn has focused on separate but related questions, including the following:
• Was there adequate predication for the FBI to open the Crossfire Hurricane investigation from its inception on July 31, 2016 as a full counterintelligence and Foreign Agents Registration Act ("FARA") investigation given the requirements of The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Domestic Operations and FBI policies relating to the use of the least intrusive investigative tools necessary?
• Was the opening of Crossfire Hurricane as a full investigation on July 31, 2016 consistent with how the FBI handled other intelligence it had received prior to July 31, 2016 concerning attempts by foreign interests to influence the Clinton and other campaigns?
• Similarly, did the FBI properly consider other highly significant intelligence it received at virtually the same time as that used to predicate Crossfire Hurricane, but which related not to the Trump campaign, but rather to a purported Clinton campaign plan "to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by Russian security services," which might have shed light on some of the Russia information the FBI was receiving from third parties, including the Steele Dossier, the Alfa Bank allegations and confidential human source ("CHS") reporting? If not, were any provable federal crimes committed in failing to do so?
• Was there evidence that the actions of any FBI personnel or third parties relating to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation violated any federal criminal statutes, including the prohibition against making false statements to federal officials? If so, was that evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? • Was there evidence that the actions of the FBI or Department personnei in providing false or incomplete information to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") violated any federal criminal statutes? If so, was there evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Our findings and conclusions regarding these and related questions are sobering.
State of Intelligence Community Information Regarding Trump and Russia Prior to the Opening of Crossfire Hurricane
As set forth in greater detail in Section IV.A.3 .b, before the initial receipt by FBI Headquarters of information from Australia on July 28, 2016 concerning comments reportedly made in a tavern on May 6, 2016 by George Papadopoulos, an unpaid foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign, the government possessed no verified intelligence reflecting that Trump or the Trump campaign was involved in a conspiracy or collaborative relationship with officials of the Russian government.21 Indeed, based on the evidence gathered in the multiple exhaustive and costly federal investigations of these matters, including the instant investigation, neither U.S. law enforcement nor the Intelligence Community appears to have possessed any actual evidence of collusion in their holdings at the commencement of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.
The Opening of Crossfire Hurricane
As set forth in greater detail in Section IV, the record in this matter reflects that upon receipt of unevaluated intelligence information from Australia, the FBI swiftly opened the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. In particular, at the direction of Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, Deputy Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Peter Strzok opened Crossfire Hurricane immediately. Strzok, at a minimum, had pronounced hostile feelings toward Trump The matter was opened as a full investigation without ever having spoken to the persons who provided the information.
Further, the FBI did so without (i) any significant review of its own intelligence databases, (ii) collection and examination of any relevant intelligence from other U.S. intelligence entities, (iii) interviews of witnesses essential to understand the raw information it had received or (iv) using any of the standard analytical tools typically employed by the FBI in evaluating raw intelligence. Had it done so, again as set out in Sections IV.A.3.b and c, the FBI would have learned that their own experienced Russia analysts had no information about Trump being involved with Russian leadership officials, nor were others in sensitive positions at the CIA, the NSA, and the Department of State aware of such evidence concerning the subject. In addition, FBI records prepared by Strzok in February and March 2017 show that at the time of the opening of Crossfire Hurricane, the FBI had no information in its holdings indicating that at any time during the campaign anyone in the Trump campaign had been in contact with any Russian intelligence officials. The speed and manner in which the FBI opened and investigated Crossfire Hurricane during the presidential election season based on raw, unanalyzed, and uncorroborated intelligence also reflected a noticeable departure from how it approached prior matters involving possible attempted foreign election interference plans aimed at the Clinton campaign. As described in Section IV.B, in the eighteen months leading up to the 2016 election, the FBI was required to deal with a number of proposed investigations that had the potential of affecting the election. In each of those instances, the FBI moved with considerable caution. In one such matter discussed in Section IV.B.l, FBI Headquarters and Department officials required defensive briefings to be provided to Clinton and other officials or candidates who appeared to be the targets of foreign interference. In another, the FBI elected to end an investigation after one of its longtime and valuable CHSs went beyond what was authorized and made an improper and possibly illegal financial contribution to the Clinton campaign on behalf of a foreign entity as a precursor to a much larger donation being contemplated. And in a third, the Clinton Foundation matter, both senior FBI and Department officials placed restrictions on how those matters were to be handled such that essentially no investigative activities occurred for months leading up to the election.
These examples are also markedly different from the FBI' s actions with respect to other highly significant intelligence it received from a trusted foreign source pointing to a Clinton campaign plan to vilify Trump by tying him to Vladimir Putin so as to divert attention from her own concerns relating to her use of a private email server. Unlike the FBI's opening of a full investigation of unknown members of the Trump campaign based on raw, uncorroborated information, in this separate matter involving a purported Clinton campaign plan, the FBI never opened any type of inquiry, issued any taskings, employed any analytical personnel, or produced any analytical products in connection with the information. This lack of action was despite the fact that the significance of the Clinton plan intelligence was such as to have prompted the Director ofthe CIA to brief the President, Vice President, Attorney General, Director of the FBI, and other senior government officials about its content within days of its receipt. It was also of enough importance for the CIA to send a formal written referral memorandum to Director Corney and the Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division, Peter Strzok, for their consideration and action. The investigative referral provided examples of information the Crossfire Hurricane fusion cell had "gleaned to date."
The Crossfire Hurricane Investigation
Within days after opening Crossfire Hurricane, the FBI opened full investigations on four members of the Trump campaign team: George Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and Michael Flynn. No defensive briefing was provided to Trump or anyone in the campaign concerning the information received from Australia that suggested there might be some type of collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russians, either prior to or after these investigations were opened. Instead, the FBI began working on requests for the use of FISA authorities against Page and Papadopoulos. The effort as related to Papadopoulos proved unsuccessful. Similarly, the initial effort directed at Page was unsuccessful until the Crossfire Hurricane investigators first obtained what were designated as "Company Intelligence Reports" generated by Christopher Steele.
As set forth in Sections IV.D. l .b.ii and iii and in brief below, the Steele Reports were first provided to the FBI in early July 2016 but, for unexplained reasons, only made their way to the Crossfire Hurricane investigators in mid-September. The reports were ostensibly assembled based on information provided to Steele and his company by a "primary sub source," who the FBI eventually determined in December 2016 was Igor Danchenko.
Our investigation determined that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators did not and could not corroborate any of the substantive allegations contained in the Steele reporting. Nor was Steele able to produce corroboration for any ofthe reported allegations, even after being offered $1 million or more by the FBI for such corroboration. Further, when interviewed by the FBI in January 2017, Danchenko also was unable to corroborate any of the substantive allegations in the Reports. Rather, Danchenko characterized the information he provided to Steele as "rumor and speculation"30 and the product of casual conversation.
Section IV.D. l .h describes other efforts undertaken by the Crossfire Hurricane investigators working on the Page FISA application. Those efforts included having CHSs record conversations with Page, Papadopoulos and a senior Trump foreign policy advisor. The FBI's own records and the recordings establish that Page made multiple exculpatory statements to the individual identified as CHS-I, but the Crossfire Hurricane investigators failed to make that information known to the Department attorneys or to the FISC. Page also made explicit statements refuting allegations contained in the Steele reporting about his lack of any relationship with Paul Manafort, but the FBI failed to follow logical investigative leads related to those statements and to report to Department lawyers what they found. Similarly, multiple recordings of Papadopoulos were made by CHS-1 and a second CHS, in which
Papadopoulos also made multiple exculpatory statements that were not brought to the attention of the Department lawyers or the FISC. Furthermore, our investigation resulted in the prosecution and conviction of an FBI OGC attorney for intentionally falsifying a document that was material to the FISC's consideration of one of the Page FISA applications.
The Steele Dossier
In the spring of 2016, Perkins Coie, a U.S.-based international law firm, acting as counsel to the Clinton campaign, retained Fusion GPS, a U.S.-based investigative firm, to conduct opposition research on Trump and his associates. In mid-May 2016, Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS met with Steele in the United Kingdom and subsequently retained Steele and his firm, Orbis Business Intelligence ("Orbis"), to investigate Trump's ties to Russia. Steele described himself as a former intelligence official for the British government, and was also at the time an FBI CHS. Beginning in July 2016 and continuing through December 2016, the FBI received a series of reports from Steele and Orbis that contained derogatory information about Trump concerning Trump's purported ties to Russia. As discussed in Section IV.D.l.b.ii, Steele provided the first of his reports to his FBI handler on July 5th. These reports were colloquially referred to as the "Steele Dossier''. or "Steele Reports."
As noted, it was not until mid-September that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators received several of the Steele Reports. Within days of their receipt, the unvetted and unverified Steele Reports were used to support probable cause in the FBI's FISA applications targeting Page, a U.S. citizen who, for a period oftime, had been an advisor to Trump. As discussed later in the report, this was done at a time when the FBI knew that the same information Steele had provided to the FBI had also been fed to the media and others in Washington, D.C.
In particular, one allegation contained in an undated Steele Report, identified as 2016/095, described a "well-developed conspiracy of co-operation" between Trump, his campaign, and senior Russian officials. This allegation would ultimately underpin the four FISA applications targeting Page. Specifically, the allegation stated:
Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an ethnic Russian close associate ofRepublican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate's campaign manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.
Igor Danchenko - Steele's Primary Sub-Source
As noted, the FBI attempted, over time, to investigate and analyze the Steele Reports but ultimately was not able to confirm or corroborate any of the substantive allegations contained in those reports. In the context of these efforts, and as discussed in Sections IV.D. l .b.ix and x, the FBI learned that Steele relied primarily on a U.S.-based Russian national, Igor Danchenko, to collect information that ultimately formed the core allegations found in the reports. Specifically, our investigation discovered that Danchenko himself had told another person that he (Danchenko) was responsible for 80% ofthe "intel" and 50% of the analysis contained in the Steele Dossier.
In December 2016, the FBI identified Danchenko as Steele's primary sub-source. Danchenko agreed to meet with the FBI and, under the protection of an immunity letter, he and his attorney met with the Crossfire Hurricane investigators on January , and, 2017. Thereafter, from January 2017 through October 2020, and as part of its efforts to determine the truth or falsity of specific information in the Steele Reports, the FBI conducted multiple interviews of Danchenko regarding, among other things, the information he provided to Steele. As discussed in Section IV.D.1.b.ix, during these interviews, Danchenko was unable to provide any corroborating evidence to support the Steele allegations, and further, described his interactions with his sub-sources as "rumor and speculation" and conversations of a casual nature. Significant parts of what Danchenko told the FBI were inconsistent with what Steele told the FBI during his prior interviews in October 2016 and September 2017. At no time, however, was the FISC informed of these inconsistencies. Moreover, notwithstanding the repeated assertions in the Page FISA applications that Steele's primary sub-source was based in Russia, Danchenko for many years had lived in the Washington, D.C. area. After learning that Danchenko continued to live in the Washington area and had not left except for domestic and foreign travel, the FBI never corrected this assertion in the three subsequent Page FISA renewal applications. Rather, beginning in March 2017, the FBI engaged Danchenko as a CHS and began making regular financial payments to him for information - none of which corroborated Steele's reporting.
The Unresolved Prior FBI Counterintelligence Investigation of Danchenko
The Unresolved Prior FBI Counterintelligence Investigation of Danchenko Importantly, and as discussed in Section IV.D.l.c, the FBI knew in January 2017 that Danchenko had been the subject of an FBI counterintelligence investigation from 2009 to 2011. In late 2008, while Danchenko was employed by the Brookings Institution, he engaged two fellow employees about whether one of the employees might be willing or able in the future to provide classified infonnation in exchange for money. According to one employee, Danchenko believed that he (the employee) might be following a mentor into the incoming Obama administration and have access to classified infonnation. During this exchange, Danchenko informed the employee that he had access to people who were willing to pay for classified information. The concerned employee passed this information to a U.S. government contact, and the information was subsequently passed to the FBI. Based on this information, in 2009 the FBI opened a preliminary investigation into Danchenko. The FBI converted its investigation into a full investigation after learning that Danchenko (i) had been identified as an associate of two FBI counterintelligence subjects and (ii) had previous contact with the Russian Embassy and known Russian intelligence officers. Also, as discussed in Section IV.D. l .c, at that earlier time, Agents had interviewed several former colleagues of Danchenko who raised concerns about Danchenko's potential involvement with Russian intelligence. For example, one such colleague, who had intt;rned at a U.S. intelligence agency, informed the Office that Danchenko frequently inquired about that person's knowledge of a specific Russian military matter.
Meanwhile in July 20 I 0, the FBI initiated a request to use FISA authorities against Danchenko, which was subsequently routed to Department attorneys in August 2010. However, the investigation into Danchenko was closed in March 2011 after the FBI incorrectly concluded that Danchenko had left the country and returned to Russia.
Our review found no indication that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators ever attempted to resolve the prior Danchenko espionage matter before opening him as a paid CHS. Moreover, our investigation found no indication that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators disclosed the existence of Danchenko's unresolved counterintelligence investigation to the Department attorneys who were responsible for drafting the FISA renewal applications targeting Carter Page. As a result, the FISC was never advised of information that very well may have affected the FISC's view of Steele's primary sub-source's (and Steele's) reliability and trustworthiness. Equally important is the fact that in not resolving Danchenko's status vis-a-vis the Russian intelligence services, it appears the FBI never gave appropriate consideration to the possibility that the intelligence Danchenko was providing to Steele -which, again, according to Danchenko himself, made up a significant majority of the information in the Steele Dossier reports - was, in whole or in part, Russian disinformation.
Danchenko's Relationship with Charles Dolan
During the relevant time period, Danchenko maintained a relationship with Charles Dolan, a Virginia-based public relations professional who had previously held multiple positions and roles in the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") and the Democratic Party. In his role as a public relations professional, Dolan focused much of his career interacting with Eurasian clients, with a particular focus on Russia. As described in Section IV.D. l.d.ii, Dolan previously conducted business with the Russian Federation and maintained relationships with several key Russian government officials, including Dimitry Peskov, the powerful Press Secretary of the Russian Presidential Administration. A number ofthese Russian government officials with whom Dolan maintained a relationship - and was in contact with at the time Danchenko was collecting information for Steele - would later appear in the Dossier.
In the summer and fall of 2016, at the time Danchenko was collecting information for Steele, Dolan traveled to Moscow, as did Danchenko, in connection with a business conference. As discussed in Section IV.D. l .d.iii, the business conference was held at the Ritz Carlton Moscow, which, according to the Steele Reports, was allegedly the site of salacious sexual conduct on the part of Trump. Danchenko would later inform the FBI that he learned of these allegations through Ritz Carlton staff members. Our investigation, however, revealed that it was Dolan, not Danchenko, who actually interacted with the hotel staff identified in the Steele Reports, so between the two, Dolan appears the more likely source of the allegations.
As discussed in Section IV.D. l .d.vi, our investigation also uncovered that Dolan was the definitive source for at least one allegation in the Steele Reports. This allegation, contained in Steele Report 2016/105, concerned the circumstances surrounding the resignation of Paul Manafort from the Trump campaign. When interviewed by the Office, Dolan admitted that he fabricated the allegation about Manafort that appeared in the Steele Report. Our investigation also revealed that, in some instances, Dolan independently received other information strikingly similar to allegations that would later appear in the Steele Reports. Nevertheless, when interviewed by the FBI, Danchenko denied that Dolan was a source for any information in the Steele Reports. Furthermore, as discussed in Section IV.D. l .d.iii, during the relevant time period, Dolan maintained a business relationship with Olga Galkina, a childhood friend of Danchenko, who, according to Danchenko, was a key source for many of the allegations contained in the Steele Reports. In fact, when Galkina was interviewed by the FBI in August 2017, she admitted to providing Dolan with information that would later appear in the Steele Reports.
The FBI's Failure to Interview Charles Dolan
Our investigation revealed that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators were aware of Dolan and his connections to Danchenko and the Steele Reports. In fact, as discussed in Section IV.D.l.b.v, in early October 2016, Steele informed the FBI that Dolan was a person who might have relevant information about Trump. The FBI interviewed hundreds of individuals through the course ofthe Crossfire Hurricane and later investigations, and yet it did not interview Dolan as a possible source of information about Trump. Our investigators interviewed Dolan on several occasions, as well as the two other persons mentioned by Steele. Dolan initially denied being a source of information for the Steele Reports. When, however, he was shown a particular Steele Report relating to Paul Manafort and his resignation as Trump's campaign manager, along with related emails between himself and Danchenko in August 2016, he acknowledged that the reporting mirrored the information he had provided to Danchenko. Dolan acknowledged to the Office that he fabricated this information. Although both Steele and Olga Galkina suggested to the FBI that Dolan may have had information related to the Steele Reports, our investigation was not able to definitively show that Dolan was the actual source - whether wittingly or unwittingly - for any additional allegations set forth in the Steele Reports. Regardless, in light of the foregoing, there does not appear to have been an objectively sound reason for the FBI's failure to interview Dolan.
Danchenko's Claims Regarding Sergei Millian
Perhaps the most damning allegation in the Steele Dossier reports was Company Report 2016, which Steele attributed to "Source E," one of Danchenko's supposed sub-sources. This report, portions of which were included in each of the four Page FISA applications, contributed to the public narrative of Trump's conspiring and colluding with Russian officials. As discussed in Section IV.D. l.f, Danchenko's alleged source for the information (Source E) was an individual by the name of Sergei Millian who was the president of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce in New York City and a public Trump supporter. The evidence uncovered by the Office showed that Danchenko never spoke with Sergei Millian and simply fabricated the allegations that he attributed to Millian.
When interviewed by Crossfire Hurricane investigators in late January 201 7, Danchenko said that Source E in Report 2016 sounded as though it was Sergei Millian. As discussed in Section IV.D.1.f.i, Danchenko stated that he never actually met Millian. Instead, he said that in late-July 2016 he received an anonymous call from a person who did not identify himself, but who spoke with a Russian accent. Danchenko further explained that he thought it might have been Millian - someone Danchenko previously had emailed twice and received no response - after watching a YouTube video of Millian speaking. Thus, as detailed in Section IV.D. l .f.i, the total support for the Source E information contained in Steele Report 2016 is a purported anonymous call from someone Danchenko had never met or spoken Lo but who he believed might be Sergei Millian - a Trump supporter - based on his listening to a YouTube video of Millian. Unfortunately, the investigation revealed that, instead of taking even basic steps, such as securing telephone caii records for either Danchenko or Miilian to investigate Danchenko' s hard-to-believe story about Millian, the Crossfire Hurricane investigators appear to have chosen to ignore this and other red flags concerning Danchenko's credibility, as well as Steele's.
The Alfa Bank Allegations
The Office also investigated the actions of Perkins Coie attorney Michael Sussmann and others in connection with Sussmann's provision of data and "white papers" to FBI Genera! Counsel James Baker purporting to show that there existed a covert communications channel between the Trump Organization and a Russia-based bank called Alfa Bank. As set forth in Section IV.E.1.c.iii, in doing so he represented to Baker by text message and in person that he was acting on his own and was not representing any client or company in providing the information to the FBI. Our investigation showed that, in point of fact, these representations to Baker were false in that Sussmann was representing the Clinton campaign (as evidenced by, among other things, his law firm's billing records and internal communications). In addition, Sussmann was representing a second client, a technology executive named Rodney Joffe (as evidenced by various written communications, Sussmann's subsequent congressional testimony, and other records).
Cyber experts from the FBI examined the materials given to Baker and concluded that they did not establish what Sussmann claimed they showed. At a later time, Sussmann made a separate presentation regarding the Alfa Bank allegations to another U.S. government agency and it too concluded that the materials did not show what Sussmann claimed. In connection with that second presentation, Sussmann made a similar false statement to that agency, claiming that he was not providing the information on behalf of any client.
With respect to the Alfa Bank materials, our investigation established that Joffe had tasked a number of computer technology researchers who worked for companies he was affiliated with, and who had access to certain internet records, to mine the internet data to establish "an inference" and "narrative" tying then-candidate Trump to Russia. In directing these researchers to exploit their access in this manner, Joffe indicated that he was seeking to please certain "VIPs," in context referring to individuals at Perkins Coie who were involved in campaign matters and the Clinton campaign. During its investigation, the Office also learned that, after the 2016 presidential election, Joffe emailed an individual and told that person that "[he - Joffe] was tentatively offered the top [cybersecurity] job by the Democrats when it looked like they'd win."
As explained in Section IV.E. l .c.i, the evidence collected by the Office also demonstrated that, prior to providing the unfounded Alfa bank claims to the FBI, Sussmann and Fusion GPS (the Clinton campaign's opposition research firm) had provided the same information to various news organizations and were pressing reporters to write articles about the alleged secret communications channel. Moreover, during his September 2016 meeting at the FBI, Sussmann told Baker that an unnamed news outlet was in possession of the information and would soon publish a story about it. The disclosure ofthe media's involvement caused the FBI to contact the news outlet whose name was eventually provided by Sussmann in the hope of delaying any public reporting on the subject. In doing so it confirmed for the New York Times that the FBI was looking into the matter. On October 31, 2016, less than two weeks before the election, the New York Times and others published articles on the Alfa Bank matter and the Clinton campaign issued tweets and public statements on the allegations of a secret channel of communications being used by the Trump Organization and a Russian bank -allegations that had been provided to the media and the FBI by Fusion GPS and Sussmann, both of whom were working for the Clinton campaign.
Conclusion
Based on the review of Crossfire Hurricane and related intelligence activities, we conclude that the Department and the FBI failed to uphold their important mission of strict fidelity to the law in connection with certain events and activities described in this report. As noted, former FBI attorney Kevin Clinesmith committed a criminal offense by fabricating language in an email that was material to the FBI obtaining a FISA surveillance order. In other instances, FBI personnel working on that same FISA application displayed, at best, a cavalier attitude towards accuracy and completeness. FBI personnel also repeatedly disregarded important requirements when they continued to seek renewals of that FISA surveillance while acknowledging - both then and in hindsight - that they did not genuinely believe there was probable cause to believe that the target was knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power, or knowingly helping another person in such activities.And certain personnel disregarded significant exculpatory information that should have prompted investigative restraint and re-examination.
Our investigation also revealed that senior FBI personnel displayed a serious lack of analytical rigor towards the information that they received, especially information received from politically affiliated persons and entities. This information in part triggered and sustained Crossfire Hurricane and contributed to the subsequent need for Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. In particular, there was significant reliance on investigative leads provided or funded (directly or indirectly) by Trump's political opponents. The Department did not adequately examine or question these materials and the motivations of those providing them, even when at about the same time the Director ofthe FBI and others learned of significant and potentially contrary intelligence.
In light of the foregoing, there is a continuing need for the FBI and the Department to recognize that lack of analytical rigor, apparent confirmation bias, and an over-willingness to rely on information from individuals connected to political opponents caused investigators to fail to adequately consider alternative hypotheses and to act without appropriate objectivity or restraint in pursuing allegations of collusion or conspiracy between a U.S. political campaign and a foreign power. Although recognizing that in hindsight much is clearer, much of this also seems to have been clear at the time. We therefore believe it is important to examine past conduct to identify shortcomings and improve how the government carries out its most sensitive functions. Section V discusses some of these issues more fully.
This report does not recommend any wholesale changes in the guidelines and policies that the Department and the FBI now have in place to ensure proper conduct and accountability in how counterintelligence activities are carried out. Rather, it is intended to accurately describe the matters that fell under our review and to assist the Attorney General in determining how the Department and the FBI can do a better, more credible job in fulfilling its responsibilities, and in analyzing and responding to politically charged allegations in the future. Ultimately, of course, meeting those responsibilities comes down to the integrity of the people who take an oath to follow the guidelines and policies currently in place, guidelines that date from the time of Attorney General Levi and that are designed to ensure the rule of law is upheld. As such, the answer is not the creation of new rules but a renewed fidelity to the old. The promulgation of additional rules and regulations to be learned in yet more training sessions would likely prove to be a fruitless exercise if the FBI's guiding principles of "Fidelity, Bravery and Integrity" are not engrained in the hearts and minds of those sworn to meet the FBI' s mission of "Protecting the American People and Upholding the Constitution of the United States."
III. APPLICABLE LAWS AND DEPARTMENT AND FBI POLICIES
This section begins by summarizing some of the Principles ofFederal Prosecution, which govern all federal prosecutions. Next, this section describes the laws and policies that we considered in the course of our investigation. These include the requirements that apply to the FBI' s assessments and investigations of counterintelligence matters, most of which are found in guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General and FBI policies, and the legal standards for conducting electronic surveillance under FISA. This section concludes by describing the principal statutes that we used to evaluate possible criminal conduct for prosecution: 18 U.S.C. § 100l(a)(2) (false statements); l 8 U.S.C. § 1621(2) (perjury); 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (falsification of records); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (violation of civil rights); 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,371 (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (fraud against the United States); 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 3012l(a) (campaign contributions); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (money-laundering); and 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (transmission of classified information).
A. Principles of Federal Prosecution
In deciding whether to exercise prosecutorial authority with respect to the statutes discussed below, the Office has been guided by the Principles ofFederal Prosecution set forth in the Justice Manual. Those principles include:
1. Determination to prosecute
A determination to prosecute represents a policy judgment that the fundamental interests of society require the application of federal criminal law to a particular set of circumstances. The attorney for the government should commence or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person's conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (i) the prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (ii) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (iii) there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.
2. Subsantial federal interest
In determining whether a prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest, the attorney for the government should weigh all relevant considerations, including:
Federal Law enforcement priorities, including any federal law enforcement initiatives or operations aimed at accomplishing those priorities; The nature and seriousness of the offense; The deterrent effect of prosecution;
The person's culpability in connection with the offense;
The person's history with respect to criminal activity;
The person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others;
The person's personal circumstances;
The interests of any victims; and
The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.
3. Most serious, readily provable offense
During our investigation, the Justice Manual provided that once the decision to prosecute has been made, the attorney for the government should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offenses. By definition, the most serious offenses are those that carry the most substantial guidelines sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences.
4. Unpopularity
Where the law and the facts create a sound, prosecutable case, the likelihood of an acquittal due to unpopularity of some aspect of the prosecution or because of the overwhelming popularity of the defendant or his/her cause is not a factor prohibiting prosecution. This provision from the Justice Manual is quoted more fully in section I.
5. Interests of uncharged parties
In all public filings and proceedings, federal prosecutors should remain sensitive to the privacy and reputation interests of uncharged third parties. In the context of public plea and sentencing proceedings, this means that, in the absence of some significant justification, it is not appropriate to identify (either by name or unnecessarily specific description), or cause a defendant to identify, a third-party wrongdoer unless that party has been officially charged with the misconduct at issue.
As a series of cases makes clear, there is ordinarily "no legitimate governmental interest served" by the government's public allegation of wrongdoing by an uncharged party, and this is true "regardless of what criminal charges may ... be contemplated by the Assistant United States Attorney against the [third-party] for the future." Courts have applied this reasoning to preclude the public identification of unindicted third-party wrongdoers in plea hearings, sentencing memoranda, and other government pleadings.
In a similar vein, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein stated that "we do not hold press conferences to release derogatory information about the subject of a declined criminal investigation." He went on to say that"derogatory information sometimes is disclosed in the course of criminal investigations and prosecutions, but we never release it gratuitously."
B. The FBl's Assessment and Investigation of Counterintelligence Matters
This subsection describes the requirements that apply to the FBI's assessments and investigations ofcounterintelligence matters. The AGG-Dom gives the FBI a broad mandate to "detect, obtain information about, and prevent and protect against federal crimes and threats to the national security." These crimes and threats include espionage and other intelligence activities and foreign computer intrusions. The AGG-Dom provides that "these Guidelines do not authorize investigating or collecting or maintaining information on United States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The requirements ofthe AGG-Dom are implemented and expanded upon in FBI policy. In its investigative activities, the FBI is to use less intrusive investigative techniques where feasible, and investigative activity is broken down into various levels. There are also requirements in separate guidelines approved by the Attorney General governing the FBI's use of confidential human sources ("CHSs").60 In 2020, the Department imposed additional requirements for politically sensitive assessments and investigations and for applications under FISA.
1. Use of least intrusive means
The President has directed that the Intelligence Community "shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States persons abroad." The Intelligence Community includes the intelligence elements of the FBI. The AGG-Dom implements this provision and observes that:
The conduct of investigations and other activities ... may present choices between the use of different investigative methods that are each operationally sound and effective, but that are more or less intrusive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy and civil liberties of individuals and potential damage to reputation.
There is additional discussion of requirements for a "sensitive investigative matter" or "SIM," principally in the DJOG. One category of SIM is a matter involving a political candidate or a "domestic political organization or individual prominent in such an organization."63 The definition of a SIM also includes "any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters and other Department of Justice officials." It goes on to explain:
In a SIM, "particular care should be taken when considering whether the planned course of action is the least intrusive method if reasonable based on the circumstances of the investigation."
• More generally, "when First Amendment rights are at stake, the choice and use of investigative methods should be focused in a manner that minimizes potential infringement of those rights."
• "If... the threat is remote, the individual's involvement is speculative, and the probability of obtaining probative information is low, intrusive methods may not be justified, and, in fact, they may do more harm than good.''
The DIOG says that the FBI will "apply best judgment to the circumstances at hand to select the most appropriate investigative means to achieve the investigative goal."68 At the same time, it "shall not hesitate to use any lawful method ... even if intrusive, where the degree of intrusiveness is warranted in light ofthe seriousness of a criminal or national security threat." The factors that may support the use of more intrusive collection techniques include operational security.
2. Levels ofinvestigation
One significant way that the AGG-Dom and the DIOG implement the least intrusive means requirement is by describing four different levels ofactivity. The first is activity that the FBI may conduct without any formal opening or authorization process and is referred to as "activities authorized prior to opening an assessment." The other, more formalized levels of activity are assessment, preliminary investigation, and full investigation. As the level increases, the FBI may use a broader range oftechniques:
Activity authorized before opening an assessment
The DIOG states that "when initially processing a complaint, observation, or information," an FBI employee may take limited steps to evaluate the information. These include looking at government records and at commercially and publicly available information. The employee may also "conduct a voluntary clarifying interview ofthe complainant or the person who initially furnished the information ... for the sole purpose ofeliminating confusion in the original allegation or information provided." The DJOG explains that "[t]hese activities may allow the FBI employee to resolve a matter without the need to conduct new investigative activity."
New investigative activity requires the opening of an assessment or predicated investigation
b. Assessment
The FBI may open an assessment if it has an authorized purpose and a clearly defined objective. No particular factual predication is required, but the basis for opening an assessment "cannot be arbitrary or groundless speculation." In addition to the techniques that are authorized without opening an assessment, in an assessment the FBI may recruit and use CHSs, conduct physical surveillance in 72-hour increments, and obtain some grand jury subpoenas. An FBI employee should be able to explain the reason for the use of particular investigative methods.
c. Preliminary investigation
The factual predicate required to open a preliminary investigation is "information or an allegation" that a federal crime or threat to the national security "may be" occurring. Authorized investigative methods include undercover operations, trash covers, consensual monitoring, pen registers, national security letters, and polygraphs. The FBI may also conduct physical searches and use monitoring devices that do not require judicial authorization. A preliminary investigation is to last a relatively short time and lead either to closure or a full investigation.
d. Full investigation
The standard for opening a full investigation is "an articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates that ... an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security ... is or may be occurring ... and the investigation may obtain information relating to the activity.''
The DIOG gives as examples of sufficient predication to open a fuil investigation: • "Corroborated information from an intelligence agency" stating "that an individual is a member of a terrorist group."
• "An analyst discovers on a blog a threat to a specific home builder and additional information connecting the blogger to a known terrorist group." The FBI may use "all lawful methods" in a full investigation, including court-authorized electronic surveillance and physical searches.
3. The Confidential Human Source Guidelines
In addition to the AGG-Dom, the Attorney General has approved separate guidelines governing the FBI's use ofhuman sources. The guidelines in place at the time of Crossfire Hurricane required the validation ofa CHS when the person was opened as a source. Validation included documenting the person's criminal record and motivation for providing information." Because a source's reliability can change, the guidelines directed the FBI to review each CHS's file "at least annually" and "ensure that all available information that might materially alter a prior validation assessment ... is promptly reported" to a supervisor and documented.
The guidelines also required that an FBI agent instruct the CHS. Because the instructions are important, another agent or official was to be present as a witness. The agent was to direct the CHS to provide truthful infonnation and to "abide by the instructions ofthe FBI." If the FBI compensated the CHS, the CHS was "liable for any taxes that may be owed. “The guidelines explained that "the content and meaning ofeach of the ... instructions must be clearly conveyed" to the CHS. Immediately afterward, the agent "shall require" the CHS "to acknowledge his or her receipt and understanding of the instructions. "
The guidelines did not include an explicit requirement to document whether the person had previously been a source ofan intelligence or law enforcement agency. Moreover, the FBI was not required to seek or obtain the approval of the Department before using sources to record conversations and obtain information not only from targets of its investigations in Crossfire Hurricane ( such as Page and Papadopoulos) but also from a senior campaign official to whom its sources had access.
4. Analytic integrity
he FBI' s Counterintelligence Division is an operational component, whereas a separate Directorate of Intelligence provides analytic support. The Counterintelligence Division's policy guidance says that "effective ... operations are based on integration" of personnel from the two entities who work "toward common goals." Division personnel "must cultivate and develop relationships" with Directorate of Intelligence elements "in order to maximize operational performance." Case agents "should rely on" the Directorate of Intelligence "for strategic and tactical guidance on targeting priorities, the generation ofsource debriefing packages, the evaluation ofsource reporting, preparation ofvarious raw intelligence dissemination products, and the identification of intelligence gaps."
For the Intelligence Community as a whole, Congress has directed the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") to assign a person or entity "to be responsible for ensuring that finished intelligence products ... are timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based upon all sources of available intelligence, and employ the standards of proper anaiytic tradecraft." The inteiiigence Community's Anaiytic Standards say that analysts "must perform their functions with objectivity and with awareness oftheir own assumptions and reasoning." They are to "employ reasoning techniques and practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate bias." Moreover, "all IC analytic products" should be "independent of political consideration" and "not be distorted by ... advocacy of a particular ... agenda ... or policy viewpoint."
Responding to a congressional inquiry, the Intelligence Community's Analytic Ombudsman documented "a few incidents" from 2020 "where individuals, or groups of individuals, [took] willful actions that ... had the effect of politicizing intelligence, hindering objective analysis, or injecting bias into the intelligence process."
The Ombudsman's assessment mentioned the reluctance of China analysts "to have their analysis brought forward because they tended to disagree with the Administration's policies." On the other hand, Russia analysts were frustrated because management was "slowing down or not wanting to take their analysis to customers, claiming that it was not well received." The assessment also has a section entitled "historical context." It discusses the politicization of intelligence about Iraq in 2003, but it does not mention Crossfire Hurricane or the Carter Page FISA. The assessment paraphrases former intelligence official Neil Wiley:
Intelligence is the only great function of state that does not come to top decision makers with an agenda .... The purpose of intelligence is to provide objective, unbiased, and policy-neutral assessments. We are, perhaps, most important to decision makers when we bring to them the bad news .... This ... sometimes demands moral courage to carry out. Other institutions are inherently political and are much less likely to bring bad news. If we lose that objectivity, or even are perceived to have lost it, we have endangered the entire reason for us to exist.
Recently upgraded protections
a. Investigative activities
The Sensitive Investigations Memorandum, promulgated by the Attorney General in 2020, imposes additional approval requirements for politically sensitive activities. If the FBI takes "exploratory investigative steps relating to" a presidential candidate, a senior staff member, or an advisor, it must give prompt written notice to the appropriate Assistant Attorney General and U.S. Attorney. The Attorney General explained that "this includes any person who has been publicly announced by a campaign as a staffer or member of an official campaign advisory committee or group." The same notice requirement applies if the FBI opens an assessment of such a person. If the FBI opens either a preliminary or full investigation of such a person, then notice to the Department is not enough; the Attorney General must approve the opening of the investigation.
The memorandum also directs:
• Department components to "review their existing policies governing notification, consultation, and/or approval of politically sensitive investigations," provide a summary ofthose policies, and recommend "any necessary changes or updates."
• The Department to study, after the 2020 elections, "its experiences and consider whether changes" to the requirements in the memorandum are necessary.
The Attorney General recently reaffirmed the need to adhere to the requirements ofthe Sensitive Investigations Memorandum that govern "the opening of criminal and counter-intelligence investigations by the Department ... related to politically sensitive individuals and entities.'
CHS guidelines and policy
In 2020, following various OIG reviews, the FBI undertook a "comprehensive review" of the 2006 CHS Guidelines "to ensure that the FBI's source validation process was wholly refocused, revised, and improved across the FBI." The 2020 CHS Guidelines thus provide additional direction to the FBI in the handling of human sources. They require information about whether the CHS "is reasonably believed to be a current or former subject or target of an FBI investigation." There is also a new requirement for information about a source's reporting relationship with other government agencies. At the time when the Attorney General approved the Guidelines, he also directed that "pending further guidance" he or the Deputy Attorney General must approve "any use" of a CHS "to target a federal elected official or political campaign ... for the purposes of investigating political or campaign activities."
The FBI's Confidential Human Source Policy Guide also includes new or strengthened requirements and implements portions of the Sensitive Investigations Memorandum. Its requirements include:
• Identifying the specific source-related activities in which FBI intelligence analysts and other non-agent personnel may engage. For example, an intelligence analyst may only contact a CHS or a potential CHS in the presence of a case agent, and an analyst may only accompany an agent to a debriefing of a CHS with supervisory approval.
• Requiring information about "all likely motivations the CHS could have for providing information."
• Enhancing the requirements for source validation reviews.
• Requiring detailed information and additional approvals in a request to reopen a CHS who was previously closed for cause, either by the FBI or another agency.
Finally, the CHS Policy Guide requires a CHS to be treated as "sensitive" and thus subject to more controls based on either the position the source holds or the position held by someone the source is reporting on. So, for example, even though a CHS may not hold a position in a campaign, if the source is reporting on such a person he/she would still be treated as sensitive. Post-Crossfire Hurricane, the Guide now provides this example:
A CHS with indirect access to a U.S. Presidential campaign is tasked to report on campaign activities involving possible cooperation with foreign entities to influence the outcome of a U.S. Presidential election. The CHS had only indirect access, but his or her affiliation nevertheless enabled the CHS to be tasked to collect information on the campaign.
Defensive briefings
The OIG's review of Crossfire Hurricane discusses defensive briefings for those who may be targets of nefarious activities by foreign powers and, specifically at the time of the investigation, the possibility of conducting a defensive briefing for the Trump campaign on Russian activities. The Review says that:
We did not identify any Department or FBI policy that applied to this decision and therefore determined that the decision whether to conduct defensive briefings in lieu of opening an investigation, or at any time during an investigation, was a judgment call that is left to the discretion of FBI officials.
It went on to suggest that it would be desirable to give "senior Department leadership the opportunity ... to consult with the FBI about whether to conduct a defensive briefing in a circumstance such as this one."
The Department and the FBI have taken steps to address this issue. First, the Attorney General has instructed the FBI Director to promulgate procedures concerning defensive briefings. The purpose of this requirement is "to address concerns" that U.S. persons "may become unwitting participants in an effort by a foreign power to influence an election or the policy or conduct" of the govemment. 115 Second, the FBI has established a Foreign Influence Defensive Briefing Board ("FIDBB"). The FBI is continuing its newly implemented review process for malign foreign influence defensive briefings, and in particular briefings to Legislative and Executive Branch officials. This will encompass actions taken after receipt of specific threat information that identifies malign foreign influence operations - that is, foreign operations that are subversive, undeclared, coercive, or criminal - including convening the [FIDBB] to evaluate whether and how to provide defensive briefings to affected parties. To determine whether notification is warranted and appropriate in each case, the FIDBB uses consistent, standardized criteria guided by principles that include, for example, the protection of sources and methods and the integrity and independence ofongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions.
C. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA")
FISA permits the government to seek authority from the FISC to use a range of investigative techniques. For the installation and use of pen register and trap and trace devices, which are relatively unintrusive, FISA requires that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an FBI investigation. For electronic surveillance, which is among the most intrusive techniques available to the FBI, the requirements are more extensive. We describe below some of the findings required by the statute, FISA's First Amendment proviso, and the certification by a high-ranking Executive Branch official. This subsection concludes by summarizing some ofthe Executive Branch's requirements for FISA applications, many of which have been added in recent years.
1. Required findings
FISA requires the government submit an application to the FISC describing the target of the surveillance, the techniques that will be used, and other matters. An FBI agent or other federal official swears to the truth of the facts in the application.
The FISC may authorize electronic surveillance if there is probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign power. 122 For a U.S. person, there are at least two additional related requirements. First, as the House Intelligence Committee's 1978 report on FISA explains, "as a matter of principle ... no United States citizen ... should be targeted for electronic surveillance ... absent some showing that he at least may violate the laws of our society." Second, the person must be knowingly engaged in the specified conduct. Thus, a U.S. person may be an agent of a foreign power if the person is knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence gathering activities on behalf of a foreign power, or knowingly helping another person in such activities, provided that the activities involve or may involve a violation of U.S. criminal law.
The House Report goes on to explain how foreign powers may engage both in intelligence gathering and other nefarious intelligence activities:
Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor ofthe foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.
Consistent with this discussion, a U.S. person engaged in political action or other non intelligence gathering activity also may fall within the definition of an agent of a foreign power. This is the case if the person knowingly aids or abets, or conspires with:
any person who ... pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States.
Because these other activities may come closer to activity protected by the First Amendment, the required level of criminal involvement is higher in this definition. The House Report explains that:
The activities engaged in must presently involve or be about to involve a violation of Federal criminal law. Again, this is a higher standard than is found in the other definitions, where the activities "may" involve a violation of law. In this area where there is close [sic] line between protected First Amendment activity and the activity giving rise to surveillance, it is most important that where surveillance does occur the activity be such that it involves or is about to involve a violation of a Federai criminal statute.
The House Report also discusses the "aiding or abetting" provision at length and says that FISA:
allows surveillance of any person, including a U.S. person, who knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described .... The knowledge requirement is applicable to both the status of the person being aided by the proposed subject of the surveillance and the nature ofthe activity being promoted. This standard requires the Government to establish probable cause that the prospective target knows both that the person with whom he is conspiring or whom he is aiding or abetting is engaged in the described activities as an agent of a foreign power and that his own conduct is assisting or furthering such activities.
The Report goes on to explain how the earlier surveillance of Martin Luther King, which was justified based on his association with members ofthe Communist Party, would not meet this standard:
An illustration ofthe "knowing" requirement is provided by the case of Dr. Martin Luther King. Dr. King was subjected to electronic surveillance on "national security grounds" when he continued to associate with two advisers whom the Government had apprised him were suspected of being American Communist Party members and by implication, agents of a foreign power. Dr. King's mere continued association and consultation with those advisers, despite the Government's warnings, would clearly not have been a sufficient basis under this bill to target Dr. King as the subject of electronic surveillance. Indeed, even ifthere had been probable cause to believe that the advisers alleged to be Communists were engaged in criminal clandestine intelligence activity for a foreign power within the meaning ofthis section, and even if there were probable cause to believe Dr. King was aware they were acting for a foreign power, it would also have been necessary under this bill to establish probable cause that Dr. King was knowingly engaged in furthering his advisers' criminal clandestine intelligence activities. Absent one or more ofthese required showings, Dr. King could not have been found to be one who knowingly aids or abets a foreign agent. As noted above, however, the "knowing" requirement can be satisfied by circumstantial evidence, and there is no requirement for the Government to disprove lack of knowledge where the circumstances were such that a reasonable man would know what he was doing.
The King excerpt underscores the need for the target to be knowingly furthering the criminal clandestine intelligence activities ofthose whom he is aiding, but it also explains that such knowledge may be inferred.
2. Protection ofFirst Amendment activities
n enacting FISA, Congress recognized that "there may often be a narrow line between covert action and lawful activities undertaken by Americans in the exercise of their [F]irst [A]mendment rights." 130 FISA thus includes a provision similar to the one found in the AGG Dom and prohibits any U.S. person from being "considered ... an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment." 131 The House Report explains that "this provision is intended to reinforce the intent of the committee that lawful political activities should never be the sole basis for a finding of probable cause to believe that a U.S. person is ... an agent of a foreign power."
3. Certification by Executive Branch official
An application for electronic surveillance under FISA requires a certification by the Director of the FBI or a similar official. The official must certify that a significant purpose of the electronic surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information. 133 One definition of foreign intelligence found in the statute is "information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that ... is necessary to ... the national defense or security of the United States ... or the conduct of the foreign affairs ofthe United States." The House Report says that this category includes information necessary to national defense or security and the conduct of foreign affairs. It does "not include information solely about the views ... or activities of ... private citizens concerning the foreign affairs or national defense ofthe United States." Another definition of foreign intelligence is information "necessary ... to protect against ... clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network ofa foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power." The certifying official must designate the type or types of foreign intelligence information sought, and include an explanation of the basis for that certification.
The official must also certify that the foreign intelligence sought cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques, and the official must explain the basis for that certification. In other words, the official must explain why the government cannot obtain the information sought through other, less intrusive techniques, such as checking government iecords and publicly available information, interviewing the target of the surveillance, or using informants. "This requirement," the House Report says, "is particularly important in those cases when U.S. citizens or resident aliens are the target ofthe surveillance."
he certification requirement thus applies to the purpose of the surveillance and to the use of electronic surveillance as an investigative technique. By its terms, it does not apply to the accuracy of the factual information in the application. That is addressed by the sworn statement of an FBI agent or other federal official, and by the Executive Branch requirements described below.
4. Executive Branch requirements
Over 20 years ago, the FBI adopted procedures designed to ensure the accuracy ofthe information contained in PISA applications. These are often referred to as the "Woods Procedures," after their principal author. The recent OIG reviews ofthe Page and other FISA applications raised concerns about compliance with the Woods Procedures and the accuracy and completeness ofthe information in FISA applications. As a result, the Department has made numerous filings with the FISC, and the FISC has also directed that changes be made:
For all applications, the FBI now requires that both an agent and a supervisor must affirm that the Office oflntelligence ("OI") ofNSD, which represents the Government before the FISC, "has been apprised of all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information in the application or otherwise raise doubts about the requested probable cause findings or the theory of the case."
• Before the government files an application for electronic surveillance ofa federal elected official, a candidate for federal office, or a staffer ofsuch a person, the Attorney General has directed that an FBI field office not involved in the investigation must "review[] the case file and evaluate
• the proposed filing for accuracy and completeness."
The Attorney General also has imposed other limitations on applications for electronic surveillance in politically sensitive matters:
• Defensive briefings. Before the government files an application with the FISC, the FBI Director must consider "conducting a defensive briefing ofthe target." Then, either the FBI must conduct a briefing or, "ifthe Director determines that such a briefing is not appropriate," the Director must document that determination in writing. This is in addition to the general requirement described above for the FBI to establish procedures for defensive briefings.
• Duration of surveillance. The maximum duration the government may seek from the FISC for a surveillance is 60 days. This is shorter than the statutorily permitted 90-day maximum for surveillance of a U.S. person. In addition, every 30 days, the government must report to the FISC "on the results of the approved surveillance and the continued need for such authority.
D. Statutes Used to Evaluate Possible Criminal Conduct
This section begins with a brief description of the burden of proof that the government faces in every criminal case. It then describes the principal statutes that we considered to evaluate possible criminal conduct and exactly what must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a jury to convict.
Standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
The government has the burden of proving that a defendant committed any criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A standard jury instruction on reasonable doubt is:
The government has the burden of proving [ name of defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not, or; in some cases, that its truth is highly probable. In criminal cases such as this one, the government's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt, as the name implies, is a doubt based on reason-a doubt for which you have a reason based upon the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. If, after careful, honest, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you cannot say that you are firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt, then you have a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person, after careful and thoughtful reflection, to hesitate to act in the graver or more important matters in life. However, it is not an imaginary doubt, nor a doubt based on speculation or guesswork; it is a doubt based on reason. The government is not required to prove guilt beyond all doubt, or to a mathematical or scientific certainty. Its burden is to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. False statements
The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to government investigators is 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As relevant here, subsection 100l(a)(2) makes it a crime "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive ... branch of the Government" knowingly and willfully to "make
• any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation." The government must prove five elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under this provision:
First, the defendant made a statement or representation; Second, the statement or representation was false, fictitious or fraudulent;
Third, this statement or representation was material;
Fourth, the false, fictitious or fraudulent statement was made knowingly and willfully;
and Fifth, the statement or representation was made in a matter within the jurisdiction ofthe executive branch of the government.
The Mueller Report contains additional discussion ofthese requirements:
An FBI investigation is a matter within the Executive Branch's jurisdiction. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984). The statute also applies to a subset of legislative branch actions-viz., administrative matters and "investigations or reviews" conducted by a congressional committee or subcommittee. 18 U.S.C. § l00l(c)(l) and (2); see United States v. Pickett, 353 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Whether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non-jurisdictional elements: the statement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; the defendant knew both that it was false and that it was unlawful to make a false statement; and the false statement was material. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1222 n.27 (9th Cir. 2017)(listing elements); see also Ninth Circuit Pattern Instruction 8.73 & cmt. ( explaining that the section 1001 jury instruction was modified in light of the Department of Justice's position that the phrase "knowingly and willfully" in the statute requires the defendant's knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful). In the D.C. Circuit, the government must prove that the statement was actually false; a statement that is misleading but "literally true" does not satisfy section 100 I ( a)(2). See United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 832-33 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For that false statement to qualify as "material," it must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is addressed. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
3. Perjury
18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) provides that:
18 U.S.C. § 1621 provides that: Whoever-- having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law ofthe United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury ....
The Department's Criminal Resources Manual states that sections 1621 and 1623 share four common elements. The government must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Manual summarizes these elements as follows:
The first element of a perjury offense is that the defendant must be under oath during his testimony, declaration or certification, uniess the perjurious statement is an unswom declaration permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The second essential element ... is that the defendant must have made a false statement. The third element ... is proof of specific intent, that is, that the defendant made the false statement with knowledge of its falsity, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory. The false statement must be material to the proceedings.
In addition to the text quoted above, the Manual explains each of the requirements in more detail as well as the differences among the statutory provisions.
4. Falsification of records
18 U.S.C. § 1519 imposes criminal liability on any person who: knowingly ... falsifies [] or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency ofthe United States ... or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter.
The government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under section 1519:
First, the defendant knowingly falsified a document; Second, the defendant did so with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence an investigation [or] the proper administration ofa matter; and Third, the investigation or matter was within the jurisdiction ofthe Department, the FBI, or another federal department or agency.
5. Obstruction of justice
There are several statutes that cover conduct intended to obstruct or impede government investigations. 154 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) is an omnibus obstruction-of-justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or contemplated official proceedings. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1505 also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury, judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings, and they are supplemented by a provision in section 1512(6) aimed specifically at conduct intended to prevent or hinder the communication to law enforcement of information related to a federal crime. The Mueller Report describes these requirements and noted that "[t]hree basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes pertinent to the Office's charging decisions: an obstructive act; some form of nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding; and criminal (re., corrupt) intent."
6. Violation ofcivil rights
18 U.S.C. § 242 makes it a crime for anyone, acting under color of law, willfully to deprive any person of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under section 242: First, the defendant deprived the person of an identified right, such as the right to due process of law, secured by the Constitution or laws ofthe United States.
Second, the defendant acted willfully, that is, the defendant committed such act or acts with a bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, specifically intending to deprive the person ofthat right. To find that the defendant was acting willfully, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant knew the specific constitutional provision or federal law that his or her conduct violated. But the defendant must have a specific intent to deprive the person of a right protected by the Constitution or federal law.
Third, the defendant acted under color of law. Acting "under color of law" means acts done under any state law, county or city ordinance, or other governmental regulation, and acts done according to a custom of some governmental agency. It means that the defendant acted in his or her official capacity or else claimed to do so, but abused or misused his or her power by going beyond the bounds of lawful authority.
7. Conspiracy to violate civil rights
156 7. Conspiracy to violate civil rights 18 U .S.C. § 241 makes it a crime to conspire to deprive a person of his or her civil rights. The government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under section 241: First, the defendant entered into a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate a named victim; Second, the defendant intended to interfere with the named victim's exercise or enjoyment of a right that is secured (or protected) by the Constitution (or laws) of the United States; and Third, the named victim was present in any state, district, or territory of the United States.
General conpiracy statute
A conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 requires the government to prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, two or more persons in some way agreed to try to accomplish a shared and unlawful plan; Second, the defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the plan and willfully joined in it; Third, during the conspiracy, one of the conspirators knowingly engaged in at least one overt act as described in the indictment; and Fourth, the overt act was committed at or about the time alleged and with the purpose of carrying out or accomplishing some object of the conspiracy. 158 In addition to criminalizing an agreement whose object is to violate a federal criminal law, section 371 also criminalizes a conspiracy "to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof for any manner or for any purpose." This may also include interfering with the performance of official duties by government officials.
9. Campaign contributions
52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(l)(A) provides that "no person shall make contributions to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $2,000." The term "person" includes "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of persons." 160 "Contributions" are defined as, "any gift ... or deposit of ... anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 161 Contributions do not include, "the value of services provided without compensation by any individual who volunteers on behalf of a candidate or political committee." 162 Section 30116( c) provides for adjustments for inflation, stating that limitations for contributions by persons to federal candidates are adjusted every two years. 163 The limitation for an individual donor to a candidate committee for the 2015-2016 election cycle was $2,700.
Violations of section 30116 by a person qualify as a crime if, (I) the violation involved at least the amount specified in a calendar year, and (2) the violation was committed knowingly and willfully.
10. Campaign contributions by foreign nationals
Campaign contributions by foreign nationals 52 U.S.C. § 3012l(a)(l)(A) makes it a crime for "a foreign national, directly or indirectly ... to make a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal ... election." Subsection (a)(2)
11. Fraud against the United States
18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) imposes criminal liability on: Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, any scheme or artifice with the intent- (1) to defraud the United States; or (2) to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, in any grant, contract ... or other form of Federal assistance ... ifthe value of such grant, contract ... or other form of Federal assistance ... is $1,000,000 or more ....
The government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under section 103l(a):
First, the defendant knowingly used or tried to use a scheme with the intent to defraud the United States or to get money or property by using materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; Second, the scheme took place as a part of acquiring property, services, or money as a contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or a supplier on a contract with the United States; and Third, the value of the contract or subcontract was $1,000,000 or more.
I2. Money-laundering
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A) imposes criminal liability on: Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-- Ci) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
To obtain a conviction under section 1956(a)(l )(A), the government must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
To obtain a conviction under section 1956(a)(l )(A), the government must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant conducted ( or attempted to conduct) a financial transaction involving property constituting the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; Second, the defendant knew that the property involved in the financial transaction was the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and Third, the defendant acted either with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity or with the intent to engage in conduct violating certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 167 18 U .S.C. § 1957 imposes criminal liability on: Whoever ... knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $ I 0,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity [and does so either] in the United States or in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction ofthe United States [ or] outside the United States and such special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United States person.
To obtain a conviction under section 1957, the government must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, the defendant engaged (or attempted to engage) in a monetary transaction in or affecting interstate commerce; Second, the monetary transaction involved criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000; Third, the property was derived from specified unlawful activity; Fourth, the defendant acted knowingly, that is, with knowledge that the transaction involved proceeds of a criminal offense; and Fifth, the transaction took place in the United States, or the defendant is a U.S. person. 168 Finally, 18 U.S.C. § l 956(h) imposes criminal liability on any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in section 1956 or 1957. To obtain a conviction under section l 956(h), the government must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, two or more persons reached an agreement to commit one ofthe specified offenses; Second, the defendant voluntarily and intentionally joined in the agreement or understanding, either at the time it was first reached or at some later time while it was still in effect; and Third, at the time the defendant joined in the agreement or understanding, he/she knew the purpose of the agreement or understanding.
13. Disclosure ofnational defense information
18 U.S.C. § 793(d) imposes criminal liability on: Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage ofany foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it.
Modern Federal Jury Instructions summarizes the elements that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under section 793(d):
First, that the defendant had lawful ... possession of ( or access to or control over) [describe document]. Second, that the [document] was related to the national defense. Third, that the defendant had reason to believe that the document could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of [name of foreign country]. Fourth, that on [insert date], the defendant willfully communicated (or delivered or transmitted or caused to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempted to communicate, deliver or transmit) the document to [name of person], who was not entitled to receive it.
V. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROSECUTION DECISIONS
This section begins by providing factual information about the FBI' s New York Field Office ("NYFO") investigation of Carter Page in the spring of 2016 (Subsection A. l ); the text messages between certain FBI officials that on their face show a predisposition to investigate Trump (Subsection A.2); and the predication, opening, and conduct of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation (Subsections A.3 through A.5). This part concludes with a comparison of some of the FBI's investigative decisions related to Clinton with some of those related to Trump (Subsection A.6).
The remaining parts of this section each include a factual background and then describe the prosecutive decisions the Office made. The first addresses an investigative referral of a possible Clinton "campaign plan" (Subsection B). The next is an extensive discussion of the FISA applications targeting Page (Subsection C). The last part of this section covers conduct by private-sector actors in connection with Crossfire Hurricane and related subjects (Subsection D). In describing these matters, this section does not endeavor to repeat or restate all the information that the Office and others have covered and made public. Instead, it aims to add to that body of information, include additional relevant facts, and explain the prosecutive decisions we made.
The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel "to prosecute federal crimes arising from his investigation" of the matters assigned to him. What is stated in the Mueller Report is equally true for our investigation:
In deciding whether to exercise this prosecutorial authority, the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution set forth in the Justice ... Manual. In particular, the Office has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction for such an offense. Where the answer to those questions was yes, the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest, the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.
These considerations, as explained below, led the Office to charge three individuals with making false statements. The Office considered whether other individuals, including individuals in the government, made false statements to the FBI, the OIG, or congressional committees or whether, during the course ofthe Office's investigation, other individuals interviewed either omitted material information or provided false information. Again, what is stated in the Mueller Report is also true for our investigation:
Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office did not seek criminal charges against any individuals other than those listed above. In some instances, that decision was due to evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity. In others, the Office determined that the witness ultimately provided truthful information and that considerations of culpability, deterrence, and resource preservation weighed against prosecution.
The Office determined that other matters it investigated either did not involve the commission ofa federal crime or that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. In addition to its prosecution and declination decisions, the Office made the following referrals to other entities:
• A referral on June 30, 2020 to the FBI's Washington Field Office ("WFO") regarding a matter related to an existing counterintelligence investigation.
• A referral in December 2020 to OI of information relevant to the accuracy of information contained in four non-Page FISA applications. • Referrals oftwo matters on December 14, 2022 to the Inspector General ofthe Department of Defense with a copy to the General Counsel ofthe Defense Intelligence Agency. One matter involved the execution of a contract between DARPA and the Georgia Institute ofTechnology; and a separate matter involved the irregular conduct in 2016 of two former employees of the Department of Defense.
• A referral to the FBI's OGC and Inspection Division ofan FBI agent for failing to document properly the known history of Igor Danchenko upon his opening as an FBI CHS.
• A referral to the FBI's OGC and Inspection Division of the same FBI agent for questionable instructions given to Danchenko regarding the taxability of cash payments made to him by the FBI.
In addition to the referrals described above, the Office also provided information to the FBI's Inspection Division regarding certain activities by current and former FBI employees.
A. The Crossfire Hurricane Investigation
New York Field Office investigation of Page In late March 2016, Carter Page, an American energy consultant, was named a foreign policy advisor to the Donald Trump 2016 presidential campaign. Page's prior business experience was largely focused on Russian and Eurasian energy issues, and as such, he frequently interacted with various Russian nationals. Based on his previous Russian contacts, Page was known to the FBI and had been interviewed on three occasions between 2009 and 2013 by the NYFO. In 2015, Page was again interviewed by the FBI in connection with the indictment of three Russian intelligence officers in the Southern District of New York. According to the criminal complaint and subsequently returned indictment in that case, Page had been approached by the intelligence officers in an apparent failed recruitment effort. In the criminal complaint, one intelligence officer referred to Page, anonymized as "Male-1," as an "idiot," and Page does not seem to have been receptive to the recruitment efforts. Page was interviewed by prosecutors as a possible government witness in that case. One defendant, Evgeny Buryakov, pleaded guilty before trial and was sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment. The two other defendants in the case were protected by diplomatic immunity and are no longer in the United States.
In April 2016, shortly after Page was named as an advisor to the Trump campaign, the NYFO opened a counterintelligence investigation of him. According to the case agent in the matter ("NYFO Case Agent-1 "), in opening the investigation, the FBI was not so concerned about Page, but rather it was concerned about the Russians reaching out to Page. Moreover, NYFO Case Agent-I told the Office that there were no plans to seek FISA coverage on Page. NYFO Case Agent-I and her FBI supervisor informed the OIG that Page's role as a foreign policy advisor "did not influence their decision to open a case on Page." It may, however, have affected the timing ofthe case opening and increased interest in him. Indeed, Director Corney had earlier in April "requested relevant information pertaining to any Presidential candidate." In line with that directive, Corney was briefed on the Page investigation, which a week later was described as a "top priority" for the Director. At that time, FBI personnel in Washington prepared a counterintelligence report on Page for the Director. In July, the same personnel described the Page case, "and ones like it" as, "a top priority for Director Comey." In any event, despite Page's role as a publicly named foreign policy advisor, the FBI did not open the investigation as a "Sensitive Investigative Matter" or SIM_
A few months later, shortly after the FBI opened the Crossfire Hurricane investigation at FBI Headquarters and the four sub-files, including on Page, the NYFO's investigation of Page was transferred to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation at FBI Headquarters.
2. Evidence of predisposition to investigate Trump
The record reviewed by the Office demonstrated a rather clear predisposition on the part of at least certain FBI personnel at the center of Crossfire Hurricane to open an investigation of Trump. For example, Peter Strzok and Lisa Page were directly involved in matters relating to the opening of Crossfire Hurricane. Strzok was the Agent who both wrote and approved the electronic communication opening the matter from the very start as a full investigation rather than an assessment or preliminary investigation. At the time, Page was serving as Deputy Director Andrew McCabe's Special Assistant, and, according to Strzok, it was McCabe who directed that the Crossfire Hurricane investigation be "opened immediately" after information described more fully below was received from Australian authorities in late July 2016. Over a period of months prior to the opening of Crossfire Hurricane, Strzok and Page had exchanged numerous messages, which are already in the public domain and express a very clear prejudice against Trump. For example:
August 16, 2015: Strzok: [Bernie Sanders is] an idiot like Trump.
December 20, 2015 (After exchanging an article about Trump): Page: What an utter idiot. Strzok: No doubt.
March 3. 2016: Page: God Trump is a loathsome human. Strzok: Yet he may win [the Republican nomination]. Good for Hillary.
Page: It is.
Strzok: Would he be a worse president than Cruz?
Page: Trump? Yes, I think so.
Strzok: I'm not sure. Omg Trump's an idiot.
Page: He's awful.
Strzok: America will get what the voting public deserves.
Page: That's what I'm afraid of.
Page: God, Hillary should win 100,000,000 - 0. And holyshit Cruz just dropped out of the race. It's going to be a Clinton Trump race.
Strzok: Unbelievable.
Page: What?!?!?? You heard that right my friend. I saw Trump won, figured it would be a bit.
Strzok: Now the pressure really starts to finish the Clinton email investigation ...
Strzok: It sure does.
July 18, 2016 (During the Republican National Convention):
Strzok: Page: July 19, 2016: Strzok: Page: July 21, 2016: Strzok: July 27, 2016: Page:
Strzok: Oooh, TURN IT ON, TURN IT ON!!! THE DOUCHE BAGS ARE ABOUT TO COME OUT. You can tell by the excitable clapping. And wow, Donald Trump is an enormous douche.
Page: Hi. How was Trump, other than a douche? Trump barely spoke, but the first thing out of his mouth was "we're going to win soooo big." The whole thing is like living in a bad dream.
Strzok: Trump is a disaster. I have no idea how destabilizing his Presidency would be. Page: Have we opened on him yet? Trump & Putin.
Strzok: Yes, It's Really a Thing http://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/trumpputin-yes it-s-really-a-thing
Page: Opened on Trump? If Hillary did, you know 5 field offices would ...
(As discussed more fully below, the next day, July 28, 2016, FBI Headquarters received the Australian information that formed the basis for the opening of Crossfire Hurricane.
On Sunday, July 3 I, 2016, Strzok, as he has written he was directed to do by McCabe, immediately opened Crossfire Hurricane. He both drafted and approved (with the authorization of Assistant Director Priestap) the Crossfire Hurricane opening communication.) August 8, 2016:
Page: [Trump's] not going to become president, right? Right?!
Strzok: No. No, he's not. We'll stop it
Similarly, and as discussed in more detail below, FBI OGC attorney Kevin Clinesmith made troubling statements demonstrating a blatant political bias against Trump. Clinesmith, who played a central role in the Page FISA process, on the day after Trump's election as President, stated to fellow FBI personnel, among other things, "viva le resistance," an obvious reference to those individuals opposed to Trump. Although those involved in opening the Crossfire Hurricane investigation denied that bias against Trump was a factor in opening the investigation, the communications quoted above quite clearly show, at least on the part of certain personnel intimately involved in the matter, a predisposition to open an investigation into Trump.
3. The opening of Crossfire Hurricane
The FBI opened Crossfire Hurricane as a full counterintelligence investigation "to determine whether individuals associated with the Trump campaign were witting of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of Russia. " The starting point for the Office's inquiry was to examine what information was known or available to the FBI about any such ties as of July 31, 2016, prior to opening Crossfire Hurricane. That question then divided itself into two related questions:
(i) what was the information that predicated the opening ofthe investigation and
(ii) did that information support such an investigation being opened not as an "assessment" or "preliminary" investigation, but from the start as a "full" investigation. In exploring these questions, we determined the following:
a. The information used to predicate Crossfire Hurricane In March 2016, the Trump campaign identified George Papadopoulos as a foreign policy advisor.
Papadopoulos had previously worked as an energy consultant, with a particular focus on projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the time of his appointment, Papadopoulos was employed in the United Kingdom at the London Center of lntemational Law Practice.Among Papadopoulos's acquaintances in London was a diplomat from another country ("Foreign Government-I Diplomat-I"). Foreign Government-I Diplomat-I was familiar with an Australian diplomat ("Australian Diplomat-l"). On May 6, 2016, by prearrangement, Foreign Government-I Diplomat-I introduced Papadopoulos to Australian Diplomat-I. 208 On May I0, 2016, Papadopoulos and Australian Diplomat-I met again, and this time they were joined byAustralian High Commissioner Alexander Downer.209 Both meetings were over drinks in public settings. The Australian diplomats were interested in meeting with Papadopoulos because of his role in the Trump campaign, and much of the conversation centered on the upcoming U.S. election.
Over two months later, on July 26, 2016, Australia provided the U.S. Embassy in London certain information its diplomats had memorialized at or around the time ofthe meetings with Papadopoulos. The next day, the State Department passed this information on to the FBI's Legal Attache assigned to the Embassy in London ("UK Legat l")
"Paragraph Five" was the name given to the raw information provided by the Australian government and included in a May 16, 2016 cable that documented the diplomats' encounters with Papadopoulos. Paragraph Five is an abstract from the cable and was quoted verbatim in the Crossfire Hurricane Opening EC, stating in its entirety that: Mr. Papadopoulos was, unsurprisingly, confident that Mr. Trump could win the election. He commented that the Clintons had "a lot of baggage" and suggested the Trump team had plenty of material to use in its campaign. He also suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs. Clinton (and President Obama). It was unclear whether he or the Russians were referring to material acquirnd publicly of [sic] through other means. It was also unclear how Mr. Trump's team reacted to the offer. We note the Trump team's reaction could, in the end, have little bearing on what Russia decides to do, with or without Mr. Trump's cooperation.
The Australian account reflects that two meetings of a casual nature took place with Papadopoulos. These meetings were documented by Downer on May 11, 2016 and by Australian Diplomat-I later in the month. Both diplomats advised that prior to the Spring of 2016, Papadopoulos was unknown to them. Notably, the information in Paragraph Five does not include any mention of the hacking ofthe DNC, the Russians being in possession of emails, or the public release of any emails. In addition, when interviewed by the Office, Downer stated that he would have characterized the statements made by Papadopoulos differently than Australian Diplomat-I did in Paragraph 5. According to Downer, Papadopoulos made no mention of Clinton emails, dirt or any specific approach by the Russian government to the Trump campaign team with an offer or suggestion of providing assistance. Rather, Downer's recollection was that Papadopoulos simply stated "the Russians have information" and that was all.
As recounted to the FBI on August 2, 2016, by Australian Diplomat-I, the substance of Paragraph Five was written in a "purposely vague" way. This was done because Papadopoulos left a number of things unexplained and "did not say he had direct contact with the Russians."The impression Papadopoulos made on the Australian diplomats was wide ranging. On the one hand, he "had an inflated sense of self," was "insecure," and was "trying to impress. On the other hand, he was "a nice guy," was "not negative," and "did not name drop." Downer noted that he was impressed Papadopoulos acknowledged his lack of expertise and felt the response was uncommon for someone of Papadopoulos' age, political experience and for someone thrust into the spotlight overnight. Many people in a similar position would represent themselves differently and Downer would have sniffed them out. If Downer believed Papadopoulos was a fraud he would not have recorded and reported on the meeting he had with Papadopoulos.
Downer also said that he "did not get the sense Papadopoulos was the middle-man to coordinate with the Russians."
The Australian diplomats would later inform the FBI, and subsequently the Office, that the impetus for passing the Paragraph Five information in late-July was the public release by WikiLeaks ( on July 22, 2016) of email communications that had been hacked from the DNC servers. As far as the Office's investigation was able to determine, Papadopoulos's comments did not undergo any additional analysis by Australian intelligence officials.
b. The lack of intelligence information supporting the premise of Crossfire Hurricane
As an initial matter, there is no question that the FBI had an affirmative obligation to closely examine the Paragraph Five information. The Paragraph Five information, however, was the sole basis cited by the FBI for opening a full investigation into individuals associated with the ongoing Trump campaign. Significantly, the FBI opened a full investigation before any preliminary discussions or interviews ,were undertaken with either the Australian diplomats or Papadopoulos. Further, the Opening EC does not describe any collaboration or joint assessments of the information with either friendly foreign intelligence services or other U.S. intelligence agencies. In effect, within three days of its receipt of the Paragraph Five reporting, the FBI determined, without further analysis, that the Australian information was an adequate basis for the opening of a full investigation into whether individuals associated with an ongoing presidential campaign were "witting of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of Russia."
In his interview with the Office, Executive Assistant Director for National Security Michael Steinbach commented on the sufficiency of the information in the Opening EC, stating that it was "poorly written." Steinbach added that the EC should not be read to suggest that the FBI was investigating the Trump campaign, but only those potential subjects within the campaign whose activities justified inquiry.
Steinbach was also questioned separately by the OIG on the amount of information that should normally be included in an EC opening a counterintelligence case. He stated that it should be a logical summary sufficient to justify the opening. Steinbach told the OI G, by way of an example, "It's, hey look, I have Mike Steinbach on this date met with a Russian who we know is associated with this intelligence organization. And, lay that out, and open a PI (preliminary investigation). "
Although not referenced in the Opening EC, FBI officials have later pointed to the importance of the Australian information when viewed in conjunction with Russia's likely connections to the Wiki Leaks disclosures and its efforts to interfere with the 2016 U.S. elections. In addition, Trump had also stated in a recently televised campaign speech, "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing,"
A widely reported statement that appears to have referred to emails stored on the personal server that Clinton used while Secretary of State.
The evidence the Office reviewed shows that there were internal discussions with FBI Headquarters executives, including the Deputy Director, about the decision to open Crossfire Hurricane. The executives were unanimous in supporting the opening ofthe investigation and there is no indication that these discussions contemplated anything short of an immediate full investigation, such as an assessment or preliminary investigation, into the meaning, credibility, and underpinnings of the statements attributed to Papadopoulos.
The personnel involved in the decision to open a full investigation have stated that they acted within the FBI 's governing principles as set forth in the AGG-Dom and DIOG that required an authorized purpose and an "articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates" that an activity constituting a federal crime or a national security threat "may be" occurring. But notably the DJOG also explicitly cautions FBI employees to avoid reputational risk to those being investigated by, among other things, specifying different standards for opening an assessment, a preliminary investigation, and a full investigation, with a corresponding continuum of permissible investigative activities. That measured approach does not appear to have been followed with respect to Crossfire Hurricane. Instead, as described above, on a Sunday and just three days after receiving the analyzed information from Australia, Strzok authored and approved the Crossfire Hurricane opening EC. Thus, a full counterintelligence investigation into a SIM237 was triggered, at the height of a political campaign, before any dialogue with Australia or the Intelligence Community, and prior to any critical analysis ofthe information itself or the potential for the risk of error or disinformation, issues that appropriately are addressed during assessments or preliminary investigations.
a. The information used to predicate Crossfire Hurricane
In March 2016, the Trump campaign identified George Papadopoulos as a foreign policy advisor.204 Papadopoulos had previously worked as an energy consultant, with a particular focus on projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the time of his appointment, Papadopoulos was employed in the United Kingdom at the London Center oflntemational Law Practice.206 Among Papadopoulos's acquaintances in London was a diplomat from another country ("Foreign Government-I Diplomat-I"). Foreign Government-I Diplomat-I was familiar with an Australian diplomat ("Australian Diplomat-l").207 On May 6, 2016, by prearrangement, Foreign Government-I Diplomat-I introduced Papadopoulos to Australian Diplomat-I. On May I0, 2016, Papadopoulos and Australian Diplomat-I met again, and this time they were joined by Australian High Commissioner Alexander Downer. Both meetings were over drinks in public settings. The Australian diplomats were interested in meeting with Papadopoulos because of his role in the Trump campaign, and much of the conversation centered on the upcoming U.S. election. Over two months later, on July 26, 2016, Australia provided the U.S. Embassy in London certain information its diplomats had memorialized at or around the time ofthe meetings with Papadopoulos. The next day, the State Department passed this information on to the FBI's Legal Attache assigned to the Embassy in London ("UK Legat l")_"Paragraph Five" was the name given to the raw information provided by the Australian government and included in a May 16, 2016 cable that documented the diplomats' encounters with Papadopoulos.Paragraph Five is an abstract from the cable and was quoted verbatim in the Crossfire Hurricane Opening EC, stating in its entirety that: Mr[.] Papadopoulos was, unsurprisingly, confident that Mr[.] Trump could win the election. He commented that the Clintons had "a lot of baggage" and suggested the Trump team had plenty of material to use in its campaign. He also suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs[.] Clinton (and President Obama). It was unclear whether he or the Russians were referring to material acquirnd publicly of [sic] through other means. It was also unclear how Mr[.] Trump's team reacted to the offer. We note the Trump team's reaction could, in the end, have little bearing on] what Russia decides to do, with or without Mr Trump's cooperation.
In his interview with the Office, Executive Assistant Director for National Security Michael Steinbach commented on the sufficiency of the information in the Opening EC, stating that it was "poorly written."Steinbach added that the EC should not be read to suggest that the FBI was investigating the Trump campaign, but only those potential subjects within the campaign whose activities justified inquiry. Steinbach was also questioned separately by the OIG on the amount of information that should normally be included in an EC opening a counterintelligence case. He stated that it should be a logical summary sufficient to justify the opening. Steinbach told the OI G, by way of an example, "It's, hey look, I have Mike Steinbach on this date met with a Russian who we know is associated with this intelligence organization. And, lay that out, and open a PI (preliminary investigation).
Although not referenced in the Opening EC, FBI officials have later pointed to the importance of the Australian information when viewed in conjunction with Russia's likely connections to the Wiki Leaks disclosures and its efforts to interfere with the 2016 U.S. elections. In addition, Trump had also stated in a recently televised campaign speech, "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing,
4. Other investigative activity prior to the receipt ofthe Steele Reports
Between the time the FBI opened the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and when Crossfire Hurricane investigators first received the Steele Reports in mid-September 2016,298 the FBI took the following investigative steps:
• As discussed above, Strzok and Supervisory Special Agent-I met with Australian officials to verify the information provided by Papadopoulos.
• Records and open source data were checked on the four Crossfire Hurricane subjects. • Travel of the subjects was monitored.
• Some records were obtained from other federal agencies and a foreign government. • FBI CHSs and UCEs were used to engage with some of the subjects.
The OIG Review provides the following succinct summary ofthe FBI's investigative activity prior to the receipt of the Steele Reports:
By the date the Crossfire Hurricane team received the six Steele reports on September 19, the investigation had been underway for approximately 6 weeks and the team had opened investigations on four individuals: Carter Page, George Papadopoulos, Paul Manafort, and Michael Flynn. In addition, during the prior 6 weeks, the team had used CHSs to conduct operations against Page, Papadopoulos, and a high-level Trump campaign official, although those operations had not resulted in the collection ofany inculpatory information.
FBI personnel told the OIO that "[t]he FBI did not use national security letters or compulsory process prior to obtaining the first FISA orders." FBI Deputy General Counsel Anderson said that "early on ... FBI managers ... 'took.off the table any idea of legal process' ... because the FBI was 'trying to move very quietly. "
3. Allegations involving the Clinton Foundation
Beginning in January 2016, three different FBI field offices, the New York Field Office ("NYFO"), the Washington Field Office ("WFO"), and the Little Rock Field Office ("LRFO"), opened investigations into possible criminal activity involving the Clinton Foundation. The LRFO case opening communication referred to an intelligence product and corroborating financial reporting that a particular commercial "industry likely engaged a federal public official in a flow of benefits scheme, namely, large monetary contributions were made to a non-profit, under both direct and indirect control ofthe federal public official, in exchange for favorable government action and/or influence." The WFO investigation was opened as a preliminary investigation, because the Case Agent wanted to determine if he could develop additional information to corroborate th~ allegations in a recently-published book, Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer, before seeking to convert the matter to a full investigation.Additionally, the LRFO and NYFO investigations included predication based on source reporting that identified foreign governments that had made, or offered to make, contributions to the Foundation in exchange for favorable or preferential treatment from Clinton.
ith three different FBI field offices having opened investigations related to the Clinton Foundation, there was a perceived need to conduct coordination meetings between the field offices, FBI Headquarters, and appropriate United States Attorney's offices and components from the Department. These meetings likely were deemed especially important given that the investigations were occurring in an election year in which Clinton was a declared candidate for President Several of those meetings are described in more detail below. On February 1, 2016, a meeting was held to discuss the Foundation investigations. Present for the meeting from the FBI were, among others, Executive Assistant Director Randy Coleman, Criminal Investigative Division Assistant Director Joe Campbell and Acting OGC Section Chief-I. Those present from the Department included Criminal Division Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell and Public Integrity Section Chief Ray Hulser.
When interviewed by the Office, Hulser noted, in sum, that the FBI briefing was poorly presented and that there was insufficient predication for at least one of the investigations due to its reliance on allegations contained in a book. Hulser also downplayed the information provided by the NYFO CHS and recalled that the amount involved in the financial reporting was "de minimis."
Although Hulser declined prosecution on behalf of the Public Integrity Section, he told the Office he "made it clear, however, that his decision was not binding on the various U.S. Attorneys' Offices or FBI field divisions.'' Acting OGC Section Chief-I recalled that the Department's reaction to the Clinton Foundation briefing was "hostile."
Three weeks later, on February 22, 2016, another meeting was convened at FBI Headquarters to discuss the Foundation investigations. The meeting was chaired by McCabe. Present for the meeting from the FBI were, among others, Coleman, Campbell, and representatives from the affected field offices, including then-WFO Assistant Director-in-Charge ("ADIC") Paul Abbate. Representatives from the Department and the affected U.S. Attorney's offices were also present. At the meeting, McCabe initially directed the field offices to close their cases, but following objections, agreed to reconsider the final disposition of the cases. In his interview with the Office, Abbate described McCabe as "negative," "annoyed," and "angry."According to Abbate, McCabe stated "they [the Department] say there's nothing here" and "why are we even doing this?" At the close of the meeting, Campbell directed that for any overt investigative steps to be taken, the Deputy Director's approval would be required.
This restriction on overt investigative activity essentially remained in place until August 2016. Abbate recalled that FBI personnel from the field offices left the meeting frustrated with the limitations placed on them by the Deputy Director.
According to NYFO Assistant Director in Charge Diego Rodriguez, Coleman called him on behalf of Director Comey around May and directed the NYFO to "cease and desist" from the Foundation investigation due to some undisclosed counterintelligence concern. Coleman informed Rodriguez that Corney wanted to consult with Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis regarding the referenced counterintelligence matter. The Office was not able to determine what the counterintelligence issue raised by Comey was.
On August 1, 2016, a video teleconference meeting ("VTC") was held wherein the WFO and LRFO cases were directed to be closed and consolidated into the NYFO investigation. During this VTC, the NYFO was given authorization to seek subpoenas from the U.S. Attorneys' offices in the Southern and Eastern Districts ofNew York ("SONY" and "EDNY"). However, both SDNY and EDNY declined to issue subpoenas to the NYFO, despite previously expressing support for the investigation.
Once again, the investigative actions taken by FBI Headquarters in the Foundation matters contrast with those taken in Crossfire Hurricane. As an initial matter, the NYFO and WFO investigations appear to have been opened as preliminary investigations due to the political sensitivity and their reliance on unvetted hearsay information (the Clinton Cash book) and CHS reporting. By contrast, the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was immediately opened as a full investigation despite the fact that it was similarly predicated on unvetted hearsay information. Furthermore, while the Department appears to have had legitimate concerns about the Foundation investigation occurring so close to a presidential election, it does not appear that similar concerns were expressed by the Department or FBI regarding the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Indeed, in short order after opening the Crossfire Hurricane file and its four sub files, the FBI was having one of its long-time CHSs meet not with just one Trump campaign associate, but meet and record conversations with three such insiders. And a little more than a month after opening the Crossfire Hurricane file on Page, a "senior U.S. law enforcement official" was publicly reported as confirming for Michael Isikoff and Yahoo! News that the FBI had Page on its radar screen.
In the end, the perceived difference between the approaches taken and mindsets of FBI personnel central to both the Clinton and Trump matters is well-captured in a February 24, 2016 email between McCabe's Special Assistant Lisa Page and Strzok. Prior to the FBI's interview of Clinton in the investigation of her use of a private email server while she was serving as Secretary of State, the following exchange took place:
Page: One more thing: Clinton may be our next president. The last thing you need is going in there loaded for bear. You think she's going to remember or care that it was more doj than fbi?
Strzok: Agreed ....
C. Investigative Referral of Possible Clinton Campaign Plan
1. Factual background
The Office also considered as part of its investigation the government's handling of certain intelligence that it received during the summer of 2016. That intelligence concerned the purported "approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services." We refer to that intelligence hereafter as the "Clinton Plan intelligence.'' DNI John Ratcliffe declassified the following information about the Clinton Plan intelligence in September 2020 and conveyed it to the Senate Judiciary Committee:
• In late July 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian intelligence analysis alleging that U.S Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign plan to stir up a scandal against U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians' hacking of the Democratic National Committee. The IC does not know the accuracy of this allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication.
• According to his handwritten notes, CIA Director Brennan subsequently briefed President Obama and other senior national security officials on the intelligence, including the "alleged approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by Russian security services."
• On 07 September 2016, U.S. intelligence officials forwarded an investigative referral to FBI Director James Corney and Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Peter Strzok regarding "U.S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's approval of a plan concerning U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering U.S. elections as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private mail server."
The Clinton Plan intelligence was relevant to the Office's investigation for two reasons.
First, the Clinton Plan intelligence itself and on its face arguably suggested that private actors affiliated with the Clinton campaign were seeking in 2016 to promote a false or exaggerated narrative to the public and to U.S. government agencies about Trump's possible ties to Russia. Given the significant quantity of materials the FBI and other government agencies did in fact receive during the 2016 presidential election season and afterwards that originated with and/or were funded by the Clinton campaign or affiliated persons (i.e., the Steele Dossier reports, the Alfa Bank allegations, and the Yotaphone allegations), the Clinton Plan intelligence prompted the Office to consider (i) whether there was in fact a plan by the Clinton campaign to tie Trump to Russia in order to "stir[] up a scandal" in advance of the 2016 presidential election, and (ii) if such a plan existed, whether an aspect or component of that plan was to intentionally provide knowingly false and/or misleading information to the FBI or other agencies in furtherance of such a plan.
Second, the Clinton Plan intelligence was also highly relevant to the Office's review and investigation because it was part of the mosaic of information that became known to certain U.S. officials at or before the time they made critical decisions in the Crossfire Hurricane case and in related law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Because these officials relied, at least in part, on materials provided or funded by the Clinton campaign and/or the DNC when seeking FISA warrants against a U.S. citizen (i.e., the Steele Dossier reports) and taking other investigative steps, the Clinton Plan intelligence had potential bearing on the reliability and credibility of those materials. Put another way, this intelligence-taken at face value-was arguably highly relevant and exculpatory because it could be read in fuller context, and in combination \vith other facts, to suggest that materials such as the Steele Dossier reports and the Alfa Bank allegations (discussed below and in greater detail in Section IV.E. l) were part of a political effort to smear a political opponent and to use the resources of the federal government's law enforcement and intelligence agencies in support of a political objective. The Office therefore examined whether, and precisely when, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials became aware of the Clinton Plan intelligence; whether they vetted and analyzed the intelligence to understand its potential significance; and whether those officials, in turn, incorporated the intelligence into their decision-making regarding the investigation of individuals who were part of the Trump campaign and had possible ties to Russian election interference efforts.
Recognizing this uncertainty, the Office nevertheless endeavored to investigate the bases for, and credibility of, this intelligence in order to assess its accuracy and its potential implications for the broader matters within our purview.
Given the significance of the Clinton Plan intelligence, and the need to protect sources and methods of the Intelligence Community, we report the results of our investigation in bifurcated fashion. More specifically:
I) This section describes in unclassified form the circumstances in which U.S. officials received and acted on ( or failed to act upon) the Clinton Plan intelligence, as well as the nature and significance oftheir reactions to it;
(2) The Classified Appendix to this report provides further information about (i) the details of the Clinton Plan intelligence; (ii) facts that heightened the potential relevance of this intelligence to the Office's inquiry; and (iii) the Office's efforts to verify or refute the key claims found in this intelligence.
a. Relevant facts
Before addressing the U.S. government's receipt and handling of the Clinton Plan intelligence, we reiterate below the description of that intelligence as declassified by the DNI in his September 29, 2020 letter to Chairman Graham. Ratcliffe's letter stated, in part, as follows:
In late July 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian intelligence analysis alleging that U.S Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign plan to stir up a scandal against U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians' hacking of the Democratic National Committee.
As described herein and in the Classified Appendix, U.S. officials described the Clinton Plan intelligence in various other ways in their official notes and documents. As described more fully in the Classified Appendix, there were specific indications and additional facts that heightened the potential relevance ofthis intelligence to the Office's inquiry.
z. Receipt ofthe Clinton Plan intelligence
The Intelligence Community received the Clinton Plan intelligence in late July 2016. The official who initially received the information immediately recognized its importance including its relevance to the U.S. presidential election-and acted quickly to make CIA leadership aware of it. Materials obtained from former Director Brennan's office holdings reflect that he personally received a copy ofthe intelligence. When interviewed, Brennan generally recalled reviewing the materials but stated he did not recall focusing specifically on its assertions regarding the Clinton campaign's purported plan. Brennan recalled instead focusing on Russia's role in hacking the DNC.
On July 28, 2016, Director Brennan met with President Obama and other White House personnel, during which Brennan and the President discussed intelligence relevant to the 2016 presidential election as well as the potential creation of an inter-agency Fusion Cell to synthesize and analyze intelligence about Russian malign influence on the 2016 presidential election. Brennan's recollection was that he spoke with Director Corney on the morning of July 29, 2016, to brief him on his July 28th meeting with the President. Brennan could not recall when he actually saw the Clinton Plan intelligence, but he did not think he had the information when he spoke to Comey on that morning.
Immediately after communicating with the President, Comey, and ON! Clapper to discuss relevant intelligence, Director Brennan and other agency officials took steps to ensure that dissemination of intelligence related to Russia's election interference efforts, including the Clinton Plan intelligence, would be limited to protect sensitive information and prevent leaks. Brennan stated that the inter-agency Fusion Cell, a team to synthesize and analyze pertinent intelligence on Russian malign influence activities related to the presidential election, was put in motion after his meeting with President Obama on July 28th. Email traffic and witness interviews conducted by the Office reflect that at least some CIA personnel believed that the Clinton Plan intelligence led to the decision being made to set up the Fusion Cell.
ii. White House briefing
On August 3, 20 I 6, within days ofreceiving the Clinton Plan intelligence, Director Brennan met with the President, Vice President and other senior Administration officials, including but not limited to the Attorney General (who participated remotely) and the FBI Director, in the White House Situation Room to discuss Russian election interference efforts. According to Brennan's handwritten notes and his recollections from the meeting, he briefed on relevant intelligence known to date on Russian election interference, including the Clinton Plan intelligence. Specifically, Director Brennan's declassified handwritten notes reflect that he briefed the meeting's participants regarding the "alleged approval by Hillary Clinton on 26 July of a proposal from one of her campaign advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services.
iii. FBI awareness
The Office was unable to determine precisely when the FBI first obtained any of the details of the Clinton Plan intelligence (other than Director Comey, who attended the August 3, 2016 briefing). It appears, however, that this occurred no later than August 22, 2016. On that date, an FBI cyber analyst ("Headquarters Analyst-2") emailed a number of FBI employees, including Supervisory Intelligence Analyst Brian Auten and Section Chief Moffa, the most senior intelligence analysts on the Crossfire Hurricane team, to provide an update on Russian intelligence materials.The email included a summary of the contents of the Clinton Plan intelligence. The Office did not identify any replies or follow-up actions taken by FBI personnel as a result of this email.
When interviewed by the Office, Auten recalled that on September 2, 2016 - approximately ten days after Headquarters Analyst-2's email - the official responsible for overseeing the Fusion Cell briefed Auten, Moffa, and other FBI personnel at FBI Headquarters regarding the Clinton Plan intelligence. Auten did not recall any FBI "operational" personnel (i.e., Crossfire Hurricane Agents) being present at the meeting. The official verbally briefed the individuals regarding information that the CIA planned to send to the FBI in a written investigative referral, including the Clinton Plan intelligence information. Auten recalled thinking at the meeting that he wanted to see the formal Referral memo containing the Clinton lan intelligence.414 Separate and apart from this meeting, FBI records reflect that by no later than that same date (September 2, 2016), then-FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Bill Priestap was also aware of the specifics of the Clinton Plan intelligence as evidenced by his hand-written notes from an early morning meeting with Moffa, DAD Dina Corsi and Acting AD for Cyber Eric Sporre. The Office was unable to determine the exact contours of Priestap's knowledge, however, in part, because he declined to be interviewed by the Office on this subject.
iv. CIA referral and dissemination
Five days later, on September 7, 2016, the CIA completed its Referral Memo in response to an FBI request for relevant information reviewed by the Fusion Cell. The CIA addressed the Referral Memo to the FBI Director and to the attention of Deputy Assistant Director Peter Strzok. The Referral Memo, which mentioned the Clinton Plan intelligence, stated, in part:
Per FBI verbal request, CIA provides the below examples of information the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE fusion cell has gleaned to date [Source revealing information redacted]: [] An exchange ... discussing US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's approval of a plan concerning US presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering US elections as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private email server. According to open sources, Guccifer 2.0 is an individual or group of hackers whom US officials believe is tied to Russian intelligence services. Also, per open sources, Guccifer 2.0 claimed credit for hacking the Democratic National Committee (ONC) this year.
None of the FBI personnel who agreed to be interviewed could specifically recall receiving this Referral Memo, nor did anyone recall the FBI doing anything in response to the Referral Memo. Auten stated that it was possible he hand-delivered this Referral Memo to the FBI, as he had done with numerous other referral memos, and noted that he typically shared referral memos with the rest of the Crossfire Hurricane investigative team, although he did not recall if he did so in this instance.
In late September 2016, high-ranking U.S. national security officials, including Corney and Clapper, received an intelligence product on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election that included the Clinton Plan intelligence. The Office did not identify any further actions that the CIA or FBI took in response to this intelligence product as it related to the Clinton Plan intelligence.
v. Awareness by the Crossfire Hurricane investigators
The Office located no evidence that in conducting the Crossfire Hurricane investigation the FBI considered whether and how the Clinton Plan intelligence might impact the investigation. No FBI personnel who were interviewed by the Office recalled Crossfire Hurricane personnel taking any action to vet the Clinton Plan intelligence. For example, Brian Auten stated that he could not recall anything that the FBI did to analyze, or otherwise consider the Clinton Plan intelligence, stating that it was "just one data point.”
This stands in sharp contrast to its substantial reliance on the uncorroborated Steele Reports, which at least some FBI personnel appeared to know was likely being funded or promoted by the Clinton campaign. For example:
• During a meeting in London on July 5, 2016, Steele provided his first Report to Handling Agent-I. Handling Agent-1 's notes from the meeting reflect that "HC" was aware of his (Steele's) "Brit firm seeking info." While Handling Agent-I did not have an independent recollection of Steele explicitly stating that "HC" referred to Hillary Clinton, he could think ofno other individual - in that context - to whom "HC" could possibly refer.
• On September 23, 2016, Strzok sent a Lyne message to Brian Auten regarding the Michael Isikoff article that stated, "Looking at the Yahoo article. I can definitely say at a minimum Steele's reports should be viewed as intended to influence as well as to inform."
• On October 11, 2016, Strzok sent a Lyne message to OGC attorney Kevin Clinesmith noting that Steele's "unnamed client" was "presumed to be connected to the (Clinton] campaign in some way."
Nor did the Office identify any evidence that the FBf disclosed the contents of the Clinton Plan intelligence to the OI attorneys working on FISA matters related to Crossfire Hurricane. Similarly, the FBI did not disclose any of the Clinton Plan intelligence materials to the FISC (despite relying on the uncorroborated Steele reporting in its FISA applications concerning Carter Page, and we uncovered no evidence that anyone at the FBI considered doing so.
The Office showed portions of the Clinton Plan intelligence to a number of individuals who were actively involved in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Most advised they had never seen the intelligence before, and some expressed surprise and dismay upon learning of it. For example, the original Supervisory Special Agent on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, Supervisory Special Agent-1, reviewed the intelligence during one of his interviews with the Office. After reading it, Supervisory Special Agent-I became visibly upset and emotional, left the interview room with his counsel, and subsequently returned to state emphatically that he had never been apprised of the Clinton Plan intelligence and had never seen the aforementioned Referral Memo. Supervisory Special Agent-1 expressed a sense of betrayal that no one had informed him of the intelligence. When the Office cautioned Supervisory Special Agent-1 that we had not verified or corroborated the accuracy of the intelligence and its assertions regarding the Clinton campaign, Supervisory Special Agent-I responded firmly that regardless of whether its contents were true, he should have been informed of it.
Former FBI General Counsel Baker also reviewed the Clinton Plan intelligence during one of his interviews with the Office. Baker stated that he had neither seen nor heard ofthe Clinton Plan intelligence or the resulting Referral Memo prior to his interview with the Office. He acknowledged the significance ofthe reporting and explained that had he known of it during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, he would have viewed in a different and much more skeptical light (i) information the FBI received from Steele concerning Trump's purported ties to Russia and (ii) information received from attorney Michael Sussmann that purported to show a secret communications channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank.
vi. Other evidence obtained by the Office that appears to be relevant to an analysis ofthe Clinton Plan intelligence
As discussed above, according to the declassified Clinton Plan intelligence, on July 26, 2016, Clinton allegedly approved a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to tie Trump to Russia as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private email server. The Office interviewed a number of individuals connected with the campaign as part of its investigation into the Clinton Plan intelligence. One foreign policy advisor ("Foreign Policy Advisor-I") stated that she did not specifically remember proposing a "plan" to Clinton or other campaign leadership to "stir up a scandal" by tying Trump to Putin or Russia. Foreign Policy Advisor-1 stated, however, that it was possible that she had proposed ideas on these topics to the campaign's leadership, who may have approved those ideas. Foreign Policy Advisor-I recalled conversations with others in the campaign expressing their genuine concerns that the DNC hack was a threat to the electoral system, and that Trump and his advisors appeared to have troubling ties to Russia. Foreign Policy Advisor-I said it was also possible someone proposed an idea of seeking to distract attention from the investigation into Clinton's use of a private email server, but she did not specifically remember any such idea. Foreign Policy Advisor-I advised that she did not recall the FBI coming up in any campaign conversations she had.
Records obtained from Foreign Policy Advisor-I reflect that on July 27, 2016-the day following candidate Clinton's purported authorization of the plan - Foreign Policy Advisor-I circulated a draft public statement to certain of her colleagues. In the email circulating the draft statement, Foreign Policy Advisor-I urged her colleagues to sign the draft statement, which criticized Trump for his comments about the NATO alliance and asserted that Trump's public statements concerning NATO were too friendly towards Russia. In her cover email, Foreign Policy Advisor-I wrote, in part:
We are writing to enlist your support for the attached public statement. Both of us are Hillary Clinton supporters and advisors but hope that this statement could be signed by a bipartisan group. Donald Trump's repeated denigration of the NA TO Alliance, his refusal to support our Article 5 obligations to our European allies and his kid glove treatment of Russia and Vladimir Putin are among the most reckless statements made by a Presidential candidate in memory.
During the same week, Clinton's campaign manager, Robby Mook, stated in media interviews that the campaign believed that the Russian government had carried out the DNC hack to assist Trump's electoral chances, and that Trump had made troubling statements concerning Russia.
During an interview of former Secretary Clinton, the Office asked if she had reviewed the information declassified by DNI Ratcliffe regarding her alleged plan to stir up a scandal between Trump and the Russians. 44 ° Clinton stated it was "really sad," but "I get it, you have to go down every rabbit hole." She said that it "looked like Russian disinformation to me; they're very good at it, you know." Clinton advised that she had a lot of plans to win the campaign, and anything that came into the public domain was available to her.
In addition, the Office interviewed several other former members of the Clinton campaign using declassified materia!s regarding the purported "plan" approved by Clinton.
The campaign Chairperson, John Podesta, stated that he had not seen the declassified material before, characterized the information as "ridiculous," and denied that the campaign was involved in any such "plan." Jake Sullivan, the campaign Senior Policy Advisor, stated that he had not seen the intelligence reporting before and had no reaction to it other than to say, "that's ridiculous." Although the campaign was broadly focused on Trump and Russia, Sullivan could not recall anyone articulating a strategy or "plan" to distract negative attention away from Clinton by tying Trump to Russia, but could not conclusively rule out the possibility. The campaign Communications Director, Jennifer Palmieri, who was shown the Referral Memo, stated that she had never seen the memorandum before, found its contents to be "ridiculous," and could not recall anything "like this" related to the campaign. She stated that Podesta, Mook, Sullivan and herself were aware of a project involving ties between Trump and Russia being conducted by Perkins Coie, the campaign law firm, but she did not think Clinton was aware of it, nor did she receive any direction or instruction from Clinton about the project.
Another foreign policy advisor ("Foreign Policy Advisor-2") confirmed that the campaign was focused on Trump and Russia, but that focus was due to national security concerns and not designed to distract the public from Clinton's server issue. Foreign Policy Advisor-2 stated that she did not have a conversation with Clinton about a plan involving Trump and Russia during the Democratic convention, that she did not remember Clinton approving anything concrete, but that she would not necessarily have been involved in such strategy conversations.
The Office's review of certain communications involving Foreign Policy Advisor-I and Foreign Policy Advisor-2, however, arguably provide some support for the notion that the Clinton campaign was engaged in an effort or plan in late July 2016 to encourage scrutiny of Trump's potential ties to Russia, and that the campaign might have wanted or expected law enforcement or other agencies to aid that effort, in part, by concluding that the Russians were responsible for the hack.
For example, on July 5, 2016, Foreign Policy Advisor-2 sent an email to three other campaign advisors ("lndividual-1," "Individual-2," and "lndividual-3") in which she wrote:
We're looking for ways to build on Franklin Foer's great (and scary) piece on Trump and Russia.450 One thing I've heard from a few folks is that the Russia desk at State has been tracking (and sounding an internal alarm) about parallels between rhetoric/words/methods that Trump uses and Putin-supported European right-wing candidates. I'm told it goes beyond just populist stuff I'd love to get my hands on details of what they are seeing - can one of you help run this down? I imagine INR or IC [Intelligence Community] types might also have some insight - obviously need to be a bit careful here but eager to get specifics or details.
Foreign Policy Advisor-2 stated that she did not speak with anyone at the State Department about this issue. The information she mentioned in this email regarding the State Department's Russia desk came from an outside advisor who formerly worked at the State Department ("Outside Advisor-I").
In addition, on July 25, 20 I 6, Foreign Policy Advisor-I had the following text message exchange with Foreign Policy Advisor-2:
(Foreign Policy Advisor-2]: Can you see if [Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council member] will tell you if there is a formal tbi or other investigation into the hack?
[Foreign Policy Advisor-I]: [She] won't say anything more to me. Sorry. Told me [she] went as far as (she] could.
[Foreign Policy Advisor-2]: Ok. Do you have others who might?
[Foreign Policy Advisor-I]: Has [Individual-2] tried (her]?
Curious if (she] would react differently to [Individual-2]? can also try OVP [Office of the Vice President]. They might say more.
[Foreign Policy Advisor-2]: I don't know if he has but can ask. Would also be good to try ovp, and anyone in IC [intelligence community]
[Foreign Policy Advisor-I]: Left messages for OVP but politico just sent me a push notification stating that they are indeed investigating.
[Foreign Policy Advisor-2]: Fbijust put our [sic] statement. Thx4
In sum, Foreign Policy Advisor-1 's July 27, 2016 email to her colleagues regarding Trump, Russia and NATO - the day after Clinton purportedly approved a plan to tie Trump to Russia- is consistent with the substance of the purported plan. In addition, Foreign Policy Advisor-1 's text message exchange with Foreign Policy Advisor-2 supports the notion that at least some officials within the campaign were seeking information about the FBI's response to the DNC hack, which would be consistent with, and a means of furthering, the purported plan.
Moreover, the campaign's funding of the Steele Reports and Alfa Bank allegations as described in greater detail in Sections IV.D. l.b.ii and IV.E. l.b provide some additional support for the credibility to the information set forth in the Clinton Plan intelligence.
ii. Other events occurring at the time ofthe purported approval ofthe Clinton Plan intelligence
As set forth in Section IV.D. l .h.i, some of the significant Steele Dossier reporting related to Carter Page and his alleged role as a conduit for passing Russian information between Paul Manafort and the Trump campaign. This uncorroborated allegation is significantly undercut by the evidence examined by the Office and that, at the time, was in the possession of the Crossfire Hurricane investigators. As discussed below, this evidence was never presented to OI or the FISC at any time during the pendency ofthe Page FISA surveillance.
Furthermore, the evidence gathered by the Office revealed a concerted effort on the part of Fusion GPS in late July 20 I 6 - i.e., the same timeframe the Clinton Plan intelligence was purportedly approved - to communicate with the press regarding the Page allegations in the Steele reporting. For example:
• On July 19, 2016, Peter Fritsch of Fusion GPS emailed Steve Le Vine, identified in his signature block as a Washington correspondent for Quartz, and asked of LeVine "have you ever come across this cat carter page? He strikes me as a fraud ...." Mr. LeVine responded that he knew Page, he (Le Vine) was on vacation, but would reach out when he returned.
• On July 22, 2016, Fritsch emailed Franklin Foer of Slate stating "now we need to do the next level, which is in the works." Foer responded, "Good deal -what's the next level? And is it a sex scandal?" Fritsch replied, "it's who carter page met with in early july and what they taiked about."
• On July 25, 2016, Mark Hosenball of Reuters sent Glenn Simpson at Fusion GPS an email stating "if you have stuff on the Carter Page guy, including his most recent Russian excursion, pls. send. Doing two Russian hacking stories today and might be able to do another as early as tomorrow."
• On July 26, 2016, Fritsch emailed Jay Solomon of the Wall Street Journal and wrote: "OTR the easy scoop waiting for confirmation: that dude carter page met with igor sechin when he went to moscow earlier this month. sechin discussed energy deals and possible lifting of sanctions on himself et al. he also met with a senior kremlin official called divyekin who told page they have good kompromat on hillary and offered to help. he also warned page they have good kompromat on the donald. i know of one person who is chasing this and has asked kremlin re these meets. the response: there was no meeting between sechin and page "at the kremlin." uh, well, ok ... maybe somewhere else? no comment. needless to say, a senior trump advisor meeting with a former kgb official close to putin, who is on the treasury sanctions list, days before the republican convention and a big russian-backed wikileak would be huge news." That same day, Solomon responded, "Page is neither confirming nor denying." Fritsch replied "call adam schiff or difi [in context, Sen. Diane Feinstein] for that matter. i bet they are concerned about what page was doing other than giving a speech over 3 days in moscow." Fritsch later emailed Solomon that "its kind of hard to believe that the wsj is ignoring the russia stuff. literally everyone is chasing this [expletive] now."
• Also, on July 26, 2016-the date of the purported approval of the Clinton Plan intelligence - Fritsch reached back out to Steve LeVine of Quartz, and wrote "So carter page is ofsome urgency now. Can you talk? " LeVine replied that he could and asked if Fritsch wanted to talk by phone.
• On that same date, July 26, 2016, Glenn Simpson emailed Jane Mayer ofNew Yorker magazine with the subject line "Carter Page." Simpson wrote, "Jane- I understand that you are interested in him."Two days later, Mayer responded to Simpson advising him that her editor, among others, was "interested in setting up an off the record meeting to discuss stories, and learn more about your research.
• On July 28, 2016, Simpson sent Jake Berkowitz, an employee at Fusion GPS, an email with the subject line "carter page TLO/ clear."466 Simpson asked Berkowitz to send "the carter page TLO/clear" to Tom Hamburger "asap" at the Washington Post. Later that same day, Berkowitz sent Hamburger a copy of the "carter page clear" information.
• Importantly, on the very next day, July 29, 2016, Hamburger emailed Simpson with subject line "Re: fyi, we are getting kick back to the idea," and wrote "That Page met with Sechin and Ivanov, 'It's [expletive}. Impossible,' said one ofour Moscow sources," Simpson responded to Hamburger's email and stated "ok."Hamburger then emailed Simpson "FYI, passed on by another reporter who likely doesn't like this story. Just letting you know ...
Thus, in one day - and months before the Crossfire Hurricane investigators used the alleged Page meetings in its initial and subsequent renewal FISA applications - a Moscow-based U.S. media source for the Washington Post appears to have been able to debunk to its satisfaction the Page meetings.
Several weeks later, on September 16, 2016, Fritsch emailed Michael Isikoff of Yahoo! News. As discussed below, on September 23, 2016, Isikoffwas the first journalist to publish an article about the alleged meetings between Page and Sechin. Fritsch wrote, "Glenn [Simpson] says you may soon break the carter page story? I ask cuz if so I'm gonna stiff-arm someone else chasing ... " Isikoff replied, "got it, am going to talk to glenn [Simpson] on [sic] a bit." Thereafter, on September 20, 2016, Simpson sent Isikoff a Word document identified as a transcript of Page's July 7, 2016 speech in Moscow.
The above-quoted emails from Fusion GPS to members of the media are a sampling of the correspondence regarding Carter Page that the Clinton/DNC-funded Fusion GPS sent to various members of the media from late July 2016 (the purported date the Clinton Plan intelligence was approved) through the fall of 2016.
In addition, as relates to the Clinton Plan intelligence and as discussed in detail in Section IV.E. l .c.iii below, on September 19, 2016, Michael Sussmann, a lawyer at Perkins Coie, the firm that was then serving as counsel to the Clinton campaign, met with James Baker, the FBI.
General Counsel, at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Sussmann provided Baker with purported data and "white papers" that allegedly demonstrated a covert communications channel between the Trump Organization and a Russia-based bank, Alfa Bank. Sussmann' s billing records reflect that he was regularly billing the Clinton campaign for his work on the Alfa Bank allegations. Importantly, on July 29, 20I 6 - three days after the purported approval of the Clinton Plan intelligence - Michael Sussmann and Marc Elias, the General Counsel to the Clinton campaign, met with Fusion GPS personnel in Elias's office at Perkins Coie. Sussrnann billed his time in this meeting to the Clinton campaign under the category "General Political Advice." Thereafter, on July 31, 2016, Sussmann billed the Clinton campaign for twenty-four minutes with the billing description, "communications with Marc Elias regarding server issue." In compiling and disseminating the Alfa bank allegations, Sussmann consistently met and communicated with Elias.
On October 31, 2016 - a little over one week before the election - multiple media outlets reported that the FBI had received and was investigating allegations concerning a purported secret channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank.479 On that day, the New York Times published an article titled Investigating Donald Trump, F.B.l Sees No Clear Link to Russia. The article stated that the FBI possessed information concerning "what cyber experts said appeared to be a mysterious back channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank." The article further reported that the FBI "had spent weeks examining computer data showing an odd stream of activity to a Trump Organization server," and that the New York Times had been provided computer logs that evidenced this activity. The article also noted that the FBI had not found "any conclusive or direct link" between Trump and the Russian government and that "Hillary Clinton's supporters ... pushed for these investigations." On the same date, Slate published an article titled ‘Was a Trump Server Communicating with Russia?’ that likewise discussed at length the allegations that Sussmann provided to the FBI.
Notably, also on that day, Mother Jones published David Corn's article titled A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump: Has the Bureau Investigated this Material?" The Mother Jones piece referenced the Foer Slate article on Alfa Bank and also disclosed that it had reviewed memos prepared by the "former western intelligence official.'' Corn included information in his October 31, 2016 article that referenced the Isikoff s earlier Yahoo! News piece on Carter Page and the Russians. In addition, the Com article contained allegations that were consistent with those contained in some of the Steele Dossier reports that eventually were published in January 2017 by BuzzFeed.
In the months before the publication ofthese articles, Sussmann had communicated with the media and provided them with the Alfa Bank data and allegations. Sussmann also kept Marc Elias apprised of his efforts, and Elias, in turn, communicated with the Clinton campaign's leadership about potential media coverage of these issues.
On September 1, 2016, Sussmann met with the New York Times reporter who published the aforementioned article and billed his time to the Clinton campaign. On September 15, 2016, Elias provided an update to the Clinton campaign regarding the Alfa Bank allegations and the not-yet-published New York Times article, sending an email to senior members of the Clinton campaign, which he billed to the campaign as "re: Alfa Article.
On the same day that these articles were published, the Clinton campaign posted a tweet through Clinton's Twitter account that stated: "Computer scientists have apparently uncovered a covert server linking the Trump Organization to a Russian-based Bank."490 The tweet included a statement from Clinton campaign advisor Jake Sullivan that made reference to the media coverage ofthe article and stated, in relevant part, that the allegations in the articles "could be the most direct link yet between Donald Trump and Moscow[,] that "(t]his secret hotline may be the key to unlocking the mystery of Trump's ties to Russia[,]" and that "[w]e can only assume that federal authorities will now explore this direct connection between Trump and Russia as part of their existing probe into Russia's meddling in our elections." The fact that the Clinton campaign immediately issued a tweet concerning the articles - after funding the Alfa Bank allegations and receiving foreknowledge ofthe articles from Sussmann and Elias - tends to support the notion that the Alfa Bank allegations were part of a Clinton campaign plan to tie Trump to Russia.
Prosecution decisions
The aforementioned facts reflect a rather startling and inexplicable failure to adequately consider and incorporate the Clinton Plan intelligence into the FBI' s investigative decision making in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Indeed, had the FBI opened the Crossfire Hurricane investigation as an assessment and, in turn, gathered and analyzed data in concert with the information from the Clinton Plan intelligence, it is likely that the information received would have been examined, at a minimum, with a more critical eye. A more deliberative examination would have increased the likelihood of alternative analytical hypotheses and reduced the risk of reputational damage both to the targets ofthe investigation as well as, ultimately, to the FBI.
The FBI thus failed to act on what should have been -when combined with other, incontrovertible facts - a clear warning sign that the FBI might then be the target of an effort to manipulate or influence the law enforcement process for political purposes during the 2016 presidential election. Indeed, CIA Director Brennan and other intelligence officials recognized the significance of the intelligence by expeditiously briefing it to the President, Vice President, the Director ofNational Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and other senior administration officials. Whether or not the Clinton Plan intelligence was based on reliable or unreliable information, or was ultimately true or false, it should have prompted FBI personnel to immediately undertake an analysis of the information and to act with far greater care and caution when receiving, analyzing, and relying upon materials of partisan origins, such as the Steele Reports and the Alfa Bank allegations. The FBI also should have disseminated the Clinton Plan intelligence more widely among those responsible for the Crossfire Hurricane investigation so that they could effectively incorporate it into their analysis and decision-making, and their representations to the OI attorneys and, ultimately, the FISC.
Whether these failures by U.S. officials amounted to criminal acts, however, is a different question. In order for the above-described facts to give rise to criminal liability under federal civil rights statutes, the Office would need to, for example, identify one or more persons who (i) knew the Clinton campaign intended to falsely accuse its opponent with specific information or allegations, (ii) intentionally disregarded a particular civil right of a particular person (such as the right to be free of unreasonable searches or seizures), and (iii) then intentionally aided that effort by taking investigative steps based on those allegations while knowing that they were false.
In order to prove a criminal violation of the false statements and/or obstruction statutes by a government official, the Office would need to prove that the official willfully and intentionally failed to inform the FISC or caused another to fail to inform the FISC of the Clinton Plan intelligence in order to conceal that information from the Court. Similarly, to prove a criminal violation of the perjury statutes, the Office would need to prove, among other things, that the official made a false statement to the Court "with knowledge of its falsity, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory."
Although the evidence we collected revealed a troubling disregard for the Clinton Plan intelligence and potential confirmation bias in favor of continued investigative scrutiny of Trump and his associates, it did not yield evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any FBI or CIA officials intentionally furthered a Clinton campaign plan to frame or falsely accuse Trump of improper ties to Russia. Nor did it reveal sufficient evidence to prove that the omission of the Clinton Plan intelligence from applications to the FISC was a conscious or intentional decision, much less one intended to influence the Court's view ofthe facts supporting probable cause.
Moreover, any attempted prosecution premised on the Clinton Plan intelligence would face what in all likelihood would be insurmountable classification issues given the highly sensitive nature of the information itself.
In sum, the government's handling ofthe Clinton Plan intelligence may have amounted to a significant intelligence failure and a troubling instance in which confirmation bias and a tunnel-vision pursuit of investigative ends may have caused government personnel to fail to appreciate the extent to which uncorraborated reporting funded by an opposing political campaign was intended to influence rather than inform the FBI. It did not, all things considered, however, amount to a provable criminal offense.
D. The Carter Page FISA Applications
On April 1, 2016, Perkins Coie, a law firm acting as counsel to the Clinton campaign, "Hillary for America," retained Fusion GPS, a Washington, D.C.-based investigative firm, to conduct opposition research on Trump and his associates.495 Shortly thereafter, Fusion GPS hired Christopher Steele and his U.K.-based firm, Orbis Business Intelligence, to investigate Trnmp's ties to Russia. At the time, Steele, who again has stated that he was formerly an intelligence professional for the British government, was an FBI CHS. Beginning in July 2016 and continuing through December 2016, Steele and Fusion GPS prepared a series ofreports containing derogatory information about purported ties between Trump and Russia. According to the reports, important connections between Trump and Russia ran through campaign manager Paul Manafort and foreign policy advisory Carter Page. Steele provided the reports to the Department, the FBI, the State Department, members of Congress, and multiple media outlets. Steele styled the reports "Company Intelligence Reports," and each report contained an identifying number (e.g., Company Intelligence Report 2016/095). Collectively, these reports came to be known colloquially as the "Steele Dossier," and we refer to them in this report as the "Steele Dossier'' or the "Steele Reports." The reports played an important role in applications submitted to the FISC targeting Page, a U.S. person. The FBI relied substantially on the reports to assert probable cause that Page was knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of Russia, or knowingly helping another person in such activities. As discussed in more detail below, the FBI was not able to corroborate a single substantive allegation contained in the Steele Reports, despite protracted efforts to do so. The Steele Reports themselves, however, were not the only issue that we considered in connection with the Page FISA applications.
important role in applications submitted to the FISC targeting Page, a U.S. person. The FBI relied substantially on the reports to assert probable cause that Page was knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of Russia, or knowingly helping another person in such activities. As discussed in more detail below, the FBI was not able to corroborate a single substantive allegation contained in the Steele Reports, despite protracted efforts to do so. The Steele Reports themselves, however, were not the only issue that we considered in connection with the Page FISA applications.
• The FBI's relationship with Steele and its handling of the Steele Reports (Subsection V.D.1.b).
• The prior counterespionage investigation of Igor Danchenko, Steele's primary subsource for his reporting (Subsection V .D. l .c).
• Danchenko's relationship with Charles Dolan, one of Danchenko's subsources (Subsection V.D. l.d).
• The FBI's failure to investigate Dolan's possible role as a subsource for Danchenko (Subsection V.D. l .e). • Danchenko's purported contact with Sergei Millian, another subsource that Danchenko claimed to have received information from (Subsection V.O.1.f).
This section then turns to other aspects of the Page FISA applications:
• Information about Page's role as a source of another U.S. government agency (Subsection V.D. l .g).
• Meetings between FBI CHSs and Papadopoulos, Page, and a senior Trump campaign official (Subsection V.D. l.h). • Other shortcomings in the Page FISA applications (Subsection V.D
This section concludes with a discussion of the factors that the Office considered in its prosecution and declination decisions related to the Page FISA applications.
A few additional aspects of the FISA applications are discussed in the Classified Appendix.
1. Factual background
"Probable Cause" and the Page FISA applications
"Omissions of material fact," the FISC has stated, "were the most prevalent and among the most serious problems with the Page applications." The OIG, for its part, found in its review ofthe applications targeting Page "at least 17 significant errors or omissions" and "so many basic and fundamental errors."These were "made by three separate, hand-picked teams on one ofthe most sensitive FBI investigations that was briefed to the highest levels within the FBI." The OIG Review also found that FBI personnel "did not give appropriate attention to facts that cut against probable cause.
Also of concern, and the focus of this section, is that several Crossfire Hurricane investigators were skeptical of the information used in the Page FISA applications and, particularly as time went on, believed that Page was not acting as an agent of Russia and was not a threat to national security. Nevertheless, despite the surveillance's lack of productivity, FBI management directed the Crossfire Hurricane investigators to renew the Page surveillance three times.
i. The lead up to the initial Page FISA application
As has been noted by several individuals, including Deputy Director McCabe, the FISA on Page would not have been authorized without the Steele reporting. Indeed, prior to receipt of the Steele Reports, the FBI had drafted a FISA application on Page that FBI OGC determined lacked sufficient probable cause. Within two days oftheir eventual receipt by Crossfire Hurricane investigators, however, information from four of the Steele Reports was being used to buttress the probable cause in the initial draft FISA application targeting Page. Yet even prior to the initial application, the Page case agent, Case Agent-I, recognized that the FBl's reliance on the uncorroborated and unvetted Steele Reports could be problematic.
Indeed, on September 27, 2016, Case Agent-I exchanged the following FBI Lyne messages with another employee assisting with Crossfire Hurricane ("Support Operations Specialist-I"):
Support Operations Specialist-I: Hopefully Steele can get more detailed info though.
Case Agent-1: Support Operations Specialist-I:
Yeah, exactly. Dates, times, etc, would be key Yeah - it just goes down to how confident we are in that reporting There aren't a WHOLE lot of details in it haha, true.
Which is just what worries me a bit Hopefully the sources sub-sources are legit They seem legit based on past reporting
Yeah, no kidding. What was strange was that [British Intelligence Services] don't seem to want to deal with the guy. But there aren't many specifics in this reporting that couldn't be expanded on from open source Not sure why.
Yeah that's weird too If he has the sub-source network that he claims to have (and the reporting suggests), you would think they'd be interested in him. Though, maybe these are newly developed since he went to [British Intelligence Services]?
Yeah that's the weird thing. [Handling Agent-I] said it was the OC angle and that they're not too interested, but that still seems odd Who knows.
We may have to take a calculated risk with the reporting, if we 're pressedfor time.
This exchange between Case Agent-I and Support Operations Specialist-I underscores the fact that Case Agent-1, the principal contributor of the factual information contained in the request for the initial Page FISA application, had clearly recognized issues with using the Steele Report information due to the uncorroborated nature of the allegations and the lack of insight into the reliability of Steele's sub-sources. Indeed, an experienced counterintelligence agent like Case Agent-1 was no doubt aware of the need to evaluate the credibility and reliability of human source information.
The OI attorney who was responsible for preparing the initial FISA application ("01 Attorney-I"), recalled being constantly pressured to advance the FISA and FBI executive management being invoked as the reason for the pressure. OI Attorney-I advised the Office that FBI OGC attorney Kevin Clinesmith informed him that Director Corney "wants to know what's going on," and that Deputy Director McCabe asked who the FBI needed to speak with at DOI "to get this going." McCabe confirmed this basic push by the FBI and Corney when he was interviewed by the OIG investigators. McCabe told the interviewers that there was a lot of back-and-forth between the Crossfire Hurricane investigators and 0I regarding"[ w ]hen are we going to get it? When are we going to get it?" and that Corney repeatedly asked him "where is the FISA, where is the FISA? What's the status with the, with the Page FISA ?" McCabe noted that the FISA was something McCabe definitely knew Comey wanted.
This recollection also is consistent with email traffic and other FBI records in which the inclination on the part of Department personnel to move cautiously and FBI executives to move quickly are made clear. For example, on October 12, 2016, a meeting took place involving AD Priestap, DAD Strzok, FBI OGC Unit Chief-I and the Deputy Director's Special Assistant Lisa Page. Page's notes from the meeting reflect that Deputy Assistant Attorney General Evans had spoken with Strzok the night before and raised concerns about the proposed FISA. Page's notes show the following:
Lots of Qs re source's motivation re reliability/bias. Hired to do opp. Research, tasked network of subsources. - Don't know who his sub-source is, who their sub-sources are.
FISA bad idea from policy perspective.
Email out the [unreadable] hacked email to [Steele] re talking to the FB L
FBI OGC Unit Chief-I's notes from the same meeting reflect that Evans was concerned that ·'[Steele] may have been hired by the Clinton campaign or the DNC. ...
That same day, at 7: 13 p.m., FBI OGC Unit Chief-1 emailed OGC attorneys Trisha Anderson and Clinesmith to advise them that, "We raised Stu's concerns to the D[irector] and Deputy] Director] at the 130, and they are supportive if [sic] moving forward despite his oncerns. I just talked to Lisa, and she had reached out to Stu and will inform the DD. We're close to losing our operational window."
Over the next few days, Department and FBI personnel continued to exchange information on questions and needed clarifications in the draft application. On October 18th, Strzok emailed FBI OGC Unit Chief-I and Clinesmith and asked, "How significant were Bakers [sic] changes back when he reviewed? Ifthe DAG and we (investigative team) are good with the current draft, we need to ram this through. Thanks. I hate these cases."512 FBI OGC Unit Chief-I responded shortly thereafter:
Just talked to Lisa. Baker had a bunch if [sic] comments, but they were not directed to issue Stu's now made a bug [sic] deal about. I think if the investigative team is good with the facts and the DAG is good with the PC, then Andy [McCabe] should push (regardless of Baker's comments.)
The FISC approved the surveillance three days later, on October 21st.
NYFO Case Agent-I, the counterintelligence agent who led the NYFO investigation of Page, was never contacted by the Crossfire Hurricane investigators prior to the submission ofthe initial Page FISA application. When interviewed by the Office, NYFO Case Agent-I noted that the NYFO viewed Page as someone "we needed to watch" due to the Russians contacting Page, but she and others were never overly concerned about Page being an intelligence officer for the Russians. At no time during the course ofher investigation did NYFO Case Agent-I consider pursuing a FISA on Page. NYFO Case Agent-I later read the Page FISA applications and recalled seeing some aspects of her investigation referenced. NYFO Case Agent-I felt the language used to link Page to the Russians was "a little strong." Nevertheless, NYFO Case Agent-I assumed the Crossfire Hurricane investigation had uncovered additional information linking Page to the Russians. In fact, the additional information contained in the initial Page FISA application was largely taken from the Steele Reports and carefully selected portions of consensual recordings with an FBI CHS as described below. In retrospect, NYFO Case Agent-I viewed the Page investigation as a "waste ofmoney."
ii. The Page FISA application renewals
In late January 2017, Supervisory Special Agent-I transferred back to WFO. Supervisory Special Agent-1 was replaced in that position by an experienced counterintelligence agent assigned to WFO ("Supervisory Special Agent-3"). In his interview with the Office, Supervisory Special Agent-3 stated that, upon arriving at FBI Headquarters, DAD Jennifer Boone informed him that his primary tasking was to renew the Page FISA application. Despite this tasking, Supervisory Special Agent-3 stated that his investigators did not feel connected to the Page investigation and were excluded from the flow of information and decision-making process, an investigation that, according to Supervisory Special Agent-3, was still managed by the "Triumvirate of control" of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, namely, Strzok, Auten, and Section Chief Moffa. For example, during the course of their time on Crossfire Hurricane, neither Supervisory Special Agent-3 nor Special Agent-1, an investigator working for Supervisory Special Agent-3, knew that Page had previously served as a source for another government agency. When Special Agent-I eventually learned this information, he stated that he "felt like a fool." Special Agent-1 also recalled that Supervisory Special Agent- 3 would often rhetorically ask his investigators, "what are we even doing here."
Moreover, based on their review of the case file and the lack of evidence obtained from the FISA surveillance, neither Supervisory Special Agent-3 nor his investigators believed that Page was a threat to national security or a witting agent of the Russian government. Special Agent-1 and another agent working for Supervisory Special Agent-3, ("Supervisory Special Agent-2") shared Supervisory Special Agent-3's conclusion that Page was not a witting agent of the Russian government. Special Agent-I went as far to say that the surveillance on Page was a "dry hole."Nonetheless, Special Agent-I "assumed" that "somebody above them" possessed important information - unknown to the investigators - that guided the Crossfire Hurricane decision-making. 530 When Supervisory Special Agent-3 informed DAD Boone of his team's assessment, he was largely ignored and directed to continue the FISA renewal process.531 It was Supervisory Special Agent-3's opinion that Boone was being directed by FBI executive management to continue the FISA surveillance. 532 When interviewed by the Office, Boone did not recall Supervisory Special Agent-3 voicing concerns about the Page FISA, and stated that, if he had, she would have elevated those concerns to AD Bill Priestap. Boone did state, however, that it was not the normal course of business to have the "7th floor" (FBI executive management) intimately involved in an investigation and very unusual to have an investigation run from FBI Headquarters.
Boone did not know why the 7th floor was so involved in this case nor did she know who from the 7th floor was the ultimate decision maker regarding Crossfire Hurricane. Boone did not have direct communication with Deputy Director McCabe, but she understood that McCabe was heavily involved in all aspects ofthe investigation. Her sense was that Priestap was not in charge and had to get approvals from the 7th floor. On a few occasions, Boone "ran ideas" by Priestap and never heard back from him. Boone recalled occasions when, during Crossfire Hurricane, Priestap would direct field offices to open cases on particular targets associated with the Trump campaign and the field offices would push back due to insufficient predication. During one meeting, Boone and her investigators presented a "Russia Strategy" to Priestap. Boone could sense that Priestap was visibly upset by their strategy and walked out of the meeting.
Supervisory Special Agent-2 signed all three renewals ofthe Page FISA application. When interviewed by the Office, Supervisory Special Agent-2 stated that, after the initial FISA surveillance of Page, the investigators had "low confidence" that Page was a witting agent of the Russian government. In fact, at the time ofthe third renewal, Supervisory Special Agent-2 stated that the probability of Page being a witting agent was "very low."Nevertheless, Supervisory Special Agent-2 signed the final renewal because, in his opinion, it was incumbent on the FBI to exhaust all resources to ensure that Page was not a Russian intelligence officer. In essence, it appears that Supervisory Special Agent-2 saw the final renewal of the Page FISA as a "belt and suspenders" approach to confirm that Page was not a Russian agent. For his part, Supervisory Special Agent-3 told us that he would not have signed the renewal affidavits if he had been the agent responsible for certifying the accuracy of the government's assertions. The approach taken by Supervisory Special Agent-2, an experienced agent, is concerning. A U.S. person is an agent of a foreign power if there is probable cause to believe that the person is knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf ofa foreign power, or knowingly helping another person in such activities. That is an affirmative determination. FISA surveillance must be used for the purposes and in the ways specified in the statute rather than to prove that someone is not an agent of a foreign power.
iii. What the FBI knew from its intelligence collections as of early 2017
As the record reflects, as of early 2017, the FBI still did not possess any intelligence showing that anyone associated with the Trump campaign was in contact with Russian intelligence officers during the campaign. Indeed, based on declassified documents from early 2017, the FBI's own records show that reports published by The New York Times in February and March 2017 concerning what four unnamed current and former U.S. intelligence officials claimed about Trump campaign personnel being in touch with any Russian intelligence officers was untrue. These unidentified sources reportedly stated that (i) U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies intercepted communications of members of Trump's campaign and other Trump associates that showed repeated contacts with senior Russian intelligence officials in the year before the election; (ii) former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort had been one of the individuals picked up on the intercepted "calls;" and (iii) the intercepted communications between Trump associates and Russians had been initially captured by the NSA.
However, official FBI documentation reflects that all three of these highly concerning claims of Trump-related contacts with Russian intelligence were untrue. Indeed, in a contemporaneous critique of the Times article prepared by Peter Strzok, who was steeped in the details of Crossfire Hurricane, all three ofthe above-referenced allegations were explicitly refuted. Strzok's evaluation of the allegations included the following:
• The FBI had not seen any evidence of any individuals affiliated with the Trump team in contact with Russian intelligence officers. He characterized this allegation as misleading and inaccurate as written. He noted that there had been some individuals in contact with Russians, both governmental and non-governmental, but none of these individuals had an affiliation with Russian intelligence. He also noted previous contact between Carter Page and a Russian intelligence officer, but this contact did not occur during Page's association with the Trump campaign.
• The FBI had no information in its holdings, nor had it received any such information from other members ofthe Intelligence Community, that Paul Manafort had been a party to a call with any Russian government official. Strzok noted that the Intelligence Community had not provided the FBI with any such information even though the FBI had advised certain agencies of its interest in anything they might hold or collect regarding Manafort.
• Regarding the allegation that the NSA initially captured these communications between Trump campaign officials and Trump associates and the Russians, Strzok repeated that if such communications had been collected by the NSA, the FBI was not aware of that fact.
In a second article published by the Times on March I, 2017, bearing the headline, "Obama Administration Rushed to Preserve Intelligence of Russian Election Hacking," allegations were made that U.S. allies, including two named countries, had provided information describing meetings in European cities between Russian officials and other Russians close to Russian President Putin and associates of Trump. The article also repeated the assertions set forth in its February 14, 2017 article. Again, a review ofofficial FBI documentation shows that Strzok had reviewed and refuted these additional allegations in a second critique. With respect to the March 1, 2017 allegations, Strzok noted that no such information had been received from one ofthe named countries and that the only information received from the second named country, which was received in response to a specific request from the FBI, related to a woman of Russian descent purportedly having been in contact with fonner Trump National Security Advisor Michael Flynn. In this second critique, Strzok further noted that with respect to the information provided to the Times by the four unnamed fonner and current officials, the FBI (approximately three weeks after it was first reported) continued to be unaware ofany information, other than that provided by Christopher Steele in his dossier reports, alleging contacts between Trump associates and senior Russian intelligence officials. Thus, the FBI had no intelligence about Trump or others associated with the Trump campaign being in contact with Russian intelligence officers during the campaign at least as of early 2017. Moreover, significant intelligence information that first became available for the FBI to review in 2018 showed that the Russians had access to sensitive U.S. government information years earlier that would have allowed them to identify Steele's subsources. Indeed, an experienced FBI analyst assessed that as a result of their access to the information, Steele's subsources could have been compromised by the Russians at a point in time prior to the date of the first Steele dossier report. The review team initially briefed Counterintelligence and Cyber executive management about their findings during a conference call. Following the call, while driving home, Headquarters Analyst-3 was called by Acting Section Chief-2. Acting Section Chief-2 told Headquarters Analyst-3 that they appreciated the team's work, but no more memorandums were to be written. A meeting was then held with Assistant Director Priestap and others. During that meeting, the review team was told to be careful about what they were writing down because issues relating to Steele were under intense scrutiny. Two weeks later, the Deputy Assistant Director for Counterintelligence, Dina Corsi, met with the review team and directed them not to document any recommendations, context, or analysis in the memorandum they were preparing. The instructions, which Headquarters Analyst-3 described as "highly unusual," concerned the team because analysis is what analysts do. Although the team did not fully adhere to that instruction because ofthe need to provide context to the team's findings, they did tone down their conclusions in the final memorandum. Headquarters Analyst-3 recalled that a separate briefing on the review was eventually provided by the team in the Deputy Director's conference room, although Headquarters Analyst-3 could not recall if Deputy Director David Bowdich attended the briefing. Headquarters Analyst-3 did know that Bowdich was aware ofthe review itself.
he ended up walking away from further participation in the review. OGC Attorney-I said he felt guilty about leaving, but he felt he had to do it. The record thus reflects that at the time the FBI opened Crossfire Hurricane on July 31, 2016, as noted above in the SSC! Report, the Russians already knew about Steele's election investigation, and there is reason to believe that even earlier in time they had access to other highly sensitive information from which the identities of Steele's sources could have been compromised.
Finally, in May 2017, about a month before the submission of the last Page F[SA renewal application, Strzok was debating whether to join Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. He texted that he was hesitating about joining, "in part, because of my gut sense and concern there's no big there there."562 Although the "there" does not appear to have been explicitly identified, it may well have been a reference to the Russia - Trump collusion investigation. 563 In any event, and more generally, the OIG found that, "as the investigation progressed and more information tended to undermine or weaken the assertions in the FISA applications," the FBI "did not reassess the information supporting probable cause.”
The "Steele dossier"
Christopher Steele - FBI Confidential Human Source
Probable cause." b. The "Steele dossier" i. Christopher Steele - FBI Confidential Human Source Beginning in 2010, Christopher Steele started providing information to the FBI on a range of subjects including, but not limited to, Russian oligarchs and corruption in international soccer competition. Steele had been introduced to his eventual FBI CHS handler ("Handling Agent-I") by former DOJ official Bruce Ohr. In 2013, the FBI formally opened Steele as an FBI CHS, and Handling Agent-I would serve as Steele's primary handler over the course of his service as an FBI source. Steele would eventually be closed as an FBI source in November 20 I6 for disclosing his status as a CHS while providing information to the media regarding his work with Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton campaign and the DNC against Trump.
Nevertheless, the FBI - using Department official Bruce Ohr as a conduit - continued to receive information from Steele despite his closure as a CHS.
ii. The FBIfirst received the Steele Reports in July 2016
In July 2016, Handling Agent-I was serving as the FBI's Assistant Legal Attache ("ALAT") in Rome, Italy. In early July 2016, Steele contacted Handling Agent-I and requested an urgent meeting at Steele's office in London. On July 5, 2016, Handling Agent-I met with Steele in London and Steele provided him with Report 2016/080 dated June 20, 2016. This Report detailed, among other things, salacious information about Donald Trump's alleged sexual activities during trips to Moscow and details of how the Kremlin purportedly had been "feeding" information to Trump's campaign regarding his political rivals. Steele informed Handling Agent-I that he (Steele) had been hired by Fusion OPS to collect information on Trump, including Trump's relationship with the Kremlin and various business dealings with Russia. Steele told Handling Agent-1 that Fusion OPS had been hired by a law firm and that his ultimate client was "senior Democrats'' supporting Clinton. Handling Agent-1 's notes of this meeting reflect that "HC" was aware of his (Steele's) reporting. During an interview with the Office, Handling Agent-I was shown a copy of his notes from the July 5, 2016 meeting. As previously noted, while Handling Agent-I did not have an independent recollection of Steele explicitly stating that "HC" referred to Hillary Clinton, he could think of no other individual - in that context - to whom "HC" could possibly refer.
Steele claimed that prior to his July 5, 2016 meeting with Handling Agent-I, he and Chris Burrows, his co-principal at Orbis, had decided that the information collected by Steele had significant national security implications and therefore should be provided to the FBI and Fusion GPS principal Glenn Simpson agreed. At the July 5, 2016 meeting, Steele informed Handling Agent-I that he was working on additional reports for Fusion GPS. 577 As discussed in detail below, following this meeting, Handling Agent-I contacted NYFO ASAC-1 at the NYFO for guidance about the information Steele had provided.
Agent-I that he was working on additional reports for Fusion GPS. 577 As discussed in detail below, following this meeting, Handling Agent-I contacted NYFO ASAC-1 at the NYFO for guidance about the information Steele had provided. In his interviews with the Office, Handling Agent-I stated his initial reaction to Steele's reporting was disbelief. Handling Agent-I knew that Steele possessed strong feelings against the Russians and their threat to the world, and Steele felt that the possibility of a Trump compromised presidency would pose a global problem. °Furthermore, Steele explained to Handling Agent-I that the information was gathered at the request of Simpson who was working with an unidentified law firm in the United States for the purpose of acquiring information on Trump and his activities in Russia. In his HPSCI testimony, Handling Agent-I told the committee that he assumed Steele's tasking was "politically motivated." Notwithstanding his skepticism about the reporting, Handling Agent-I deemed the allegations to be something he could not arbitrarily discount, particularly since Steele was his CHS and someone in whom he had faith.
In his interviews with the Office, Handling Agent-I stated his initial reaction to Steele's reporting was disbelief. Handling Agent-I knew that Steele possessed strong feelings against the Russians and their threat to the world, and Steele felt that the possibility of a Trump compromised presidency would pose a global problem. °Furthermore, Steele explained to Handling Agent-I that the information was gathered at the request of Simpson who was working with an unidentified law firm in the United States for the purpose of acquiring information on Trump and his activities in Russia. In his HPSCI testimony, Handling Agent-I told the committee that he assumed Steele's tasking was "politically motivated." Notwithstanding his skepticism about the reporting, Handling Agent-I deemed the allegations to be something he could not arbitrarily discount, particularly since Steele was his CHS and someone in whom he had faith.
On July 19, 2016, Steele sent Handling Agent-I an additional Report (2016/94) detailing, among other things, an alleged meeting that Trump campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page had in July 2016 with Igor Sechin, Chairman of Russian energy conglomerate Rosneft, and another such meeting with Igor Divyekin, a senior official in the Russian Presidential Administration. This Report alleged details of (i) Page's conversations with Sechin regarding the lifting of U.S. sanctions, and (ii) Page's conversations with Divyekin about Russia being in possession of compromising information on both candidates Trump and Clinton. On July 28, 2016, Handling Agent-I forwarded Steele Reports 2016/080 and 2016/94 to NYFO ASAC-l. 585 These Reports - including four additional reports subsequently received by Handling Agent-I from Steele - only reached the Crossfire Hurricane investigators at FBI Headquarters on September 19, 2016.
iii. The delay in the FBI's transmission ofthe Steele Reports to the Crossfire Hurricane investigator
The Office endeavored to account for the nearly 75 days between when Handling Agent ! received the initial report from Steele in London and when the reports ultimately were passed to the Crossfire Hurricane team at FBI Headquarters. As discussed more fully below, these issues remain unresolved, and the Office has not received a satisfactory explanation that would account for the unwarranted delay. The FBI possessed the earliest Steele reporting claiming Russian efforts to assist the Trump campaign more than three weeks prior to the receipt of the information provided by the Australian diplomats concerning George Papadopoulos and the opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation on July 31, 20 I 6. The Office's investigation has revealed that - taken in its most favorable light to the FBI - the initial reports provided by Steele to Handling Agent-I in London on July 5, 2016, and then later in July 2016, met an inexplicable FBl bureaucratic delay. As a consequence, the Reports were not disseminated in a manner that would have allowed experienced FBI counterintelligence experts an early opportunity to examine the reports and subject them to appropriate analysis and scrutiny.
The failure to act resulted in a gap in time of approximately 75 days from when Steele initially shared his first report with the FBI on July 5, 2016, and September 19, 2016, when the Crossfire Hurricane investigators appear to have first received six ofthe Steele Reports. Despite the lack of any corroboration of the Reports' sensational allegations, however, in short order portions of four of the Reports were included in the initial Carter Page FISA application without any further verification or corroboration of the allegations contained therein. Due to conflicting recollections of those involved, significant gaps exist in our understanding of how and why this delay occurred in analyzing Steele's Reports. As discussed above, after meeting Steele in London on July 5, 2016,
Handling Agent-1 returned to Rome with Steele's first report (Report 2016/080). Handling Agent-I told the Office that he informed his immediate supervisor, ("Italy Legat-1 "), about the Steele reporting, which led to a conversation about what to do with the Report. 587 Handiing Agent-1 informed Italy Legat-1 that he intended to contact trusted colleagues in the NYFO for advice.
The Office endeavored to account for the nearly 75 days between when Handling Agent ! received the initial report from Steele in London and when the reports ultimately were passed to the Crossfire Hurricane team at FBI Headquarters. As discussed more fully below, these issues remain unresolved, and the Office has not received a satisfactory explanation that would account for the unwarranted delay. The FBI possessed the earliest Steele reporting claiming Russian efforts to assist the Trump campaign more than three weeks prior to the receipt of the information provided by the Australian diplomats concerning George Papadopoulos and the opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation on July 31, 20 I 6. The Office's investigation has revealed that - taken in its most favorable light to the FBI - the initial reports provided by Steele to Handling Agent-I in London on July 5, 2016, and then later in July 2016, met an inexplicable FBl bureaucratic delay. As a consequence, the Reports were not disseminated in a manner that would have allowed experienced FBI counterintelligence experts an early opportunity to examine the reports and subject them to appropriate analysis and scrutiny. The failure to act resulted in a gap in time of approximately 75 days from when Steele initially shared his first report with the FBI on July 5, 2016, and September 19, 2016, when the Crossfire Hurricane investigators appear to have first received six ofthe Steele Reports. Despite the lack of any corroboration of the Reports' sensational allegations, however, in short order portions of four of the Reports were included in the initial Carter Page FISA application without any further verification or corroboration of the allegations contained therein. Due to conflicting recollections of those involved, significant gaps exist in our understanding of how and why this delay occurred in analyzing Steele's Reports.
As discussed above, after meeting Steele in London on July 5, 2016, Handling Agent-1 returned to Rome with Steele's first report (Report 2016/080). Handling Agent-I told the Office that he informed his immediate supervisor, ("Italy Legat-1 "), about the Steele reporting, which led to a conversation about what to do with the Report. Handiing Agent-1 informed Italy Legat-1 that he intended to contact trusted colleagues in the NYFO for advice.
During that call, Handling Agent-1 summarized his July 5th meeting with Steele and Report 2016/080
NYFO ASAC-1 told the Office that he was unsure of what to do about the Steele Report, but that he verbally informed both his NYFO Supervisor, Criminal SAC Michael Harpster, and NYFO Chief Division Counsel-I, ofthe Steele reporting and requested their guidance. NYFO ASAC-1 believed that by informing SAC Harpster he was effectively placing the information in the right hands. According to NYFO ASAC-1, NYFO Chief Division Counsel-I assigned an Assistant Division Counsel ("NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I") to handle the matter.
No follow up activity appears to have occurred between the NYFO and Handling Agent I until NYFO ASAC-1 called Handling Agent-I on July 28, 2016, at which time he asked Handling Agent-I to send the Steele Reports to him. NYFO ASAC-I could not recall the reason for the two-week delay between his July 13th and July 28th calls with Handling Agent- 1. For his part, Handling Agent-I recalled that in the July 28th call, NYFO ASAC-1 advised him that FBI leadership, including an FBI Headquarters official at the Executive Assistant Director (''EAD") level, was now aware of the existence ofthe reports. That same day, Handling Agent-I forwarded to NYFO ASAC-1 Steele Reports 2016/080 and 20 I 6/94.
A few hours after receiving the reports, NYFO ASAC-1 forwarded them to SAC Michael Harpster. ;gs Harpster initially told the Office that he recalled receiving the Reports from NYFO ASAC-1, but did not read them in order to avoid taint issues with respect to the Clinton Foundation matter that he was overseeing. 599 Harpster recalled, however, that he immediately forwarded the Reports to his supervisor, Assistant Director-in-Charge ("ADIC") Diego Rodriguez. Harpster told the Office that he had no other involvement with the Steele Reports after he provided them to Rodriguez, and, further, that he could not recall speaking with anyone else about the reporting. According to Rodriguez, he recalled that there may have been a conversation with Harpster on this topic. The Office has found no record in FBI files to indicate that the reports were emailed to Rodriguez.
A review of FBI records reflects that between July 27 and July 29, 2016, SAC Harpster was visiting FBI Headquarters "shadowing" Executive Management as part of a career development opportunity. Records also reflect that, on the same day he received the Steele Reports from NYFO ASAC-1, Harpster met with several senior FBI officials at Headquarters. Harpster, however, told the Office that he could not remember receiving the Steele Reports while at Headquarters on July 28, 2016. Nevertheless, email records reflect that Harpster, in fact, received the Reports from NYFO ASAC-1 on July 28, 2016. The email sent by NYFO ASAC-1 contained the message, "As discussed." FBI phone records also reflect multiple telephone calls between Harpster and NYFO ASAC-1 on July 28, 2016. The first call occurred prior to transmission of the reports and the other calls occurred fo!lowing NYFO ASAC-1 's email to Harpster attaching the reports. FBI phone records also reflect a July 28, 2016 call between Harpster and Rodriguez after the reports were sent by NYFO ASAC-1 to Harpster. Thus, the records substantially corroborate NYFO ASAC-1 's version of events.
In a second interview with the Office, Harpster recollected that he sent the initial Steele Reports to the Criminal Cyber Response and Services Branch Executive Assistant Director ("EAD") Randall ("Randy") Coleman and the Associate Executive Assistant Director ("AEAD") David ("DJ") Johnson. Harpster also recalled that he met with Coleman and Johnson at · Headquarters on July 28, 2016. During these meetings, it appeared to Harpster that the FBI officials were already aware ofthe Steele Reports and that EAD Coleman appeared to have engaged in previous conversations with other FBI "higher ups" about the reports. During their interviews with the Office, neither EAD Coleman nor AEAD Johnson could recall any conversation with Harpster about the Steele Reports and they did not recall receiving the reports from him. 61 t In addition to his meetings with Coleman and Johnson, Harpster was scheduled to spend the entire next day (July 29th) in an executive management shadowing exercise with Deputy Director McCabe.
While Harpster was at FBI Headquarters, others in the NYFO were conferring internally to determine what to do with the Steele Reports. On August 3, 2016, NYFO ASAC-1 held a meeting with NYFO Chief Division Counsel-I and NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I, as well as NYFO Clinton Foundation Case Agent-2, who at the time was overseeing the NYFO portion of the fraud and corruption allegations involving the Clinton Foundation. When interviewed by the Office, NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I advised that he had been asked to provide legal advice on whether the Steele Reports, which he had not yet read, could be relevant to the Clinton Foundation investigation. NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I told the Office that he was effectively serving as a "taint" attorney to avoid potential conflicts for the NYFO corruption team if it were to access Steele's reporting. Shortly after this meeting, NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I had a discussion with Handling Agent-I about the Reports. On August 5, 2016, NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I received two Steele Reports from Handling Agent- I, and on August 25, 2016, NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I had a discussion with Handling Agent-I about Steele's role as an FBI CHS.
NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I ultimately concluded that the Steele Reports appeared to be related exclusively to Trump and were not relevant to the Clinton Foundation investigation. Moreover, NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I concluded that the Steele Reports should be examined by FBI counterintelligence personnel.NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I subsequently met with the NYFO' s ASAC for counterintelligence ("NYFO ASAC-2"). NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I told the Office that he did not provide copies of the Steele Reports to NYFO ASAC-2 in this meeting, but that NYFO ASAC-2 appeared to already be familiar with the Reports.
On August 29, 2016, NYFO ASAC-2 contacted Case Agent-!, one of the principal agents assigned to Crossfire Hurricane, stating, "We have a taint team in place up here. I am trying to get this reporting released to you so you guys can see it. Just debriefed today."On September l, 2016, NYFO ASAC-2 connected NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I with Case Agent-I and Supervisory Special Agent-I. In his email to Supervisory Special Agent-I, Case Agent-I, and NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I, NYFO ASAC-2 explained, "[NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I] has some information that I believe may directly impact your CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation. I would like [NYFO Assistant Divisional Counsel-I] to contact your team and deconflict the reporting." On September 2, 2016, NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I emailed Handling Agent-1, NYFO ASAC-2, and NYFO ASAC-1 stating, "I spoke to [Supervisory Special Agent-1] briefly yesterday evening ... [Supervisory Special Agent-1] has an open matter that touches upon what the CHS provided to you. We decided that he should create a subfile in the matter to serve as a repository for the information the CHS provided to you. It is my understanding that he did this last night." However, Supervisory Special Agent ! confirmed that Handling Agent-I was unable to upload the reporting to the case file until September 13, 2016.627 In his email ofthe same date to Handling Agent-I, NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I and Special Agent-2, Supervisory Special Agent-I notified Handling Agent ! in Rome that he (Handling Agent-I) has been added as a case participant to the restricted case file. Supervisory Special Agent-I followed this with his apology "for not getting this to you earlier, but the initial email I sent almost 10 days ago had a hangfire and didn't go out!
Also of note is the fact that on August 22, 2016, Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS asked DOJ official Bruce Ohr to call him. Approximately one hour later, Ohr emailed Handling Agent-1 wanting to "check-in."Ohr and Handling Agent-I planned to speak by phone on August 24, 2016. During the call, Ohr inquired if the FBI was going to do anything with the information contained in the Steele Reports Handling Agent-I told Ohr that a group at FBI Headquarters was working on them.
In multiple interviews with both the Office and the OIG, Supervisory Special Agent-I stated that he was instructed to call NYFO Assistant Division Counsel-I by Deputy Director McCabe following a briefing at FBI Headquarters on August 25, 2016. According to Supervisory Special Agent-I, McCabe directed him (Supervisory Special Agent-I) to reach out to the NYF0. In context, McCabe had attended a retirement party in New York City for ADIC Rodriguez the night before. When interviewed by the OIG, however, McCabe stated that he did not recall giving advice to Supervisory Special Agent-I to call the NYFO. Ultimately, FBI records reflect that it was not until September 19, 2016, that the Crossfire Hurricane team at FBI Headquarters actually received the first six Steele Reports.
These Reports were sent to Supervisory Special Agent-I by Handling Agent-I - some 75 days after Handling Agent-I first received the initial Report from Steele in London. The delayed dissemination within the FBI of the sensational information contained in the Steele Reports is both perplexing and troubling. Indeed, the failure of recollection by FBI personnel concerning the matter certainly raises the question of whether the FBI had misgivings from the start about the provenance and reliability of the Steele Reports. Nevertheless, within two days of their eventual receipt by the Crossfire Hurricane team, information from four of the Steele Reports were being used to support probable cause in the initial FISA application on Carter Page.
iv. The September 23, 2016 Yahoo! News article
On September 23, 2016, Michael Isikoff published his article in Yahoo! News titled "U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin." The article detailed Carter Page's alleged meetings in July 2016 with Igor Sechin, Chairman ofRussian energy conglomerate Rosneft, and Igor Divyekin, a senior official in the Russian Presidential Administration. The article contained information that was nearly identical to Steele Report 2016/94. The information in the article allegedly came from a "well-placed Western intelligence source" and had been confirmed by a "senior U.S. law enforcement official." A review of communications between and amongst Crossfire Hurricane personnel revealed that senior investigators, including Case Agent-1 and Supervisory Special Agent-I, believed the "Western intelligence source" was Steele.
Further, a review of communications also revealed that members ofthe investigative team expressed disappointment that Steele had provided the information to the media, believing, justifiably, that such an action would put the Page FISA application in jeopardy. As discussed in more detail below, until late in the process, several drafts ofthe Page FISA application contained a footnote that explicitly attributed the information in the Yahoo! News article to Steele.
The October meeting with Steele in Rome
On October 3, 2016, Special Agent-2, Acting Section Chief-I, and SIA Brian Auten traveled to Rome, Italy to meet with Handling Agent-I and Steele.
During this meeting, the interviewers informed Steele, in sum, that the FBI might be willing to pay Steele in excess of $1,000,000 if he could provide corroborating evidence of the allegations contained in his reporting. The FBI also admonished Steele about the need to have an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI because, by this time, the FBI had been made aware of the fact that Steele had also been providing his Reports to the State Department through his acquaintance, State Department official Jonathan Winer. In turn, Winer had been providing the Reports, to, among others, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, a confidant of former-Secretary of State Clinton. Notwithstanding these red flags, when interviewed by the Office, neither Auten nor Special Agent-2 had any recollection of addressing the Yahoo! News concerns with Steele. Further, both Auten and Special Agent-2 drafted summaries of the October 3, 2016 meeting with Steele, and neither summary addressed concerns about the Yahoo! News article or whether the issue had even been raised with Steele.
Auten's summary provided, among others, the following pertinent facts:
• Steele had one primary sub-source who traveled frequently in Russia.
• Most of the primary sub-source's contacts appear to be unwitting of where their information was going. • Steele's primary sub-source had personal contact with Sergei Millian. Millian appeared to be "Source E" referenced in Report 2016/095 and was possibly "Source D" in Report 2016/080.
• Steele provided the FBI with the names offour U.S. citizens who may have information regarding Russia and Trump: (i) Charles Dolan; (ii) U.S. Person-I; (iii) U.S. Person-2; and (iv) U.S. Person-3.
• Steele reiterated that Russian Presidential Administration Spokesman Dimitry Peskov was heavily involved in the Russia/Trump operation.
vi. The draft Page FISA applications - Yahoo! News
In late September 2016, OI Attorney-I received a draft copy of the initial Carter Page FISA application from FBI OGC attorney Kevin Clinesmith. This draft copy included information contained in the Steele Reports that first had been provided to Crossfire Hurricane team on September 19, 2016. On October 2, 2016, OI Attorney-I emailed a revised draft FISA application to Case Agent-I, Auten, Supervisory Special Agent-I, OGC attorneys Clinesmith and FBI OGC Unit Chief-I, and OI Unit Chief-1. Embedded in this draft FISA application was a question regarding the FBI's assessment of the Yahoo! News article, in particular, whether Steele had been the source for the article. OI Unit Chief-I told the Office that, prior to that draft being sent, he was so certain that Steele was the source of the Yahoo' News leak that he included the information in a footnote of the draft application. Case Agent-I responded to OI Attomey- 1's email, in sum, that it was the FBI's assessment that the Yahoo! News information had indeed come from Steele.
Following the Rome trip, several additional drafts of the Page FISA application were circulated between the FBI and 01. Throughout these drafts, a footnote stated, in sum, that Source #1 (Steele) had been the "well-placed Western intelligence source" referenced in the Yahoo! News article, but that Steele had been admonished by the FBI and that going forward Source #1 would have an exclusive relationship with the FBI. Notwithstanding this footnote, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Evans continued to have questions about Steele's decision to speak with the press about the same information that he had provided to the FBI. Evans wanted further clarification on whether Steele's decision to speak with the press indicated a potential bias.
On October 14, 2016, Special Agent-2 emailed OI Attorney-I and stated that Steele had not previously mentioned the leak (to Yahoo! News) and "only acknowledged it when the FBI brought it up on October 4." This email is directly contradictory to what both Auten and Special Agent-2 told the Office during their interviews, i.e., that the Yahoo! News leak had not been raised with Steele. Despite being interviewed about this issue on two separate occasions by the Office, Special Agent-2 did not provide a satisfactory response to explain the contradiction between his memory of the October 3, 2016 meeting with Steele and his October 14, 2016 email to OI Attorney-I.
The confusing nature of Special Agent-2' s email was not lost on OI Attorney-I. Indeed, later on October 14th, OI Attomey-1 sent an email to his supervisor, 01 Unit Chief-1, which stated, in part:
I am waiting to hear back from [ first name of Case Agent-1], but my super keen investigative skills tell me (based on FBI's earlier comment that only mention of the leak is: "(Source #1] has not mentioned the leak and only acknowledges it when the FBI brought it up on October 4.") they never asked and don't want to ask.
On October 14, 2016, OI Attorney-I circulated a document titled "Source #1 footnote update v.2.docx," and informed the recipients that the document "lists the descriptions we provide in the application about Source #1 ."656 The last paragraph of the footnote provided the following:
As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate [in context, Glenn Simpson] to conduct research into Candidate #l's ties to Russia. Source # I provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Given that the information contained in the September 23rd News Article generally matches the information about Page that Source #1 discovered during his/her research, the FBI assesses that Source #1 's business associate or the law firm that hired the business associate likely provided this information to the press.
Later that day, OI Attorney-I circulated a new draft ofthe FISA application containing the Source #I footnote he provided earlier. This version ofthe FISA application was then sent to the Office ofthe Deputy Attorney General ("ODAG") for review.
On October 17, 2016, 01 Unit Chief-I circulated follow-up questions to the FBI that had come from ODAG's review ofthe updated draft application. One question centered on reconciling the disparity between the current Source # 1 footnote - now attributing the leak to Fusion GPS or the Clinton campaign's law firm - with the actual language of the article, i.e., that the information in the article came directly from a "well-placed Western intelligence source." Later that evening, Case Agent-I, Supervisory Special Agent-I and others called OI Unit Chief-I on the FBI's Top Secret Lyne system (the FBI's voice chat platfonn). This call lasted approximately 16 minutes. Following the call, Supervisory Special Agent-I emailed OI Unit Chief-I and stated, in sum, that the FBI had addressed all open questions. OI Unit Chief-I responded to Supervisory Special Agent-1 's email and confirmed that all ofthe Department's questions had been answered. In their interviews with the Office, however, Supervisory Special Agent-I and OI Unit Chief-I had no recollection ofwhat was said in the conversation that changed the FBI's assessment that Steele was the source for the Yahoo! News article. This failure of recollection on an important issue for ODAG is troubling and made the Office's potential prosecution of the matter untenable On October 18, 2016, OI Attorney-I emailed Case Agent-I and Clinesmith an updated draft of the Page FISA application. The Source #1 footnote now provided, in part, and with new language in italics, the following:
As discussed above, Source #I was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #I told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI. Given that the information contained in the September 23rd News Article generally matches the information about Page that Source # I discovered during his/her research, the FBI assesses that Source #l's business associate or the law firm that hired the business associate likely provided this information to the press. The FBI also assesses that whoever gave the information to the press stated that the information was provided by a "well placed Western intelligence source." The FBI does not believe that Source #I directly provided this information to the press.
In fact, by this time, the FBI knew that the statement "'Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI" in itself was not accurate because the FBI was aware that Steele had already provided the Reports to the State Department. Footnote 18 of the final signed October 2016 FISA application contained the identical language as included in the above October 18, 2016 draft.
The Office did not receive a satisfactory answer as to the question of why the FBI initially believed that Steele provided the information directly to Yahoo! News and then subsequently came to believe that Fusion GPS and/or the Clinton campaign's law firm provided the information to Yahoo! News. The September 23, 2016 article itself says that "a well-placed Western intelligence source told Yahoo! News" about the intelligence reports, and one would conclude (assuming that the article is accurate) that the information came directly from the source and not from a law firm, a business associate, or other person. And, in fact, Steele later admitted to the OIG that in September and October of 2016 he and others from Fusion GPS provided journalists, including Yahoo! News, with the allegations against Page. Why did the FBI's assessment change? No FBI or Department employee was able to provide the Office with an explanation as to why the analysis changed, nor do any of the individuals interviewed recall discussions about it. In his interview with the Office, Auten had no recollection of who told him that Steele was not the source of the Yahoo! News article, but Auten said his "contemporaneous understanding" at the time ofthe Rome meeting was that Handling Agent-I had provided that information. Handling Agent-I, however, emphatically denied asking Steele about the Yahoo! News article and stated that his role in the October 2016 meeting was simply to make introductions.
Given Steele's interactions with Yahoo! News, the questions about his potential bias raised by Evans and ODAG were completely justified. It seems reasonable to surmise that the FBI's assessment ofthe Yahoo! News article radically changed in order to protect the FISA application. Again, not a single FBI employee who participated in the October 3, 20 I 6 meeting with Steele, no other employees with whom we spoke who assisted in drafting the initial FISA application, nor OI Unit Chief-I had any recollection ofwhy the FBI's assessment changed. For his part, OI Attorney-I told the Office that he deferred to the FBI's assessment ofthe Yahoo! News issue because the FBI was the "owner ofthe facts." or Attorney-I also recalled that the FBI was constantly pressuring OI to advance the FISA. As mentioned above, OI Attorney-I recalled Clinesmith informing him (OI Attorney-I) that Director Corney "wants to know what's going on," and that the Deputy Director asked who the FBI needed to speak with at the Department "to get this going." or Attorney-I opined that in hindsight he should have been less deferential to the FBI given his concerns about the validity ofthe assessment.
OI Unit Chief-I told the Office that, in hindsight, the FBI's change in assessment regarding Yahoo! News, was "curious." OI Unit Chief-I stated that, at the time, the FBI's evolution on the assessment made sense to him. Nonetheless, or Unit Chief-I told the Office that it would be "troubling" ifthe FBI never asked Steele about his role in the Yahoo! News leak, which no one apparently ever did.
vii. The Steele Reports are included in the Page FISA application
As discussed in greater detail below, four Steele Reports (2016/080, 2016/94, 2016/095 and 2016/102) were relied on by the FBI to support probable cause in the initial Page FISA application and three renewals ofthat application. Before the receipt of the Steele Reports, the FBI did not believe that there was sufficient probable cause to apply for a FISA warrant against Page.
Although the FBI had reason to believe that the Steele Reports were opposition research documents commissioned by a law firm and that the candidate's campaign who hired the firm was aware ofthe Steele Reports, there is nothing in the FBI record to show that this was a consideration or subject of debate prior to the use of the Steele information in the initial FISA application targeting Page. Moreover, not a single substantive allegation pulled from the Steele Reports and used in the initial Page FISA application had been corroborated at the time of the FISA submission - or indeed, to our knowledge, has ever been corroborated by the FBI.
The FBI obtained a total of four FISC orders targeting Page, which authorized intrusive electronic surveillance of Page and physical searches of certain items of his property from October 2016 through September 2017. Each of the FISA applications set forth the FBI's basis for believing that Page was knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of Russia, or knowingly helping others in such activities and alleged - based, in part, on the Steele Reports - that (i) Page was part of a "well-developed conspiracy of co-operation" between Trump's campaign and the Russian government (Steele Report 2016/095), (ii) Page allegedly met in July 2016 with Igor Sechin, Chairman of Russian energy conglomerate Rosneft, and Igor Divyekin, a senior official in the Russian Presidential Administration (Steele Report 2016/94), (iii) the Kremlin had for years gathered compromising information on Clinton (Steele Report 2016/080), and (iv) Russia had leaked DNC emails to Wikileaks, an idea concocted by Page and others (Steele Report 2016/l 02).
As discussed above, in late September 2016, OI Attorney-I received a copy of a draft request to prepare a FISA application targeting Page from Clinesmith. OI Attorney-I informed the Office that his subsequent primary responsibility was to "wordsmith" the application and to gather information regarding sources. In this regard, 0I Attorney-I primarily worked with Case Agent-1 and Clinesmith. OI Attomey-1 also told the Office that he was not aware of the fact that a previous draft application had been prepared by the FBI prior to the receipt of the Steele Reports which OGC determined lacked sufficient probable cause to move forward. As discussed above, with respect to the initial application, FBI OGC Unit Chief-1 told the Office that she believed that the initial application was a "close call" but needed more information to meet the probable cause standard. FBI OGC Unit Chief-l stated that the inclusion of the Steele reporting allowed the FBI to clear the probable cause hurdle in the Page FISA application, and, therefore, FBI OGC Unit Chief-1 approved the transmission of the request to OI.
FBI OGC Unit Chief-1 informed the Office, in sum, that she had no concerns with the inclusion of the Steele reporting in the Page FISA applications. FBI OGC Unit Chief-1, however, was not aware of what, if any, vetting had been done regarding the allegations prior to the submission of the initial application to the FISC. 683 FBI OGC Unit Chief-I did have some recall that a lack of vetting ofthe Reports was a concern. Finally, FBI OGC Unit Chief-I told the Office that there was also some concern that Steele had been hired by a law firm on behalf of the Clinton campaign and the DNC to conduct opposition research on Trump. Despite these concerns, the fact that Steele's information was being financed by the DNC and/or the Clinton campaign was not included in the affidavit's source description of Steele. The failure to provide this information to the FISC was a major omission in that the information clearly had the potential to affect the analysis of any bias in Steele's reporting.
With respect to the Steele Report allegations in the initial FISA application, OI Attorney- 1told the Office that he did not think the FBI was initially concerned with corroborating Steele's reporting, although he recalled that at some point some unknown efforts had been made. Rather than corroborating the allegations, 0 I Attorney-I recalled that the FBI's primary focus was on Steele's past reliability as an FBI CHS. In his interview with the Office, Case Agent-I also noted the importance of Steele's past reliability as reason to include his (Steele's) reporting in the PISA application, but also stated, in sum, that it was essential for the FBI to corroborate the Steele reporting, to include verification of Steele's alleged sub-sources. To that end, the Office directly asked Case Agent-1 whether any of Steele's allegations contained in the initial FISA application had been corroborated. Case Agent-I stated that "he could not recall anything specific that was fully corroborated. "Shockingly, Case Agent-I told the Office that the initial FISA application targeting Page was being done in the hope that the returns would "self corroborate." In any event, over time, and as discussed in more detail below, the FBI did attempt to investigate, vet, and analyze the Steele Reports but ultimately was not able to confirm or corroborate any of the substantive allegations.
Notwithstanding these obvious infirmities, the FBI and the Department included these allegations in all four Page FISA applications, including in two applications after Steele's primary sub-source (Igor Danchenko) had been identified, interviewed by the FBI, and was not able to provide corroboration for any of the allegations he provided to Steele. To that end, as discussed more fully below, OI Unit Chief-1 was aware that the primary sub-source had been identified and interviewed by the FBI, but OI Unit Chief-1 only later learned that serious questions arose from those January 2017 interviews of Danchenko concerning the reliability of his information as well as apparent contradictions with Steele's reports. In OI Unit Chief-1 's opinion, he doubted that NSD would have supported subsequent renewals ofthe Page surveillance had the FBI made it fully aware of the disconnect between Steele's reporting and the FBI' s interviews of Danchenko.
viii. The FBI identifies Steele's primary sub-source
During the October 3, 2016 Rome meeting, Steele informed FBI personnel that his reporting was primarily generated by a single sub-source, who in tum, relied on his own network of sub-sources to gather information. Steele stated that this primary sub-source traveled freely in Russia and appeared to be well-connected.694 Steele, however, would not provide the FBI with the name of his primary sub-source. In late December 2016, the FBI determined that Igor Danchenko, a U.S.-based Russian national living in Washington, D.C., was Steele's primary sub source. Notwithstanding this fact, the FBI and the Department did not correct in the final two FlSA applications targeting Page the characterization of the primary sub-source as being “Russia-based."
ix. Igor Danchenko
From 2005 through 2010, Igor Danchenko worked as an analyst at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. where he focused primarily on Russian and Eurasian geo political and economic matters. Danchenko came to be employed at Brookings after writing to Brookings senior fellows ("Brookings Fellow-I" and "Brookings Fellow-2") while a student at the University of Louisville. Through that connection, Danchenko was hired as a research assistant to Brookings Fellow-2. In approximately 20 I 0, Brookings Fellow-I introduced Danchenko to Christopher Steele. In 2011, Steele retained Danchenko as a contractor for his London-based firm, Orbis Business Intelligence. In his work for Orbis, Danchenko focused primarily on Russian and Eurasian business risk assessment and geopolitical analysis. As discussed above, beginning in June 2016, Steele - using information provided primarily by Danchenko - began to compile and draft the Steele Reports containing unsubstantiated allegations of illicit ties between Trump and the Russian government.
As discussed in more detail below, from January 2017 through October 2020, and as part of its efforts to determine the truth or falsity of specific information in the Steele Reports, the FBI conducted multiple interviews of Danchenko regarding, among other things, the allegations that he provided to Steele that ultimately formed the core of the Steele Reports. During these extensive interviews, Danchenko was unable to provide the FBI with corroborating evidence for any of the substantive allegations contained in the Steele Reports. In fact, Danchenko claimed that the Ritz Carlton allegations he provided to Steele were nothing more than "rumor and speculation," and that most of the information he gathered for Steele was the product of casual conversation with people in his social circle, including those parts ofthe Steele Reports used in the Page FISA applications.
x. Danchenko 's employment at Danchenko Employer-] andpayments by Steele and others
During the course of its investigation, the Office gathered evidence related to the unusual process through which Steele paid Danchenko over the course of his work for Orbis. A brief recitation of those facts is included below. As discussed above, Danchenko informed the FBI during his January 2017 interviews that, in approximately 2011, he began conducting work for Steele's firm, Orbis Business Intelligence. Danchenko described his work with Steele as a "side project[]" in addition to his employment in the United States at a Virginia-based venture capital firm.
In approximately 2014, Danchenko ceased working for the venture capital firm following the firm's declaration of bankruptcy. According to Danchenko, at the time of its bankruptcy, the firm was in the process of sponsoring Danchenko's visa application to remain in the United States. Following this development, Danchenko reached out to an acquaintance in the United States who operated Danchenko Employer-I, a Virginia-based information technology staffing firm. Danchenko stated, in sum, that he was seeking employment at Danchenko Employer-I in order to extend his visa and remain in the United States. Orbis, due to its United Kingdom based registration, was unable to sponsor Danchenko in furtherance of his work visa application.
According to Danchenko, the principal of Danchenko Employer-I informed Danchenko that he would hire him on the condition that Danchenko would be compensated by an outside source - in essence, Danchenko Employer-I would hire Danchenko to assist with his immigration status, but not fund his salary. Danchenko informed Steele about this arrangement and Steele agreed to pay Danchenko Employer-I for the work that Danchenko was conducting on behalf of Orbis. During his January 2017 interviews with the FBI, Danchenko described Danchenko Employer-I as a "contract vehicle" through which Danchenko would be paid for his work on behalf of Orbis. Put plainly, Danchenko Employer-I was merely a front to allow Danchenko to continue his work on behalf of Orbis, while at the same time allowing him to secure a work visa through alleged employment with a U.S.-based company. As relevant to this investigation, Danchenko Employer-! Executive-!, an ethnic Russian, described Danchenko as someone who was "boastful ... having low credibility, and a person who liked to embellish his purported contacts with the Kremlin.
The Office's investigation discovered that Orbis, through a separate New Jersey-based company, paid Danchenko Employer-I for the work Danchenko performed on behalf of Orb is. In turn, Danchenko Employer-I provided Danchenko with a salary funded by Orbis. By any measure, this was an extremely odd arrangement given that Danchenko performed no work related to Danchenko Employer-1 's primary business purpose, i.e., the staffing of information technology and engineering contractors. Nevertheless, Danchenko Employer-1 ultimately sponsored Danchenko's work visa to remain in the United States. In sworn testimony that Steele provided in litigation in the United Kingdom concerning, among other things, the Steele Reports, Steele stated that he paid his sources an average retainer between $3,000 and $5,000 per month.
anking and other records also show that from January of 2016 through June 2021, Danchenko received over $436,000 in wire transfers from European businesses, including from Orbis and other entities affiliated with Orbis. These money transfers were in addition to the money that Orbis sent through Danchenko Employer-I to fund Danchenko's salary.
c. The prior counterespionage investigation of Danchenko and the FBI's failure to account for his possible motivations and allegiance
Danchenko was a known entity to the FBI in December 2016 when he was identified as Steele's primary sub-source. As publicly reported, Danchenko was the subject of an FBI counterespionage investigation from 2009 to 2011. In late 2008, while employed by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., Danchenko engaged two fellow employees ("Brookings Researcher-I" and "Brookings Researcher-2") at a happy hour about whether one of the employees might be willing or able in the future to provide classified information in exchange for money. Brookings Researcher-I was a research fellow for an influential foreign policy advisor who was about to enter the Obama administration. According to Brookings Researcher-I, Danchenko believed that he (Brookings Researcher-I) might also enter the Obama administration with the foreign policy advisor and have access to classified information. During this exchange, Danchenko informed Brookings Researcher-I that he (Danchenko) had access to people who would be willing to pay money for classified inforrnation. Rightly concerned, Brookings Researcher-I informed a U.S. government contact at an appropriate government agency about this encounter, and the information was subsequently passed on to the FBI.
When interviewed by the FBI, Brookings Researcher -1 confirmed the details of the interaction with Danchenko. With respect to his interactions with Danchenko at Brookings, Brookings Researcher-I described Danchenko as "sketchy" and "suspicious." The second Brookings employee, Brookings Researcher-2, was also interviewed by the FBI. While Brookings Researcher-2 did not specifically recollect the events in question, he did harbor suspicions that Danchenko was connected to Russian intelligence. His suspicions were based, in part, on the fact that Danchenko held multiple advanced degrees but continued working as a low-level research assistant at Brookings - the implicit assumption being that Brookings unwittingly provided Danchenko access to information of high value to the Russians.
Based on the information provided by Brookings Researcher-I, the FBI's Baltimore Field Office initiated a preliminary espionage investigation into Danchenko. Two Baltimore Field Office Agents led the investigation into Danchenko ("Baltimore Case Agent-I" and "Baltimore Case Agent-2"). Brian Auten, who was at the time an Intelligence Analyst (IA) as opposed to a Supervisory IA, provided Headquarters analytical support to the investigation. The FBI converted its investigation of Danchenko into a "full investigation" after learning that Danchenko (i) had been identified as an associate oftwo other FBI espionage subjects, and (ii) had previous contact with the Russian Embassy and known Russian intelligence officers. In particular, the FBI learned that in September 2006, Danchenko informed one Russian intelligence officer that he had an interest in entering the Russian diplomatic service. Four days later, the intelligence officer contacted Danchenko and informed him that they could meet that day to work "on the documents and then think about future plans.' In October 2006, Danchenko contacted the intelligence officer "so the documents can be placed in [the following day's] diplomatic mail pouch."
As part of its investigation into Danchenko, the FBI also interviewed several people at Georgetown University who knew Danchenko. At the time, Danchenko was attempting to obtain another advanced degree. One person, a U.S. citizen who had recently interned at an intelligence agency, recalled that Danchenko asked her about her knowledge of Russian matters very time he encountered her. On one occasion, Danchenko inquired about the person's knowledge of a specific Russian military matter. That same person stated, in sum, that Danchenko informed her that he served in the Russian army and worked with rockets, but at the time worked on "special" matters. Danchenko also told this person that his Russian passport listed him as GRU (the Russian military intelligence service) because of his language skills. Based on these encounters, the individual believed that Danchenko was working for a Russian intelligence service. Another Brookings colleague recalled that in 2008 Danchenko informed her that he (Danchenko) had been absent from work at Brookings because he had been in South Ossetia fighting Georgians. Danchenko also bragged to this colleague about vandalizing the Georgian embassy in Belarus.
Further, as part of its espionage investigation, the FBI determined that Danchenko was an associate of two FBI counterintelligence subjects.
In July 20 I 0, the FBI initiated a FISA request on Danchenko, which was subsequently routed to 01 in August 20 I 0. However, the investigation into Danchenko was closed in March 201 I after the FBI incorrectly concluded that Danchenko had left the country. Specifically, the FBI believed that Danchenko and his then-wife had traveled on a one-way ticket to London on September 26, 2010. The Office's investigative efforts revealed that, in fact, Danchenko never boarded the flight to London but, unknown to the FBI, continued to reside in the Washington, D.C. area.
In 2012, after the counterespionage investigation of Danchenko had been closed because he was thought to have left the country, Auten exchanged emails with Baltimore Special Agent-2 regarding Danchenko. Specifically, Auten advised Baltimore Special Agent-2 that Danchenko may not have left the United States as initially believed in September 20 I 0. FBI Baltimore apparently indicated that it would consider re-opening the investigation into Danchenko, but never did. 746 Thereafter, Auten contacted WFO about re-opening a case on Danchenko, or alternatively, attempting to recruit him as a CHS. Auten, however, cautioned WFO to not "get played back," meaning the Russian intelligence services could be using Danchenko as a double agent. During his interview with the Office, Auten stated that he did not know what, if any, action WFO took with respect to this information.Ultimately, the case against Danchenko was never reopened by the Baltimore Division and no recruitment effort was undertaken by WFO.
The Special Counsel interviewed both Baltimore Special Agent-1 and Baltimore Special Agent-2. Baltimore Special Agent-I believed that, based on his review of the case file, Danchenko was connected in some manner to Russian intelligence.Baltimore Special Agent-I believed that Danchenko was "hiding in plain sight" in the United States while frequently traveling overseas to Europe to be debriefed by Russian intelligence.Baltimore Special Agent-2 stated, in sum, that the counterintelligence case on Danchenko remained unresolved and, in her opinion, "certainly a lot more investigation" should have been conducted on Danchenko.
Danchenko becomes a paid FBI CHS despite the unresolved counterespionage investigation
Danchenko was interviewed by the FBI in January 2017 following his identification in December 2016 as Steele's primary sub-source. FBI materials reviewed by the Office revealed that the primary purpose for the FBI's initial engagement with Danchenko in January 2017 was to recruit him as a paid CHS. If this recruitment was successful, the FBI planned to mine Danchenko for information that was corroborative of the damaging allegations about President elect Trump in the Steele Reports.
The FBI initially interviewed Danchenko over the course of three days, January 24-26, 2017. These interviews were conducted pursuant to a grant of letter immunity provided by the Department. The interviews were conducted primarily by Case Agent-1 and Auten. Danchenko was represented by counsel during the entirety of the interviews. As Auten has stated both in interviews with the Office and as a trial witness in United States v. Danchenko, 2 l CR-245 (E.D Va.), the game plan for the January 2017 interviews was to (i) have Danchenko identify his sources for the allegations contained in the Steele Reports and (ii) provide evidence to corroborate the allegations contained in the Steele Reports. 756 As Auten testified in Danchenko, during the January 2017 interviews, Danchenko was not able to provide any corroborative evidence related to any substantive allegation contained in the Steele Reports - and critically-was unable to corroborate any of the FBI's assertions contained in the Carter Page FISA applications.
Nevertheless, following the January 2017 interviews, Crossfire Hurricane leadership reached out to WFO to begin the recruitment of Danchenko as an FBI CHS. SA Kevin Helson, assigned to a counterintelligence squad at WFO, was selected to serve as Danchenko's source handler. According to Helson, he was selected because he was a senior agent with knowledge of Russian matters. In early March 2017, Helson prepared the Danchenko source opening documentation. In preparing those documents, Helson incorrectly noted that there was no "derogatory" information associated with Danchenko and that Danchenko had not been a prior subject of an FBI investigation. This was clearly not true as there had previously been the unresolved Baltimore FBI counterespionage investigation of Danchenko that was only closed because it was believed he had left the country and returned to Russia. The Office was able to determine that Helson became aware of the counterespionage investigation shortly after completing the source opening documentation, but failed to revise the paperwork because of a purported belief that the prior case on Danchenko was based solely on hearsay.
In a November 24, 2020 interview with the Office, Helson was shown a spreadsheet listing Sentinel (the FBI's case management system) searches that he performed on March 7, 2017 - mere days after completing the CHS opening documentation - in which he specifically queried the counterespionage case file on Danchenko. Helson stated that he had no recollection as to why he searched certain serials in that case file, and he advised that he would not have thought Danchenko should be the main subject of that type of espionage case since Danchenko, in Helson's view, was a foreign national without a security clearance. Whatever the reason for not locating and documenting the serious derogatory information, the record is clear the FBI opened Danchenko as a CHS without ever resolving the Baltimore espionage matter or examining the file.
Despite having seen that Danchenko was identified in the opening serial of a counterespionage investigation in Baltimore, Helson informed investigators that he was surprised to learn from Auten on March 24, 2017 that Danchenko was indeed the main subject of that counterespionage case. According to Helson, Auten informed him, in sum, that Danchenko had a long history with Russian intelligence officers, and that he had previously pitched someone for classified information. According to Helson, however, Auten advised him (Helson) that the case against Danchenko was "interesting, but was not a significant" matter. Helson informed the Office that he had a clear recollection of this conversation with Auten. Notably, Auten did not inform Helson that he had previously assisted in the Baltimore investigation. Once Helson learned of the existence of the counterespionage case against Danchenko, he failed at the time to take even the basic step of conferring with the case agents previously assigned to the matter. In fact, and as discussed in more detail below, Helson did not reach out to Baltimore Special Agent-2 until May 2019 when Danchenko was being evaluated by the FBI's CHS Validation Management Unit ("VMU") and the VMU raised serious concerns about the prior counterespionage case.
When the Office asked Helson about his reaction to learning that Danchenko pitched a colleague for classified information, Helson stated "it sounds like something Danchenko would do, that's how Danchenko works."Helson further stated, in sum, that the fact Danchenko comes off as a Russian spy is describing half the population of Washington, D.C. In his interviews with the Office, Helson was essentially dismissive ofthe prior counterespionage investigation on Danchenko.
Despite the unresolved counterespionage case against Danchenko and Helson's (and others) apparent lack of curiosity regarding the matter, the FBI began operating Danchenko as a paid CHS in March 2017.767 As discussed further below, the FBI and Helson made no further efforts to examine the unresolved espionage case until the VMU exposed the security issues surrounding Danchenko in May 2019.
ii. The VMU examines Danchenko 's suitability as a source
The FBI's previous espionage investigation into Danchenko was raised in May 2019 in the context of a Human Source Validation Report ("HSVR") on Danchenko prepared by the FBI's VMU. The VMU raised several concerns related to Danchenko's past associations, behaviors, and travel history, including the prior and unresolved espionage case. In addition to the information contained in the prior espionage file, including Danchenko's fairly extensive contacts with known and suspected Russian intelligence officers, the HSVR detailed a February 2018 U.S. Customs and Border ("CBP") inspection ofDanchenko when he re-entered the United States after being in the United Kingdom, in which a CBP officer discovered business cards for Russian diplomats residing in England.The HSVR also detailed several falsehoods and inconsistencies found in Danchenko's visa applications and immigration documents. One member of the VMU with extensive prior service as an Army counterintelligence officer in Europe ("Headquarters Supervisory Analyst-I") expressed grave concerns about the counterespionage case and was strongly of the opinion that Danchenko was connected to Russian intelligence in some manner.
In response to the concerns of Supervisory Analyst-I and others in the VMU, Helson reached out to Baltimore Special Agent-2 for the first time - over two years after he initially learned of the counterespionage case against Danchenko. Helson informed the VMU (and later the Office), that Baltimore Special Agent-2 stated, in sum, that the investigation was premised on "hearsay at best." However, when interviewed by the Office on July 28, 2020, Baltimore Special Agent-2 expressed disbelief when she first learned that Danchenko had been signed up as an FBI source because, among other things, the FBI had not resolved the prior counterespionage case. When informed that Helson stated to the VMU that Baltimore Special Agent-2 had characterized the predication of the counterespionage case as "hearsay at best," Baltimore Special Agent-2 was adamant that she would never have characterized Danchenko's direct pitch to Brookings Researcher -1 for classified information as hearsay. To the contrary, Baltimore Special Agent-2 stated that the information came directly from the individual who was the target ofthe pitch for classified information. In two subsequent interviews with the Office, Baltimore Special Agent-2 again denied ever telling Helson that the counterespionage case against Danchenko was predicated on "hearsay at best." Baltimore Special Agent-2 confirmed to the Office that the Danchenko counterespionage case would have continued if he had not left the country, as the FBI mistakenly believed he had. When shown Helson's source opening documentation that contained the "no derog" entry, Baltimore Special Agent-2 agreed that the entry was clearly incorrect.
iii. The VA1U's recommendations to WFO and Helson
The HSVR on Danchenko recommended that he be allowed to remain open as a CHS but recommended that several steps be taken to help mitigate the VMU's substantial concerns about Danchenko. As an initial matter, when asked why the VMU recommended that Danchenko be allowed to remain open given the concerns noted above, several individuals who participated in the HSVR stated that the VMU lacked the institutional ability to do anything more than to make recommendations to mitigate CHS issues. One supervisor in the VMU noted that it rarely recommended closure of sources out ofa general fear that the field offices would largely be unreceptive to important recommendations designed to enhance source handling issues if the VMU recommended closure of a source. In addition to the serious concern about the prior unresolved counterespionage investigation, the VMU also highlighted numerous problematic areas that warranted attention. For example, Danchenko's background and employment history had noted inconsistencies and omissions; his assessed motivation for providing infonnation to the FBI had changed; his immigration applications omitted certain derogatory information and contained inconsistencies and falsehoods; and, despite his concerns for his personal safety, he traveled frequently to Russia before becoming a CHS. Danchenko also demonstrated knowledge oftradecraft and made contradictory statements, and much of the information he provided appeared to be hearsay that he was unable, despite requests, to validate. The VMU recommended several steps to mitigate these areas, such as administering a polygraph examination, further controls on his reporting, and additional evaluation, but these did not occur. Instead, Helson and WFO ignored nearly all of the VMU's recommendations and continued to operate Danchenko as a CHS until WFO was ordered to close Danchenko in October 2020. 779 In total, the FBI paid Danchenko approximately $220,000 during the 3.5 years that Danchenko was a CHS.78 ° FBI counterintelligence personnel at WFO and in the Counterintelligence Division at FBI Headquarters opposed efforts to close Danchenko and delayed doing so. Moreover, the Office learned that the FBI proposed making continued future payments to Danchenko, totaling more than $300,000, while the Office was actively investigating this matter, which would have been in addition to the $220,000 he had already received.
It is extremely concerning that the FBI failed to deal with the prior unresolved counterespionage case on Danchenko. Given Danchenko's known contacts with Russian intelligence officers and his documented prior pitch for classified information, the Crossfire Hurricane team's failure to properly consider and address the espionage case prior to opening Danchenko as a CHS is difficult to explain, particularly given their awareness that Danchenko was the linchpin to the uncorroborated allegations contained in the Steele Reports. Despite the FBI's awareness of (i) there being significant issues relating to conflicts between what Danchenko had reported to the FBI in January 2017 and thereafter as a paid CHS and what Steele, a long term paid CHS of the FBI, had stated in the "Company Intelligence" reports he provided to the FBI (and others), (ii) Danchenko's troubling history regarding a prior unresolved espionage matter, and (iii) a CHS validation report that raised various red flags concerning Danchenko, the counterintelligence executive managers at the WFO and FBI Headquarters resisted efforts to have Danchenko closed as a source. Instead, management supported continued payments to him, requiring FBI Headquarters approval, of sizable amounts of money and insisted that Danchenko was very valuable to the FBI's counterintelligence program. Interviews conducted by the Office revealed, however, that the Assistant Directors for Counterintelligence in WFO and FBI Headquarters, as well as the FBI's Executive
Assistant Director for National Security, made clear that they were not even able to accurately describe the value or contributions of Danchenko that would justify keeping him open, much less making hundreds ofthousands of dollars in payments to him. Indeed, the Assistant Director for Counterintelligence at FBI Headquarters thought Danchenko was being paid for information he was providing that corroborated the Steele Dossier reporting, which, of course, was not the case because Danchenko never produced any such evidence.
By (i) ignoring the significance of Danchenko's prior status as a subject of a counterespionage investigation, (ii) failing to resolve the conflict between that history and his role as primary sub-source for the Steele reporting, and (iii) failing to follow through on VMU's recommendations for continued operation of Danchenko as a CHS, Helson and the Counterintelligence Division missed another opportunity to make any needed course corrections to Crossfire Hurricane and in the use of Danchenko as a CHS.
d. Danchenko's relationship with Charles Dolan
When interviewed by the FBI in June 2017, Danchenko failed to disclose the role a U.S. based individual named Charles Dolan played in the reporting Danchenko provided for inclusion in the Steele Reports. In particular, Danchenko denied that Dolan provided any specific information contained in the Steele Reports. However, Dolan acknowledged to the Office that he provided information to Danchenko related to Paul Manafort's firing as Trump campaign manager. Dolan further admitted to the Office that this allegation, which appears in Steele Report 2016/105, was fabricated.
As discussed in a previous section, during the October 3, 2016 Rome meeting, Steele provided the FBI with the names of four U.S.-based individuals who might have information on Trump's connections to Russia. Three of the names provided by Steele were Washington, D.C. based individuals Charles Dolan, U.S. Person-I and U.S. Person-2.785 An FBI report of a September 18th and 19th 2017 interview of Steele cryptically mentioned that Danchenko had drinks with Dolan, but the report included no further inforn;iation on that topic. In the same interview, however, Steele also stated that Dolan could have been the "American political figure associated with Donald Trump and his campaign" referenced in the following paragraph of Steele Report 2016/105:
Speaking separately, also in late August 2016, an American political figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign outlined the reasons behind Paul Manafort's recent demise. S/he said it was true that the Ukraine corruption revelations had played a part in this, but also, several senior players close to TRUMP had wanted Manafort out, primarily to loosen his control on strategy and policy formulation. Of particular importance in this regard was Manafort' s predecessor as campaign manager, Corey Lewandowski, who hated Manafort personally and remained close to TRUMP with whom he discussed the presidential campaign on a regular basis.
The following section discusses in greater detail Dolan's role in the Steele reporting and his relationship with Danchenko.
Charles Dolan
Charles Dolan is a public relations professional who in 2016 was employed by a Washington, D.C.-based public relations firm called kglobal. In addition to his work as a public relations professional, Dolan had previously served as (i) Executive Director ofthe Democratic Governors Association, (ii) Virginia Chairman of former President C!inton' s 1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns, and (iii) an advisor to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign. Moreover, beginning in 1997, President Clinton appointed Dolan to two four-year terms on the State Department's U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. With respect to the 2016 Clinton campaign, Dolan described himself as a "door to door" guy in New Hampshire who did not hold any significant position.
ii. Dolan 's connections to the Kremlin
In his role as a public relations professional, Dolan spent much of his career interacting with Eurasian clients with a particular focus on Russia. For example, from approximately 1999 through 2004-2005, Dolan was employed by global public relations firm Ketchum Inc. where he assisted with Ketchum's representation of the Russian Federation. 793 Part ofDolan's responsibility on the Russian Federation account consisted of, among other things, monitoring current policy discussions of U.S.-based think tanks and reporting back to the Russian government. Dolan also assisted in media consulting and press operations for the 2006 08 Summit held in St. Petersburg, Russia. As a senior member of Ketchum' s Russian Federation team, Dolan frequently interacted with Russian government officials, including, most importantly, Dimitry Peskov, Press Secretary of the Russian Presidential Administration, and Alex Pavlov, Deputy Press Secretary of the Presidential Administration. Peskov has often been described in media reports as Russian President Putin's "right-hand man." As discussed more below, both Peskov and Pavlov would subsequently feature prominently in the Steele Reports. Additionally, Dolan maintained relationships with Sergei Kislyak, who served as Russian Ambassador to the United States from 2008-2017, and Mikhail Kalugin, the head of the Russian Embassy's Economic Section in Washington, D.C. from 2010-2016. Both Kislyak and Kalugin would also feature prominently in the Steele Reports.
iii. Dolan is introduced to Danchenko in early 2016
In March 2016, Brookings F ellow-1 introduced Dolan to Danchenko in connection with a potential business opportunity. Specifically, Danchenko had reached out to Brookings Fellow-I in an attempt to broker business between a U.S.-based public relations firm and his longtime friend, Olga Galkina, an executive at a Cyprus-based computer firm named Servers.com. Danchenko would later inform the FBI that Galkina served as a source of information for allegations contained in the Steele Reports. Brookings Fellow-I subsequently connected Danchenko and Dolan to discuss a possible business venture between Dolan and Servers.com. In March 2016, Danchenko brokered a meeting between Dolan (and his firm kglobal) and Galkina to discuss a potential business arrangement between kglobal and Servers.com, the latter of which was attempting to enter the U.S. marketplace. Dolan was joined at this meeting by a Washington-based lobbyist ("U.S. Person-2") with whom Dolan had previously worked804 - and who Steele would later name along with Dolan as a possible source for information on Trump/Russia connections
.Dolan and kglobal would ultimately enter a contractual relationship with Servers.com. As discussed in detail below, Dolan traveled to Cyprus on two occasions in the summer of 2016 to meet with Galkina, Aleksej Gubarev (the principal of Servers.com) and other executives at Servers.com. As a result of this collaboration, Dolan and Danchenko continued to communicate through the Spring of 2016. In late April 2016, Dolan and Danchenko engaged in separate discussions regarding a potential business collaboration between kglobal and Orbis. For example, on April 29, 2016, Danchenko sent an email to Dolan indicating that Danchenko had passed a letter to Christopher Steele on behalf of Dolan. Specifically, the email sent to Dolan stated that Danchenko had "forwarded your letter" to Steele and Steele's business partner, Christopher Burrows. The email continued, "I'll make sure you gentlemen meet when they are in Washington, or when you are in London." That same day, Danchenko sent an email to Dolan outlining certain work that Danchenko was conducting for Orbis. The email attached an Orbis report titled "Intelligence Briefing Note, 'Kompromat' and 'Nadzor' in the Russian Banking Sector.
Beginning in early 2015, a Washington, D.C.-based lawyer and acquaintance of Dolan, ("U.S. Person-!") informed Dolan that he was planning a business conference for October 2016 in Moscow. The conference, titled "Inside the Kremlin," was being sponsored by the Young President's Organization, and was designed to introduce senior international business executives to potential investment opportunities in Russia (the "YPO Conference"). To that end, the YPO Conference was to include individuals who could provide insight into the economic, political, diplomatic and cultural aspects of the Russian Federation. The YPO Conference was to be held at the Ritz Carlton hotel in Moscow. U.S. Person-I enlisted Dolan to participate in the YPO conference because of Dolan's access to senior Russian government officials and his ability to provide analysis of the approaching 2016 U.S. presidential election.
In April 2016, Dolan asked Danchenko to assist Dolan and U.S. Person-I with the YPO conference, which Danchenko agreed to do. Dolan believed that Danchenko's language skills and his supposed contacts in the Russian government would be of assistance to the conference. Dolan subsequently asked and received permission from U.S. Person-I to enlist Danchenko to assist with logistics, provide translation services, and present on various relevant topics at the YPO Conference. In preparation for the YPO Conference, Dolan and U.S. Person-I planned to travel to Moscow in June 2016 to view the Ritz Carlton and other potential sites for the conference (the "June Planning Trip"). At the same time, Danchenko informed Dolan that he (Danchenko) would be present in Moscow in June on other business.
On April 30, 2016, Dolan sent an email to a U.S.-based acquaintance and stated, in part, the following:
Waiting on confirmation for meetings with the Kremlin. If all goes well I will probably leave on the 9th [June] and stop in London to meet with these intelligence guys (another potential project but nothing certain) and leave on the l 0th for Moscow and stay for the week.
In his interviews with the Office, Dolan denied meeting with Steele. Travel records confirm that Dolan did not travel to London prior to the June Planning Trip. In fact, the Office was not able to find any definitive evidence to indicate that Dolan ever met with Steele.
To further prepare for the YPO Conference, in May, July, and October 2016, Dolan and U.S. Person-I attended at least three meetings at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and communicated with Russian Embassy staff, including Ambassador Sergei Kislyak and the Head of the Economic Section, Mikhail Kalugin. As noted above, both Kislyak and Kalugin would feature prominently in the Steele Reports. Danchenko was not present at any of these meetings.
In anticipation of the June Planning Trip to Moscow, Dolan attempted to communicate with Press Secretary Peskov and Deputy Press Secretary Pavlov, as well as former Russian President and then-Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev. Dolan had previously attended several lunches with Medvedev when he (Dolan) served as an advisor to the Valdai Club in connection with his work at Ketchum. (The Valdai Club is a Moscow-based think tank that is closely associated with Russian President Putin and is viewed by many in the West as a vehicle for Russian propaganda). In May 2016, Dolan reached out to Medvedev's Press Secretary to have Medvedev speak at the YPO Conference.
hen interviewed by the FBI in September 2017, Steele noted that his primary sub source (Danchenko) has sub-sources who had access to Dimitry Peskov. In particular, Steele stated that information in the Reports involving Peskov stemmed from a "friend of a friend" of his primary sub-source (Danchenko). 826 Later in the interview, Steele informed the FBI that his primary sub-source had a sub-source who had contact with Alexey Pavlov and had conversations with Pavlov about Peskov. Steele told the FBI that this unidentified source was close to then Russian Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev. (As discussed above, Dolan claimed to have met Medvedev on several occasions.) Steele also stated that his primary sub-source (Danchenko) would meet Pavlov for drinks when he (the primary sub-source) traveled to Russia.However, as discussed more fully below, the Office found no information to indicate that Danchenko maintained a relationship with Pavlov.
On June 10, 2016, before traveling abroad, Dolan sent an email to a U.S.-based acquaintance reflecting that Dolan and Danchenko had become colleagues. Dolan stated in part:
On Monday night I fly to Moscow and will meet with a Russian guy [Danchenko J who is working with me on a couple of projects. He also works for a group of former MI 6 guys in London who do intelligence for businesses. Send me your questions and I'll pass them on to Igor. He owes me as his Visa is being held up and I am having a word with the Ambassador.
Shortly thereafter, Dolan sent another email to the U.S.-based acquaintance. In describing Danchenko, Dolan stated: "He is too young for KGB. But I think he worked for FSB. Since he told me he spent two years in Iran. And when I first met him he knew more about me than I did. [winking emoticon]."831 (The Federal Security Service ofthe Russian Federation, or "FSB" is the principal security agency of Russia and principal successor agency to the KGB.) When interviewed by the Office, Dolan stated that he was "speculating" about Danchenko's connections to Russian intelligence, and that he was "halfjoking and half serious.
Dolan was scheduled to be in Moscow for the June Planning Trip from June 13-18, 2016. In connection with the June Planning Trip, Dolan decided to first travel to Cyprus to meet with executives from Servers.com. Dolan departed Washington, D.C. on June 9th, arrived in Moscow on the morning of June 10th, and departed for Cyprus later that afternoon. While in Cyprus, Dolan met with Galkina, Gubarev and the other executives at Servers.corn's offices.835 Dolan then left Cyprus on June 13th and flew to Moscow to attend the June Planning trip.
During the June Planning Trip, Dolan and U.S. Person-I stayed at the Ritz Carlton in Moscow. On June 14th, Danchenko, who as noted above was already present in Moscow, met Dolan for lunch at a restaurant in Moscow. Dolan and Danchenko took a photograph together in front of the Kremlin, which was later posted by Danchenko on Facebook. According to Dolan, this was the only time he encountered Danchenko on the June Planning Trip, and Danchenko did not stay at the Ritz Carlton during the June Planning Trip - a fact that was confirmed by hotel records.
While in Moscow, Dolan and U.S. Person-I participated in, among other things, (i) a meeting with the German-national general manager ofthe Ritz Carlton, and at least one female hotel staff member to discuss the logistics of the YPO Conference, (ii) a lunch with the general manager and three hotel staff members who assisted in the preparations for the YPO conference, and (iii) a tour of the hotel.
Dolan told the Office that during the June Planning Trip he met with two deputies from the Russian Presidential Administration Press Office (Dimitry Peskov's Office). According to Dolan, Danchenko was not present for any events at the Ritz Carlton during the June Planning Trip and was not present for his meeting with the deputies from the Press Office. As discussed in detail below, the general manager and other hotel staff members would later appear in the Steele Reports.
On June 15, 2016, Dolan emailed an acquaintance from Moscow: "I'm in Russia making plans to be adopted in the event this mad man [Trump] gets e!ected." On June 18, 2016, Dolan returned to Washington, D.C.
The FBI's handling ofthe prior counterespionage investigation of Danchenko
The failure of the FBI to assess properly the prior counterespionage investigation of Danchenk.o is incomprehensible. The investigation related to Danchenk.o's pitching a person he thought perhaps was going into the Obama administration for classified information. Although the conduct ofcertain FBI employees was, at best, negligent with respect to the prior investigation of Danchenk.o and his subsequent use as a CHS, we did not find any evidence that FBI personnel acted with specific intent - which the statute requires - to permit knowingly false information received from Danchenko to continue to be used in FISA applications. Prosecution, therefore, was not supported by the available evidence. i. The recordings of Page, Papadopoulos and others The Office carefully reviewed and analyzed the evidence related to, among other things, (i) the FBI's handling of the recordings made by CHSs and UCEs, (ii) the conduct of the CHSs and UCEs in making those recordings, and (iii) the FBI' s failure to include key exculpatory material from those recordings in the Page FISA applications. As discussed more fully below, in determining whether the actions of individuals and entities warranted criminal prosecution, the Office adhered to the previously delineated Principles of Federal Prosecution.
CHS-1 's recordings of Page
As discussed throughout this report, one of the key allegations contained in the Steele reporting, and which would later underpin the Page FISA applications, was the existence of "a well-developed conspiracy of co-operation'" between the Trump campaign and Russian leadership. This alleged conspiracy purportedly was managed by campaign manager Paul Manafort using Page, and others, as intermediaries with the Russians. ns6 On its face, this was a shocking and serious allegation of collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. However, as discussed in detail above, during the first recorded meeting between Page and CHS-I, Page never once indicated that he maintained a relationship with Manafort - despite several efforts by CHS-1 to establish such a relationship. In fact, Page explicitly denied ever having met or spoken with Manafort. While Page said he had sent a couple of emails to Manafort during his time on the campaign, he noted that Manafort did not respond to any of these emails. These assertions made by Page could have easily been corroborated through basic investigative steps and legal process, but were never undertaken. Moreover, as discussed above, the Page FISA applications also relied on un.corroborated allegations from the Steele Reports that Page had met with Igor Sechin and Igor Divyekin in July 2016 to discuss the removal of certain sanctions against the Russian government. In his recorded meetings with CHS-1, however, Page denied meeting with Sechin or Divyekin and further denied even knowing who Divyekin was. Following the release of the Yahoo! News article on September 23, 2016 containing these same allegations, Page made similar denials in his letter to Director Comey and volunteered to be interviewed by the FBI regarding the accusations.
The Crossfire Hurricane investigators did not correct the errors, omissions, and misrepresentations that were contained in the initial Page FISA application and subsequent renewals. When interviewed by the Office, one of the Crossfire Hurricane investigators stated, without further explanation, that he assessed Page's statements to CHS-I to be "evasive." Similarly, when interviewed by the OIG, the investigator stated that Page "minimized, he kind of vacillated on some things. So, that's our, that was our, my assessment of what he said." Again, a fair reading of the transcripts of the recorded meetings between Page and CHS-I reveal that Page was, if nothing else, explicit in his denials regarding Manafort, Sechin, and Divyekin. Based on a review of all the evidence, the Office concluded that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators, while aware of Page's explicit denials regarding the allegations, appear to have chosen to cloak those explicit denials in unsupported assessments to not endanger the viability of the Page FISA applications.
While the evidence assembled by the Office may have been sufficient to meet a negligence standard, in order to prove a criminal violation of Page's civil rights, the Government would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more persons acted intentionally to violate those rights. What in our judgement would be the admissible evidence in such a prosecution did not meet that standard. In addition, in order to prove a false statement or perjury charge, such a prosecution would have to rest largely on not what was a provable, affirmative false statement, but rather on material omissions (e.g. Page's exculpatory statements to CHS-1). Given, among other things, (i) the reliance by the investigators on their professional assessments, (ii) the claimed inability to recall the details of important conversations, (iii) the lack of evidence as to who was responsible for information that was included or withheld in the FISA applications, and (iv) the inability to prove intent, the Office concluded that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not be met. Accordingly, the Office did not seek criminal charges against any FBI or Department personnel in relation to the Page exculpatory material being withheld from the Page FISA applications.
ii. Recordings of George Papadopoulos
The FBI also recorded meetings between Papadopoulos and FBI CHSs and UCEs. During the course of these meetings, Papadopoulos denied Russian assistance to the Trump campaign, notwithstanding repeated attempts by CHS-1 to link the WikiLeaks disclosures of DNC emails to the campaign - an assertion set forth in the Page FISA applications. In fact, when asked directly by CHS-I if the campaign had advance knowledge about the WikiLeaks disclosures, Papadopoulos replied "no." Papadopoulos stated that the campaign "would [not] advocate for this type of activity because at the end of the day, it's, ah, illegal ... and compromises the U.S. national security." Papadopoulos also stated that this type of activity is "espionage ... treason." Papadopoulos also made repeated denials about the campaign's involvement with the WikiLeaks disclosures to a second CHS. These highly probative statements, some of which were made before the initial Page FISA application, were not included in that application or any subsequent renewals. Perhaps more importantly, these statements did not cause anyone in the FBI to question the initial predication for Crossfire Hurricane, namely Papadopoulos's alleged statements to the Australian diplomats regarding Russia's offer of assistance to the Trump campaign.
Similar to the Page exculpatory statements, the Crossfire Hurricane investigators chose not to credit Papadopoulos's statements and assessed them to be "weird," "rote," "canned," "rehearsed," and, without citing any evidence, the product oflegal coaching. Indeed, when interviewed by the Office, one Crossfire Hurricane investigator repeated that assessment noting that Papadopoulos's statements were "curious," rehearsed, and therefore not authentic. Likewise, when interviewed by the Office, another investigator recalled briefing FBI executives about the Papadopoulos statements, including McCabe, and noted that the statements were deemed to be scripted to give a false impression.
For the same reasons stated with respect to Page, the evidence assembled by the Office in relation to the exclusion of the Papadopoulos statements in the Page FISA application may have been sufficient to meet a negligence standard but was insufficient to bring criminal charges against any FBI or Department personnel.
iii. The conduct ofCHS-I
As discussed above, on December 15, 2016, CHS-1 and Page had the third of what would eventually be four recorded meetings. In that meeting, CHS-I and Page discussed, among other things, the potential formation of a London-based think tank focusing on Russia's relations with the West. Although the two discussed Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson' s relationship with Igor Sechin and also briefly discussed a Washington Post column mentioning Page's purported relationship with Sechin, the subject of Page meeting Sechin and Igor Divyekin was not raised during this meeting. Nevertheless, a few days later, CHS-1 informed Case Agent-1 that Page, in fact, had told CHS-1 that he had met with Sechin on his most recent trip to Russia. According to Case Agent-1, CHS-1 purported to recall this information after reading about Sechin in the newspaper. A review of the transcript of this meeting and careful listening to the entire recording revealed no such statements made by Page, and reviewing the transcript or listening to the recorded conversation appears to have been a basic step that Case Agent-I did not take. The Office examined whether CHS-I made an intentional false statement to the FBI when he provided this information, but was unable to establish that CHS-I intentionally lied to the FBI.
J- Certification of the FISA applications
The Office also assessed whether there were any criminal violations in the certifications made by senior government officials as part of the Page FISA applications. The certification addresses the foreign intelligence purpose of the application, such as a purpose of obtaining information "necessary ... to protect against ... clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power" or "information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that ... is necessary to ... the national defense or security of the United States ... or the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States." The official must also certify that the foreign intelligence sought cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques, and explain the basis for that certification. The certification of a FISA application does not cover the accuracy of the information in the application itself; that is addressed by a sworn statement from an FBI Agent.
The certifications met the requirements of FISA. Our investigation did not reveal that any certifier lacked a reasonable basis for believing that the assertions as to the purpose of the application were true. The examples and explanations provided in the certifications strongly supported the assertions that a significant purpose of the applications was to obtain foreign intelligence information. The certifiers also certified that the foreign intelligence sought could not be obtained by normal investigative techniques. The certifications listed other techniques that might be used to investigate Page. Again, our investigation did not find that any certifier lacked a reasonable basis for believing that the assertions about the use of investigative techniques were true. The certifications explained the basis for the statements logically and in a manner that was relevant to the Page applications.
The Alfa Bank and Yotaphone Allegations
I. Factual background-Alfa Bank
Introduction
The Office's investigation identified evidence that certain individuals and entities sought to support the Clinton campaign by promoting allegations to law enforcement and the Intelligence Community related to Trump and his campaign. The Office considered.
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First, the Office identified certain statements that Michael Sussmann made to the FBI and the CIA that the investigation revealed were false. Sussmann was a partner at Perkins Coie, the law firm that served as counsel to the Clinton campaign. A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found probable cause to believe that Sussmann lied to an FBI official and returned a one-count indictment charging him with making a materially false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
As set forth in the Indictment, on September 19, 2016 - less than two months before the 2016 election - Sussmann met with FBI General Counsel Baker. Sussmann provided Baker with data and white papers that allegedly demonstrated a covert communications channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank, a Russia-based bank. The Indictment alleged that Sussmann lied in that meeting, falsely stating to Baker that he was not providing information to the FBI on behalf of any client. Instead, the Office's investigation revealed that Sussmann had assembled and conveyed the allegations to the FBI on behalf of two clients, Rodney Joffe, an executive at Tech Company-1 1395 and the Clinton campaign. After a two-week trial, a jury found that the case against Sussmann had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, as explained further below, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of numerous actions by individuals and entities with ties to the Clinton campaign to promote the Alfa Bank allegations to the Intelligence Community and the government. The Office also uncovered evidence that individuals and entities with ties to the Clinton campaign promoted allegations that Trump or his associates were using, in the vicinity ofthe White House and other locations, one or more telephones from the Russian mobile telephone provider Yotaphone. The Office considered the validity ofthe allegations and evaluated whether the conduct of these individuals or entities constituted a federal offense and whether admissible evidence would be sufficient to obtain a conviction for such an offense. Ultimately, the Office concluded that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction.
The Office also examined the FBI' s actions in relation to the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations. In doing so, the investigation assessed whether any FBI or other federal employee conspired with others to promote the allegations in order to benefit the Clinton campaign in a manner that would constitute a federal offense. The Office's investigation did not establish sufficient evidence that any FBI official or employee knowingly and intentionally participated in a conspiracy with others to promote the allegations, to falsify government records, to obstruct justice, or to cause the FBI to open an investigation into them as part ofsuch a conspiracy.
b. Sussmann' s attorney-client relationship with the Clinton campaign and Joffe
As part of its investigation, the Office obtained billing records from Perkins Coie related to the firm's representation of various individuals and entities, including the Clinton campaign, Tech Company-I, and Rodney Joffe. The records reflect that Sussmann repeatedly billed the Clinton campaign for his work on the Alfa Bank allegations. In compiling and disseminating these allegations, Sussmann and Joffe also met and communicated with Marc Elias, another partner at Perkins Coie, who was then serving as General Counsel to the Clinton campaign.
By way of background, in April 2015, the Clinton campaign engaged Perkins Coie and Elias to provide "legal counseling and representation of [the Clinton campaign] in connection to its legal affairs, including the Federal Election Commission and other regulatory requirements and general organizational and compliance matters." A few months later, the DNC and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee engaged Perkins Coie to provide legal advice in connection with the "Federal Election Commission and other regulatory requirements and general organizational and compliance matters."
After these engagements, in the spring of 2016, Perkins Coie engaged Fusion OPS on behalf of the Clinton campaign. Fusion OPS was a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm that provided research and strategic intelligence services to clients, including corporations and law firms. As set forth in the letter memorializing that engagement, the purpose was for Fusion to support Perkins Coie's legal advice to clients on "defamation, libel and similar laws in which accuracy is an essential legal element." 1399 Elias explained that Perkins Coie hired Fusion for research and investigative services to assist Elias and Perkins Coie in representing the Clinton campaign. As part ofthose services, Fusion provided research and other services that were used to, among other things, promote the Alfa Bank allegations to the media and the FBI.
c. The Alfa Bank allegations
Actions by Sussmann, Perkins Coie, and Joffe to promote the allegations
The Office's investigation revealed that beginning in late July or early August 2016, Sussmann, Joffe, and agents of the Clinton campaign together assembled and disseminated the Alfa Bank allegations and other derogatory information about Trump and his associates to the media and then to the FBI. Generally speaking, the Alfa Bank allegations pertained to assertions that a "secret" email server located in Pennsylvania was configured to allow email communications between Alfa Bank and the Trump Organization through a "TOR exit node" (i.e., a node used for anonymized internet traffic) at Spectrum Health, a U .S.-based healthcare company located in Michigan.
Beginning in the summer of 2016, Joffe worked with Sussmann, Fusion GPS, a number of cyber researchers, and employees at multiple internet companies to assemble data and white papers. In connection with these efforts, Joffe used his access to non-public or proprietary internet data. Joffe also enlisted the assistance of researchers at a U.S.-based university ("University-I") who were receiving and analyzing large amounts of internet data in connection with a pending federal government cybersecurity research contract. Joffe tasked these researchers to mine internet data to establish a connection between Trump and Russia.
In particular, in late July and early August, Joffe commenced a project in coordination with Sussmann and Perkins Coie to support an "inference" and "narrative" tying Trump to Russia. For example, records show that on three days in August 2016, Joffe had meetings or conference calls with Sussmann and Elias. At about the same time, Joffe began tasking his own employees and associates to mine and assemble internet data that would support such an inference or narrative. Joffe expressly stated in emails that a purpose of this effort was to please certain "VIPs," apparently referring to Sussmann, Elias, and the Clinton campaign.
Among others whom Joffe called was an executive of another technology company ("Tech Company-3 Executive-I"). Joffe had an ownership interest in Tech Company-3. Joffe instructed Tech Company-3 Executive-I to search data maintained by his company and another affiliated company for information concerning the online activities of Trump and his associates. Joffe told Tech Company-3 Executive-I that he was working with a person at a firm in Washington, D.C. with close ties to the Clinton campaign and the Democratic Party. Joffe also provided to Tech Company-3 Executive-1 a document containing the physical addresses, email addresses, Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses, email domains, and other personal information associated with various Trump associates, including information about some spouses and family members (the "Trump Associates List").
Tech Company-3 Executive-I was highly uncomfortable with this task. Still, according to Tech Company-3 Executive-I, he and others complied with the instructions because Joffe was a powerful figure at these companies. The companies thereafter embarked on a data analysis and opposition research project concerning Trump and his associates, which they codenamed "Crimson Rhino." As part of the research project, Tech Company-3 Executive-I and his associates drafted a report that they provided to Joffe. The report's "preliminary result" was that the researchers "observed no connection that clearly indicated direct communications between said individuals and Russia that would imply money transfers from Russia to the United States within the last 90 days.
Joffe also tasked others, including an employee ofTech Company-I ("Tech Company-I Employee-I"), to use resources at his companies to conduct opposition research about Trump. According to Tech Company-I Employee-I, one of the services that Tech Company-I provided was access to domain name system ("DNS") information. As part of these services, Tech Company-] stored approximately 150 billion DNS transactions per day, which was approximately five terabytes of data. Although Tech Company-I Employee-I acknowledged that Tech Company-I did not conduct political research as part of its business operations, during the 2016 campaign, Joffe asked Tech Company-I Employee-I to run searches of Tech Company-1 's DNS data logs related to the Alfa Bank allegations. According to Tech Company-1 Employee-I, this included creating scripts to pull data related to various domains and IP addresses, including the domain trump-email.com and various domains that included the phrase "alfa" in them. Tech Company- 1 Employee-1 could not recall conducting any other searches of Tech Company-1 's DNS data for political projects or related in any way to specific political organizations, but Tech Company-I Employee-I never asked Joffe about the purpose ofthe project or whether these searches were on behalf a political campaign. Tech Company-1 Employee-I has stated, in sum and substance, that he did not ask because he did not want to know.
Joffe similarly tasked Tech Company-2 Executive-1 and other researchers with conducting opposition research regarding Trump. For instance, Joffe emailed these researchers the same Trump Associates List that he had provided to Tech Company-3 Executive-I. Among those whom Joffe and Tech Company-2 Executive-I enlisted were researchers at University-I who were assigned to a then-pending federal cybersecurity contract with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ("DARPA"). At the time, Joffe was negotiating an agreement between Tech Company-1 and University-I to sell large amounts of internet data to the university for use under the DARPA contract. The intended purpose of this agreement, and of University's sensitive work with DARPA, was to gather and analyze internet metadata to detect malicious cyberattacks. Both Joffe and Tech Company-2 Executive worked with two of these University-I researchers, University-1 Researcher-I and University-I Researcher-2, to mine internet data to conduct opposition research.
As part of these efforts, Sussmann and Elias began facilitating collaboration and information sharing by Joffe, Fusion GPS, and the Clinton campaign. For example, email records reflect that in August 2016, Sussmann began exchanging emails with personnel from Fusion and Elias containing the subject line, "connecting you all by email." 1422 (The contents of these emails have been withheld pursuant to asserted attorney-client privilege.)
Later that month, Joffe also began communicating with Fusion OPS personnel. 1424 Email records offered at the Sussmann trial and described in further detail below reflect that, in the ensuing months, Fusion OPS employees communicated with news reporters regarding the Alfa Bank allegations and urged them to publish articles about them. Sussmann took additional steps to integrate the Alfa Bank-related allegations into the Clinton campaign's opposition research efforts. For example, in the summer of 2016, Sussmann met in Perkins Coie's offices with Fusion personnel and with Christopher Steele, whose Dossier-relate activities are described above.
Fusion had at the time retained Steele to conduct opposition research. Sussmann and Steele have each testified separately about the meeting and their accounts differ as to what occurred. Although Sussmann testified before Congress that the purpose of the meeting was to "vet" Steele for the Clinton campaign given Sussmann's knowledge ofnational security matters, Sussmann never acknowledged discussing the Alfa Bank allegations with Steele and has maintained that the contents of their meeting are privileged. In contrast, Steele testified under oath in a British legal proceeding that, during the meeting, Sussmann told him about the Alfa Bank allegations. Steele further testified that, after the meeting, Fusion personnel tasked Steele to research and produce intelligence reports about Alfa Bank, which he did.
According to government records and public information, Steele also later provided the substance of the Alfa Bank allegations to State Department personnel, and Fusion GPS and Steele provided such information to Bruce Ohr, an official at the Department.
Emails, billing records, and testimonial evidence offered at trial show that during approximately the same time period - and before approaching the FBI about these matters - Sussmann provided the Alfa Bank allegations to Eric Lichtblau, a reporter for the New York Times.
Law firm records reflect that after providing the Alfa Bank allegations to the media, Sussmann apprised Elias of his efforts who, in turn, appears to have communicated with the Clinton campaign's senior leadership concerning these issues.
Emails and billing records further show that, during the same time period, Sussmann and Joffe worked together to draft a white paper, which summarized the Alfa Bank allegations and which Sussmann provided to the FBI during his September 19th meeting with James Baker. Sussmann billed significant time drafting this paper to the Clinton campaign. In addition, and as described in further detail below, Joffe also solicited input on this white paper from the University-I researchers.
Sussmann incorporated at least one of the aforementioned researchers into his efforts to disseminate the Alfa Bank allegations to the media for the benefit of the Clinton campaign. For example, emails reflect that on September 17, 2016 - two days before his meeting with the FBI- Sussmann emailed University-I Researcher-2, stating that "[w]e have a mutual acquaintance," in context apparently referring to Joffe. Soon thereafter, Sussmann spoke with University-I Researcher-2. During their conversation, Sussmann told University-I Researcher-2 that the data underlying the Alfa Bank allegations had been lawfully collected, thus reflecting Sussmann's apparent knowledge concerning the data's origins. University-I Researcher-2 also said that Joffe asked him to speak with the media about the Alfa Bank allegations, which he subsequently did.
ii. Actions by Tech Company-2 Executive-I and others and additional actions by Joffe
The Office gathered emails and communications between Joffe, employees of various internet companies, and the other researchers regarding the use of internet data related to the Trump campaign. Among the internet data Joffe and his associates obtained was DNS internet traffic pertaining to (i) Spectrum Health, (ii) Trump Tower, (iii) Trump's Central Park West apartment building, and (iv) the Executive Office ofthe President ("EOP").
For example, Tech Company-2 Executive-I referenced the Trump Associates that Joffe had provided:
Regarding this whole project, my opinion is that from DNS all we could gain even in the best case is an *iriference *. I have not the slightest doubt that illegal money and relationships exist between pro-Russian andpro-Trump, meaning actual people ve1y close to Trump ifnot himself. . .. But even ifwefound what Rodney asks us to find in DNS we don't see the moneyflow, and we don't see the content ofsome message saying "send me the money here" etc. I couldfill out a sales form on two websites,faking the other company's email address in each form, and cause them to appear to communicate with each other in DlVS (And other ways I can think ofand !feel sure [University-I Researcher-2] can think of) IF Rodney can take the *inference* we gain through this team exercise ... and cause someone to apply more use.fit! tools ofmore useful observation or study or questioning ... then work to develop even an inference may be worthwhile. That is how I understood the task. Because Rodney didn't tell me more context or specific things. What [Cyber Researcher-I] has been digging up is going to wind up being significant. It's just not the case that you can rest assured that Hillary's opposition research and whatever professional govts and investigative journalists are also digging ... they just don't all come up with the same things or interpret them the same way. But if you find any benefit in what [he] has done or is doing, you need to say so, to encourage [him]. Because we are both killing ourselves here, every day for weeks. Trump/ advisor domains I've been using. These include ALL from Rodney's PDF [the Trump Associates List] plus morefrom [Cyber Researcher-lJ's work ...
The above email reflects the fact that Joffe's tasking likely triggered or affected the research efforts that ultimately culminated in Sussmann's meeting with Baker. Joffe's response states that the "task is indeed broad" and that the ability to "provide evidence of *anything* that shows an attempt to behave badly" would make "the VIPs ... happy." According to Joffe, the "VIPs" were looking for a "true story that could be used as the basis for a closer examination," and any interactions between Trump and Alfa Bank "would be a jackpot."
Joffe proceeded to disseminate the Alfa Bank allegations despite having previously expressed and received from others expressions of serious doubts and differing views about their strength, and purposefully crafted a written analysis to conceal the weaknesses of the allegations. For example, on August 21, 2016, Joffe urged the researchers to push forward with additional research concerning Trump, which he stated would "give the base of a very useful narrative." Later in the same email, Joffe expressed his own belief that the "trump email.com" domain was "a red herring," noting that the host for that domain "is a legitimate valid [customer relationship management] company." Joffe therefore concluded that "'we can ignore it, together with others that seem to be part of the marketing world."
On August 22, 2016, University-I Researcher-I expressed his view that Joffe's research project was flawed, stating that:
Lets [sic] for a moment think of the best case scenario, where we are able to show (somehow) that DNS (MX 1441 or otherwise) communication exists between Trump and R[ussia]. How do we plan to defend against the criticism that this is not spoofed UDP trqffic we are observing? There is no answer to that. Lets [sic] assume again that they are not smart enough to refute our "best case" scenario. Rodney, you do realize that we will have to expose every trick we have in our bag to even make a very weak association? Letsv [sic] all reflect upon that for a moment. [S]orry folks, but unless we get combine netflow and DNS traffic collected at critical points between suspect organizations, we cannot technically make any claims that would fly public scrutiny. This is not a typical attribution problem when the two parties (defenders vs. attackers) are clearly separated. In this case we will have not only the Trump folks trying to sho[o ]t this down, but all the privacy freaks trying to come up with a crazy conspiracy theory on how we obtain the data. Sorry to say this, we are nowhere close coming [sic] with a plan to attack this problem that will fly in the public domain. The only thing that drive [sic] us at this point is that we just do not like [Trump}. This will not fly in eyes of public scrutiny. Folks, I am afraid we have tunnel vision. Time to regroup?
On September 14, 2016, Joffe solicited the views of the researchers on the white paper, and asked these DNS experts to consider the paper not using their expertise, but conducting the reviews as ifthey were not experts:
Please read as if you had no prior knowledge or involvement, and you were handed this document as a security expert (NOT a dns expert) and were asked: 'Is this plausible as an explanation?' NOT to be able to say that this is, without doubt, fact, but to merely be plausible. Do NOT spend more than a short while on this (Ifyou spend more than an hour you have failed the assignment). Hopefully less. :)
University-I Researcher-I replied, endorsing Joffe's approach: "A DNS expert would poke several holes to this hypothesis (primarily around visibility, about which very smartly you do not talk about). That being said, I do not think even the top security (non DNS) researchers can refute your statements. Nice!" University-I Researcher-I explained to our investigators that he endorsed Joffe's approach of downplaying the paper's weaknesses because Joffe was important to the success of the then-pending DARPA contract with University-I, and University-I Researcher-I therefore felt pressure to please Joffe. Apart from this email, however, University-I Researcher-I consistently maintained that the Alfa Bank data did not support any definitive conclusions.
The following morning, University-I Researcher-2 responded to Joffe by disputing one of the paper's key findings, stating that, "Tor exit nodes, by definition route traffic for all users, since they do not know the origin of the traffic. To say that the Tor exit is exclusively used by Alfa Bank goes too far." Tech Company-2 Executive-I responded to Joffe, stating, in part, that the paper's conclusion was "plausible" in the "narrow scope" defined by Joffe, and noting in part that: "ifthe whitepaper intends to say that there are communications between at least Alfa [Bank] and Trump, which are being intentionally hidden by Alfa [Bank] and Trump, I absolutely believe that is the case." University-1 Researcher-2 replied on the same date, stating that he believed that there was “a threshold of probable cause" for criminal and other federal violations.
On September 16, 2016, Tech Company-2 Executive-I emailed these researchers, discussing, among other things, the draft white paper's allegation that there was a TOR exit node at Spectrum Health that Alfa Bank had used to communicate with the Trump organization. Tech Company-2 Executive-I initially noted that University-I Researcher-2 had given his "adversaries every courtesy" and that "if everyone in America were as measured, fair and careful, what concerns could we ever have?" Tech Company-2 Executive-1 continued that she had no reason to think that Alfa Bank has a VPN somehow through mail I.trump-email.com. "'That would suggest we are dealing with masterminds of the internet." Tech Company-2 Executive-I added that she firmly believed that there were communications between the Trump organization and Alfa Bank and that she did not care in the least “whether I'm right or wrong about VPN from Alfa Bank, [TOR] from Alfa Bank, or just SMTP artifact pointing to a 3-way connection. Rodney has carefully crafted a message that could work to accomplish the goals. Weakening that message in any way would in my opinion be a mistake.”
Notably, TOR publishes a comprehensive list of exit nodes dating back to February 22, 2010. FBI experts we engaged examined this data for dates between February 22, 2010 and September 1, 2021. No instances offP addresses in the range of 167.73.x.x (assigned to Spectrum Health) were ever indexed as TOR exit nodes. The FBI experts advised that historical TOR exit node data conclusively disproves this white paper allegation in its entirety and furthermore the construction ofthe TOR network makes the described arrangement impossible. Even iftrue or indeed possible, using the TOR network in the alleged manner would result in worse anonymization and security than simply using TOR in its default configuration. The experts explained that it would instead amount to a static proxy with a known endpoint that could be more easily correlated with traffic to the relatively small number of guard nodes allowing the identification or the true source IP much more easily than using a randomly selected exit node for each connection as the system is designed to do. It is entirely likely that one or more users, at some time, connected to both Spectrum Health and Alfa Bank using TOR and may have even come through the same exit node, but this in no way indicates any kind ofcorrelation given the deliberately random nature of TOR routing.
iii. Sussmann 's meeting with the FBI
The night before he met with Baker, Sussmann sent the following text message to Baker's personal cellphone: "Jim- it's Michael Sussmann. I have something time-sensitive (and sensitive) I need to discuss. Do you have availability for a short meeting tomorrow? I'm coming on my own - not on behalf of a client or company - want to help the Bureau. Thanks." Baker responded: "Ok. I will find a time. What might work for you?" To which Sussmann replied: "Any time but lunchtime - you name it.
The next day, Sussmann met with Baker at FBI Headquarters. According to Baker, the meeting occurred in Baker's office and lasted approximately 30 minutes. No one else was present. Baker explained that Sussmann said during the meeting that he had information regarding a "surreptitious communications channel" between Alfa Bank and the Trump organization and that he stated, 'Tm not here on behalf of any particular client." Baker said that he was "100 percent confident" that S ussmann made this statement during the meeting. Because Baker considered Sussmann a friend and colleague, Baker believed that the statement was truthful. Baker also stated that Sussmann provided him with thumb drives containing data and "white papers" that explained the covert channel. Baker also noted that Sussmann said that major news organizations were aware of the Alfa Bank allegations and were intent on publishing about the issue relatively soon. As a result, Baker considered this to be an urgent matter because, if a news organization were to publish the allegations, any secret communications channel would likely disappear.
Thus, soon after he met with Sussmann, Baker spoke with Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Priestap and Deputy General Counsel Anderson, who handled counterintelligence and cyber matters. Baker believed that Priestap and Anderson needed to be aware ofthe allegations because they involved a Russian bank purportedly making an effort to communicate with the Trump organization. This "seemed to [Baker], on its face, to be a potential national security threat." Baker relayed to Priestap and Anderson the details of his meeting, including Sussmann's specific representation that he was not there on behalf ofany client and a general explanation of the Alfa Bank allegations. Both Priestap and Anderson took contemporaneous notes. Priestap wrote in his FBI notebook 1462 that Sussmann "said not doing this for any client": See images in original PDF
Despite their notes, neither Priestap nor Anderson remembered receiving this information from Baker. Baker also recalled that he briefed both Director Comey and Deputy Director Andrew McCabe about the Alfa Bank allegations.
d. The FBI' s Alfa Bank investigation
Following his meeting with Sussmann and briefings of FBI leadership, Baker recalled that he gave either Priestap or Strzok the white papers and thumb drives from Sussmann. The materials then made their way quickly to the Cyber Division. At trial, an FBI cyber agent ("Cyber Agent-I") testified that the agent and his supervisor ("Cyber Agent-2") were tasked to take custody of the Alfa Bank materials and to obtain signatures for the accompanying chain of custody form. A review of that form showed that Baker relinquished custody of the materials to Strzok, who then provided the materials to Eric Sporre, the Deputy Assistant Director of the Cyber Division. According to the form, . Sporre thereafter transferred custody to Cyber Agent-2. Cyber Agent-I testified that he was able to get signatures from Baker and Sporre for the form, but Strzok was unavailable and someone else obtained his signature.
The Cyber Division's review ofthe Alfa Bank allegations
Following the receipt of the materials, Cyber Agent-2 tasked Cyber Agent-I to review the data provided on the thumb drives along with the white papers and identify whether there were any "cyber equities," such as an allegation of hacking.Cyber Agent- 2 also tasked Cyber Agent-I to review the data and compare it to the white paper and provide an assessment as to whether the data supported the white paper's findings. The white paper that Cyber Agent-I reviewed, titled "White Paper #1 - Auditable V3," contained an initial section titled "Findings" that stated:
The Trump Organization is using a very unusually-configured 'secret' email server in Pennsylvania for current and ongoing email communications with Alfa Bank (Moscow), and with Alfa Bank (Moscow) through another unusually-configured server (a 'TOR exit node') at Spectrum Health in Michigan. These servers are configured for direct communications between the Trump organization and Alfa Bank to the exclusion of all other systems. The only plausible explanation for this server configuration is that it shows the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank to be using multiple sophisticated layers ofprotection in order to obfuscate their considerable recent email traffic.
The white paper further stated that the "secret" email server domain was "mail l .trump email.com was hosted by a Pennsylvania-based company, Listrak, which is a reasonably well known CRM [customer relationship management] company that provides large-scale distribution of marketing emails (usually sending emails to thousands of recipients hundreds of times a day)."
Within a day of receiving the Alfa Bank materials, Cyber Agent-I and Cyber Agent- 2 drafted a report of their analysis. The report's summary stated that they had "assess[ ed) there is no CyD [Cyber Division] equity in this report and that the research conducted in the report reveals some questionable investigative steps taken and conclusions drawn." The report acknowledged that there was no allegation of hacking and so there was no reason for the Cyber Division to investigate further. The report also said that:
It appears abnormal that a presidential candidate, who wanted to conduct secret correspondence with the Russian government ( or a Russian bank), would (1) name his secret server 'mail I.trump-email.com', (2) use a domain (trump~ernail.com) registered to his own organization, and then (3) communicate directly to the Russian bank's IP address (as opposed to using TOR or proxy servers).
Cyber Agent-I testified that both he and Cyber Agent-2 did not agree with the conclusion in the white paper and assessed that (i) the authors of the white paper 'jumped to some conclusions that were not supported by the technical data," (ii) the methodology was questionable, and (iii) the conclusions drawn did not "ring true at all." In interviews with the Office, both Cyber Agent-1 and Cyber Agent-2 said that they were proud of their work because they had both come to the same conclusion despite their own very different political views.
ii. The opening of the FBJ's investigation
After the Cyber Division's review, FBI leadership referred the matter to a squad in the Chicago Field Office responsible for investigating Eurasian counterintelligence and cyber matters. The investigation was referred to a Chicago Field Office Agent ("Chicago Agent-I") who had worked on both the FBI's Mid-Year Examination investigation (the investigation related to Hillary Clinton's email server) and Crossfire Hurricane. Chicago Agent-I was joined by a new FBI agent, Chicago Agent-2. Chicago Agent-2 was Chicago Agent-1 's trainee and was the co-case Agent and primary lead for the Alfa Bank investigation. Chicago Agent-] and Chicago Agent-2 opened a full investigation "into the network communications between a US-based server and the Russian Alfa Bank organization." A full investigation, as described above in section III.B.2, may be opened if there is "an articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates that ... an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security ... may be occurring."
According to the case agents and other records obtained during the investigation, it was FBI leadership who decided to open a full investigation. Indeed, two days after the meeting between Baker and Sussmann, Supervisory Special Agent-I, the Crossfire Hurricane supervisor, reached out to Chicago Agent-I. Supervisory Special Agent-I told Chicago Agent-I that "people on the 7th floor to include Director are fired up about this server." Supervisory Special Agent-I further stated that, ifthe investigation had not been opened, he would have reached out to Chicago Agent-1 's supervisor because "Priestap says it's not an option - we must do it." Chicago Agent-I responded that the case team was "opening a CI case today." Still, the team was already skeptical of the allegations. Chicago Agent-I noted that the team was "leaning towards this being a false server not attributed to the Trump organization" but that they would "run it down."
Chicago Agent-I and Chicago Agent-2 memorialized the opening of the investigation in an EC. Chicago Agent-I and Chicago Agent-2 later acknowledged that there were certain errors in this document. Of most importance to the Office was the representation made as to the source of the white papers. The EC stated that "the Department ofJustice provided the FBI with a whitepaper that was produced by an anonymous third party." According to both Chicago Agent-I and Chicago Agent-2, this representation was an error, and both recalled that they understood the allegations were presented to the FBI's General Counsel by an anonymous source.
iii. The close hold on Sussmann 's identity as a source
In evaluating the FBI's early actions related to the Alfa Bank investigation, one issue that the Office identified was the decision by the FBI to put a "close hold" on Sussmann's identity as the source of the allegations and to prevent its disclosure to the Alfa Bank case team. (A close hold is when the FBI's leadership protects specific information, such as the identity of a source, and prevents the "field" or investigative team from learning that information.) The investigation revealed that multiple members of the Alfa Bank case team were "frustrated" and "concerned" that they were prevented from interviewing the source of the allegations. Accordingly, the Office attempted to determine whether Baker or other senior FBI officials may have protected Sussmann's identity improperly to further the Alfa Bank allegations against Trump for political reasons or to mask Sussmann's ties to the DNC and the Clinton campaign.
During Baker's testimony at the Sussmann trial, and although not remembering having done so, Baker speculated that he may have attempted to protect Sussmann's identity and limited disclosure to only a few senior FBI executives. 1489 According to Baker, if he did so, it was because he considered Sussmann to be a source who "had in their possession very sensitive information that he was willing to give to the FBI." But, again, Baker testified he did not recall whether he had refused to provide this to any specific FBI personnel or who he would have instructed to put a close hold in place. Cyber Agent-1 testified that when he was obtaining Baker's signature on the chain of custody, he could not "distinctly recall what the conversation was" but that he was "frustrated" that Baker did not tell him who had provided the thumb drives. Cyber Agent-2 told the Office that he and Cyber Agent-1 considered filing a whistleblower claim about Baker's failure to provide the information but ultimately decided that they would not because the data provided was not formal evidence in a criminal proceeding. The FBI Headquarters Program Manager for the Alfa Bank case team ("Headquarters Supervisory Special Agent-3"), noted that FBI leadership, including Strzok, instructed him not to identify the source to the team. Headquarters Supervisory Special Agent-3 further explained that he believed that the investigative team did not need to interview the source as a first step and instead should focus on the data and log files to make a determination as to the validity ofthe allegations.
The Office's investigation showed that the Alfa Bank investigative team made multiple requests to learn the identity ofthe source of the Alfa Bank allegations. Approximately a week after the FBI received the Alfa Bank allegations, Chicago Agent-I sent Supervisory Special Agent-I a message requesting that the investigative team interview the source ofthe white paper. Approximately a week later, Chicago Agent-I and his supervisor again made requests to FBI leadership to interview the source of the allegations. As Chicago Agent-I explained, this was important to the case team because the investigation had found that the allegations were unsubstantiated, and the team wanted to confirm their findings. Ultimately, the case team never learned that Sussmann was the source ofthe allegations nor that he was connected in any way to the DNC and the Clinton campaign.
The FBI's investigation ultimately concluded that it was unable to substantiate any of the allegations in the white paper that Sussmann provided to Baker:
FBI Chicago assesses Alfa Bank and Trump Organization related servers almost certainly did not communicate intentionally or covertly, based on the results ofan internal examination of Alfa Bank servers by [redacted] and subsequent preventative steps employed by the companies. FBI Chicago has high confidence in this assessment, which is based on a highly reliable sensitive source with excellent access and corroborates FBI investigative activity conducted to date.
In coming to that conclusion, the investigators took a number ofsteps. First, they conducted open-source research on the mail 1.trump-email.com domain that was identified in the white paper. They learned that the domain was registered to a company called Central Dynamics ("Cendyn") and that the server was housed at a company named Listrak, located in Pennsylvania. As a result, the FBI reached out to both Cendyn and Listrak to request data and log files from each company and to conduct interviews as well. Both Cendyn and Listrak were compliant with these requests and provided log files and data that was analyzed by FBI analysts on the investigative team. Ultimately, the data and files provided nothing to substantiate the Alfa Bank allegations. In addition, the FBI reached out to Mandiant, a cybersecurity firm, that was hired by Alfa Bank to conduct an internal investigation and forensic analysis into the allegations. Mandiant provided the FBI with its findings, which too concluded that there was no evidence to support the allegations of a secret communications channel nor any evidence of direct communications between the Alfa Bank servers and Trump Organization servers.
In early October 2016, an Agent detailed to the National Computer Forensics and Training Alliance ("Cyber Agent-3"), contacted the Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters because he had received two IP addresses from an anonymous source who had requested that the information be provided to the FBI. tsos According to Cyber Agent-3, the anonymous source told him that the information related to a New York Times story involving the upcoming election. Cyber Agent-3 was then put in contact with Chicago Agent-2. Cyber Agent-3 recalled that Chicago Agent-2 was dismissive of the information and Cyber Agent-3 interpreted Chicago Agent-2's response as if the investigative team was already aware of the information. Chicago Agent-2 explained that the case team performed open-source checks on these two IP addresses that resulted in identifying one IP address associated with Alfa Bank and one IP address associated with a home address in Moscow.
The Office's investigation revealed that the anonymous source who provided the two IP addresses to Cyber Agent-3 was, in fact, Joffe. The most likely reason Joffe decided to provide the two IP addresses to the FBI via Cyber Agent-3 anonymously was to create the appearance of corroboration. One plausible theory that the Office considered was that Joffe and others were attempting to promote the Alfa Bank allegations in such a way that the allegations appeared to be from multiple independent sources. Indeed, at this time, Joffe himself was an FBI CHS. But in this instance, Joffe decided to provide the Alfa Bank allegations and the two IP addresses to Cyber Agent-3, instead of his FBI handler, with instructions to keep his identity protected. Joffe's unwillingness to voluntarily meet with our investigators left unanswered his actual motive for providing some information to the FBI through Sussmann and the two IP addresses through Cyber Agent-3, and in both instances to remain anonymous.
inally, the Alfa Bank investigators also received information in early October 2016 from a separate CHS regarding the Alfa Bank allegations. Chicago Agent-2 explained that, according to the handler, the CHS had access to the white paper and had made an initial assessment that the allegations were credible but that the data appeared incomplete. The CHS also explained that he/she had been contacted by University-I Researcher-2, one of the white paper authors.In the correspondence from Chicago Agent-2, there is an indication that the FBI was interested in speaking with University-I Researcher-2, 1514 however, that meeting never occurred.
In January 2017, the FBI closed the Alfa Bank investigation. Ultimately, the FBI was unable to substantiate any of the allegations in the white paper.
Actions by Fusion GPS to promote the Alfa Bank allegations
The Special Counsel's investigation also uncovered numerous communications in which Fusion OPS leadership and other personnel sought to discuss, advance, and disseminate the Alfa Bank allegations.
As noted, in April 2016, Perkins Coie engaged Fusion OPS in connection with the 2016 election. As part of Fusion GPS's work on behalf of Perkins Coie and the Clinton campaign, it collected, organized, and promoted opposition research on Trump's ties to Russia. Perhaps most notably, as described in Section IV.D.1.b, Fusion GPS retained Steele, who compiled the information and reports that became known as the Steele Dossier. Fusion GPS also drafted one of the white papers that Sussmann provided to Baker at their September 19, 2016 meeting. That white paper provided an overview of the parent company of Alfa Bank and described ties to Russian government officials and certain U.S. persons and entities.
Following Sussmann's promotion of the Alfa Bank allegations to the FBI, Fusion GPS continued to promote these allegations to various media personnel. For instance, on October 18, 2016 - two weeks before news stories would first appear about the Alfa Bank allegations - Mark Hosenball of Reuters emailed Fusion GPS co-founder Peter Fritsch, stating in part, "anything new Russkie/Donald wise?," to which Fritsch responded, "'do the [expletive] Alfa Bank secret comms story. It's hugely important. Forget the wikileaks side show." The reporter replied that the issue with the story was the inability of his "cyber expert colleagues" to confirm that some of the important data was authentic. Later on that day, Fritsch replied: "It's everyone's problem. Call University-I Researcher-2 at University-I.
On October 22, 2016, Franklin Foer, a reporter for Slate magazine, emailed University-I Researcher-2 at his University-I email address asking for assistance on the "Alfa Bank/Trump story". A few days later, Fritsch forwarded to Foer a tweet stating that the U.S. Senate Majority Leader had ·'talked w/ top NatSec officials who say that [the FBI Director] 'possesses explosive information' about Trump's ties to Russia. "Fritsch's email stated: "time to hurry." Foer replied "Here's the first 250 words," and included in the email a partial draft of an article about Alfa Bank and Trump on which Foer was working for Fritsch's review. The reporter published an article shortly thereafter.
On October 31, 2016, media outlets published articles regarding the Alfa Bank allegations and the existence of an FBI investigation. As previously noted, within hours ofthese articles, the Clinton campaign issued tweets and public statements concerning the purported existence of a secret communications channel involving the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank.
Actions by the Clinton campaign to promote the Alfa Bank allegations
On October 31, 2016 - about one week before the election - multiple media outlets reported that the FBI had received and was investigating the allegations concerning a purported secret channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank. For example, Slate published an article that discussed at length the allegations that Sussmann provided to the FBI.
Also on that day, the New York Times published an article titled Investigating Donald Trump, F.B.f Sees No Clear Link to Russia. 1531 The article discussed information in the possession of the FBI about ··what cyber experts said appeared to be a mysterious computer back channel between the Trump Organization and the Alfa Bank." The article further reported that the FBI had "spent weeks examining computer data showing an odd stream of activity to a Trump Organization server," and that the newspaper had been provided computer logs that evidenced this activity. The article also noted that at the time of the article, the FBI had not found "any conclusive or direct link" between Trump and the Russian government and that "Hillary Clinton's supporters ... pushed for these investigations.
As noted above, in the months prior to the publication of these articles, Sussmann had communicated with the media and provided them with the Alfa Bank data and allegations. Sussmann also kept Elias apprised of his efforts. Elias, in tum, communicated with the Clinton campaign's leadership about potential media coverage of these issues.
For example, emails reflect that on September I, 2016, Sussmann met with the reporter who published the New York Times article, Eric Lichtblau. Sussmann billed his time for the meeting to the Clinton campaign under the broader billing description "confidential meetings regarding confidential project."
Emails further reflect that on September 12, 2016, just one week prior to Sussmann's meeting with Baker, Sussmann and Elias communicated about Sussmann's efforts to share the Alfa Bank allegations with the New York Times.
In addition, on September 15, 2016, Elias provided an update to the Clinton campaign regarding the Alfa Bank allegations and the not-yet-published New York Times article, sending an email to Jake Sullivan (HFA 154 °Chief Policy Advisor), Robby Mook (HF A Campaign Manager), John Podesta (HF A Campaign Chairman), and Jennifer Palmieri (HFA Head of Communications), which he billed to the Clinton campaign as "email correspondence with J. Sullivan, R. Mook, J. Podesta, J. Palmieri re: Alfa Bank Article."
On the same day that these articles were published, the Clinton campaign posted a tweet through Hillary Clinton's Twitter account which stated: "Computer scientists have apparently uncovered a covert server linking the Trump Organization to a Russian-based bank." The tweet included a statement from Clinton campaign advisor Jake Sullivan which made reference to the media coverage article and stated, in relevant part, that the allegations in the article "could be the most direct link yet between Donald Trump and Moscow, that "this secret hotline may be the key to unlocking the mystery ofTrump's ties to Russia," and that"w]e can only assume that federal authorities will now explore this direct connection between Trump and Russia as part of their existing probe into Russia's meddling in our elections.”
During the Sussmann trial, both Elias and Mook said that the HF A campaign did not authorize Sussmann to take the Alfa Bank allegations to the FBL According to Elias and Mook, the campaign did not trust the FBI due to Corney's announcement related to the FBI's Midyear Exam investigation, regarding Hillary Clinton's use of a private e-mail server during her time as Secretary of State. Mook also explained that top Clinton campaign officials were aware of the Alfa Bank allegations and favored providing the alligations to the media. Clinton, who approved the dissemination of them to the media.Mook testified that the campaign did so before questions and potential doubts about the accuracy and reliability of the allegations had been resolved and without knowing the exact origins othe data, Mook also noted that the top official at theClintoncampaign , who approved the dissemination of them to the media.Mook testified that the campaign did so before questions and potential doubts about the accuracy and reliability of the allegations had been resolved and without knowing the exact origins of the data.
Although the campaign could not substantiate the allegations, they stated that they considered them '·concerning" and wanted the media to vet the allegations because of concerns about Trump's association with Russia. Sullivan and Elias raised Trump's July 2016 "Russia, if you're listening" statement as one reason for the Clinton Campaign's concern about Trump's ties to Russia.
Sussmann's meeting with the CIA
The Office also gathered information related to a post-election meeting that Sussrnann had with the CIA. On February 9, 2017, Sussmann provided an updated set of allegations - including the Alfa Bank data and additional allegations relating to Trump- to the CIA. The Office examined Sussmann's interactions with various CIA employees, including how he was able to secure a meeting with the CIA, what occurred during that meeting, and what materials he provided to the CIA.
The investigation revealed that in December 2016, Sussmann reached out to the CIA General Counsel and requested a meeting related to allegations against Trump. The General Counsel did not take the meeting and suggested to Sussmann that he provide the allegations to the FBI. 1550 Sussmann, however, ignored that suggestion and continued to pursue a meeting. On or about January 31, 2017, Sussmann met with a retired CIA employee ("Retired CIA Employee”). During the meeting, Sussmann told Retired CIA Employee-I that he had a client who wanted to provide information to the CIA about Trump. 1551 Sussmann explained that his client "is an engineer with a number of patents" and was unsure whether his client would reveal his identity to the CIA. 1552 Sussmann further noted that his client did not want to provide this information to the FBI because the client did not trust the FBI and did not believe that the FBI had the requisite resources to deal with the allegations. Retired CIA Employee-I also recalled Sussmann's statement that, should the CIA not investigate the allegations, he would provide them to the New York Times. Following the meeting, Retired CIA Employee-I drafted a memorandum describing the meeting and sent it to active CIA officers, who then scheduled a meeting with Sussmann for early February 2017.
In the next meeting, Sussmann made a substantially similar statement to the one he had made to Baker regarding the source of the allegations. In particular, Sussmann asserted that he was not representing a particular client in conveying the above allegations. Sussmann, however, was in fact continuing to represent at least Joffe - a matter Sussmann subsequently acknowledged under oath in December 2017 testimony before Congress (without identifying the client by name).
Sussmann provided a similar set of allegations to the CIA that he had previously provided to the FBI. Specifically, Sussmann provided the CIA with an updated version of the Alfa Bank allegations and a new set of allegations that supposedly demonstrated that Trump or his associates were using, in the vicinity ofthe White House and other locations, one or more telephones from the Russian mobile telephone provider Y otaphone. The Office's investigation revealed that these additional allegations relied, in part, on the DNS traffic data that Joffe and others had assembled pertaining to the Trump Tower, Trump's New York City apartment building, the EOP, and Spectrum Health. Sussmann provided data to the CIA that he said reflected suspicious DNS lookups by these entities of domains affiliated with Yotaphone. Sussmann further stated that these lookups demonstrated that Trump or his associates were using a Yotaphone in the vicinity of the White House and other locations.
The FBI DNS experts with whom we worked also identified certain data and information that cast doubt upon several assertions, inferences, and allegations contained in (i) the above-quoted white papers about the Yotaphone allegations, and (ii) the presentation and Yotaphone-related materials that Sussmann provided to the CIA in 2017. In particular:
• Data files obtained from Tech Company-2, a cyber-security research company, as part of the Office's investigation reflect DNS queries run by Tech Company-2 personnel in 2016, 2017, or later reflect that Yotaphone lookups were far from rare in the United States, and were not unique to, or disproportionately prevalent on, Trump related networks. Particularly, within the data produced by Tech Company-2, queries from the United States IP addresses accounted for approximately 46% of all yota.ru queries. Queries from Russia accounted for 20%, and queries from Trump associated IP addresses accounted for less than 0.01 %.
• Data files obtained from Tech Company-I, Tech Company-2, and University-I reflect that Yotaphone-related lookups involving IP addresses assigned to the EOP began long before November or December 2016 and therefore seriously undermine the inference set forth in the white paper that such lookups likely reflected the presence of a Trump transition-team member who was using a Yotaphone in the EOP. In particular, this data reflects that approximately 371 such lookups involving Yotaphone domains and EOP IP addresses occurred prior to the 2016 election and, in at least one instance, as early as October 24, 2014.
Two CIA employees ("CIA Employee-2" and "CIA Employee-3") prepared a memorandum summarizing the meeting they had with Sussmann in February 2017. The final version included Sussmann's representation that he was not representing any '"particular client." In their interviews with the Office, both CIA employees specifically recalled Sussmann stating he was not representing a particular client.
During the meeting, Sussmann provided two thumb drives and four paper documents that, according to Sussmann, supported the allegations. The CIA analyzed the allegations and data that Sussmann provided and prepared a report to reflect its findings. The report explained that the analysis was done to examine whether the materials provided demonstrated "technical plausibility" of the following: "do linkages exist to any Russian foreign intelligence service; do linkages exist to Alpha [sic] Bank; are the provided documents/data based upon open source tools/activities; and is the provided information/data technically conceivable." The CIA ultimately concluded that the materials that Sussmann provided were neither "technically plausible" nor did they "withstand technical scrutiny" and further, that none ofthe materials showed any linkages between the Trump campaign or Trump Organization and any Russian foreign intelligence service or Alfa Bank. The report also noted that one ofthe thumb drives contained hidden data, which included Tech Company-2 Executive-I's name and email address.
Accordingly, Sussmann's conduct supports the inference that his representations to both the FBI and the CIA that he was not there on behalf of a client reflect attempts to conceal the role ofcertain clients, namely the Clinton campaign and Joffe, in Sussmann's work. Such evidence also further supports the inference that Sussmann's false statements to two different agencies were not a mistake or misunderstanding but, rather, a deliberate effort to conceal the involvement of specific clients in his delivery of data and documents to the FBI and CIA.
Sussmann's Congressional testimony
On December 18, 2017, Sussmann testified under oath before the HPSCI and addressed his role in providing the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations to the FBI and CIA. During the proceedings, the following exchange, in part, occurred:
Question: Okay. Did you have any other meetings with any other administration officials regarding the information you conveyed to the FBI G(eneral) C(ounsel) and CIA GC? Was there anyone else you contacted that worked for the Federal Government?
Sussmann: Not that I recall.
Question: Okay. So those are the only two? Now, I want to ask you, what was the information about?
Sussmann: The information was about communications, or potential communications between persons unknown in Russia, and persons unknown associated with the Trump Organization.
Question: Information that was given to you by a client?
Sussmann: Yes.
Question: So that information was not given to you by any other source but the client you represented?
Sussmann: Absolutely.
Question: · No, that's fair. So let me ask you this question: When you decided to engage the two principles [sic] one, Mr. Baker in September, and the general counsel of CIA in December, you were doing that on your own volition, based on information another client provided you. Is that correct?
Sussmann: No.
Question: So what was -- so did your client direct you to have those conversations?
Sussmann: Yes.
Question: Okay. And your client also was witting of you going to - in February to disclose the information that individual had provided you?
Sussmann: Yes.
Question: Back to the FBI. You obviously had a conversation or you had a meeting at the FBI with Mr. Baker. Was there anybody else in the room from the FBI in that room with you?
Sussmann: No.
Question: Okay. I want to ask you, so you mentioned that your client directed you to have these engagements with the FBI and -and to disseminate the information that client provided you. Is that correct?
Sussmann: Well, I apologize for the double negative. It isn't not correct, but when you say my client directed me, we had a conversation, as lawyers do with their clients, about client needs and objectives and the best course to take for a client. And so it may have been a decision that we came to together. I mean, I don't want to imply that I was sort of directed to do something against my better judgment, or that we were in any sort of conflict, but this was -- I think it's most accurate to say it was done on behalf of my client.
Sussmann's congressional testimony concealed and obscured the origins and political nature of his work on the Alfa Bank allegations. Moreover, Sussmann 's testimony was also misleading in that it conveyed the impression to Congress that Sussmann' s only client for the Alfa Bank allegations was Joffe, when in fact he was billing the work to the Clinton campaign. indeed, during points in the testimony not quoted above, Sussmann was specifically asked if Fusion OPS was his client in these matters. Sussmann's answer failed to disclose or volunteer that Fusion, in fact, had drafted one of the white papers that Sussmann gave to the FBI. Sussmann also failed to mention that the only client billed for Sussmann's pre-election work on those allegations was the Clinton campaign.
Perkins Coie's statements to the media
On October 4, 2018, Perkins Coie stated to multiple media outlets that "when Sussmann met with [the FBI General Counsel] on behalf of a client, it was not connected to the firm's representation of the Hillary Clinton Campaign, the DNC or any Political Law Group client." The following week, John Devaney, the Managing Partner of Perkins Coie, wrote to the editor of the Wall Street Journal and stated, "Mr. Sussmann's meeting with the FBI General was on behalf of a client with no connections to either the Clinton campaign, the DNC or any other Political Law Group client." The Office interviewed Perkins Coie leadership, including Mr. Devaney, regarding their knowledge of Sussmann's promotion ofthe Alfa Bank allegations and his billing entries related to the Clinton campaign. Each of the Perkins Coie employees denied knowing that Sussmann had in fact billed all of his time related to the Alfa Bank allegations to Clinton campaign.
Sussmann could have easily corrected Perkins Coie's mistaken belief that Sussmann's work on the Alfa Bank allegations "was not connected to the firm's representation ofthe Hillary Clinton Campaign, the DNC or any Political Law Group client." He chose not to.
Providing the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations to Congress
The Office identified documents reflecting that in March and April 2017 - during the months after Sussmann provided the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations to the CIA - the offices of at least two U.S. Senators received similar materials.
On March 22, 2017, Senators Jack Reed and Mark Warner wrote to Director Corney urging the FBI "to conduct an investigation" into reports that "a server belonging to the Trump Organization was purposefully communicating with servers belonging to a major Russian bank and the Spectrum Health organization in Michigan during the 2016 election. In support of its request, the letter attached an untitled white paper of unknown authorship. The paper included a summary of the Alfa Bank allegations, which was similar in substance to materials that Sussmann had provided to the FBI and CIA."
About a month later, Senator Reed sent a second letter to Corney about the Yotaphone allegations. Like the first letter, this one attached a white paper of unknown authorship. The paper stated that a small number of Yotaphones are sold globally and a very small number - in the dozens - presently operate in the United States. 1576 The paper noted that a group of internet technical experts had discovered a pattern of Y otaphone-like activity occurring within the Trump Organization and the Spectrum Health networks, which it correlated with Trump campaign and transition team visits to Michigan. The data also purportedly showed that Yotaphone-like activity continued at the Trump Organization until December 15th when the same activity began within the EOP, from which the experts inferred that the person or persons using this device in the Trump campaign were part of the transition team that began working within the EOP. The paper concluded that "[g]iven the broad concerns about the Trump campaign's connections to Russia, the existence and activity ofthe YotaPhone, as described here, stands out as an extraordinary oddity that warrants investigation."
inally, on May 8th, a staffer to Senator Reed sent a follow-up memorandum to the FBI's Office of Congressional Affairs. The memorandum noted that the source of the analysis "insists on remaining anonymous, but is represented by an attorney." It went on to say that "the source is willing, through counsel, to have extensive technical discussions with the Bureau's technical staff to explain the DNS records and the analysis that has been conducted." The memorandum also noted that Senator Reed continued to request that the FBI pursue the allegations and that the source's attorney was Michael Sussmann.
Because, however, either the FBI or the CIA, or both agencies, had already examined these allegations, the FBI did not take further investigative steps in response to these requests. The Office did not determine how, or from whom, Senators Reed and Warner received the above-described materials. An executive at Research Organization-I ("Research Executive-I") appears to have learned about the allegations from Senator Reed's office and thereafter conducted work on these issues in coordination and consultation with Senator Reed's staff. Research Executive-I was a former FBI analyst and Hill staffer and the founder of Research Organization-I. Research Executive-I's activities are further described below.
Tech Company-I's connections to the DNC and the Clinton campaign
he Office's investigation also identified evidence that the Clinton campaign and the DNC maintained or sought contemporaneous relationships with Tech Company-I personnel, and used or considered using Tech Company-I products and services, at around the same time as Joffe' s efforts to promote the Alfa Bank and Y otaphone allegations. The campaign and the DNC considered Tech Company-I a possible source of data, including telephone metadata, and there were a number of communications regarding Tech Company data. The Office examined this information in considering whether the campaign or the DNC maintained broader relationships with Tech Company-I that might have led or contributed to Joffe's Alfa Bank and Yotaphone activities. Although the Office identified multiple instances in which the campaign or the DNC maintained ties or communicated with Tech Company-I and its employees, we did not identify evidence establishing that any such activities originated with Joffe or related to the Alfa Bank or Yotaphone allegations. Joffe was not copied or addressed on these communications, and the Office did not identify evidence of his awareness ofthese discussions. We also are not aware ofany evidence that the campaign or the DNC used this data to conduct opposition research (i.e., to gather information regarding an opposing candidate, as opposed to voter information) or otherwise target Trump or his associates.
The Office also considered whether any conduct related to the Tech Company-I data constituted an illegal campaign contribution to the Clinton campaign by Tech Company-1 or other related criminal statutes. The Office did not identify any chargeable criminal conduct in this regard.
Other post-election efforts to continue researching and disseminating the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations.
In addition to the above efforts to disseminate the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations to the FBI, the CIA, and Congress, the Office identified other efforts to generate and disseminate research and other materials relevant to these allegations during the post election period. These post-election activities included (i) continued efforts by employees of Tech Company-I and Tech Company-2 (including Tech Company-2 Executive-I) to gather data and information concerning Trump, Russia, and other topics, and (ii) efforts by Research Executive-I to conduct research and analysis through a non-profit organization that Research Executive-I created in 2017 with the assistance of former HFA Chairman John Podesta, Fusion GPS founder Glenn Simpson, and others.
Continued efforts through Joffe-affiliated companies
Documents and other records that the Office gathered from private entities reflect that during or around the same time period as the aforementioned letters from Senator Reed and afterwards, Joffe was continuing to use Tech Company-I resources and personnel to discuss research issues relating to Trump and Russia, including the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations.
For example, emails and other evidence reflect that in early 2017 and afterwards, Joffe tasked Tech Company-I Employee-I to run searchers over Tech Company-1 's DNS traffic to gather additional information concerning the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations. In particular:
• According to Tech Company-I Employee-I, at or around the time of Trump's inauguration, Tech Company-I Employee-I had been running queries for Joffe relating to Trump, including queries concerning Alfa Bank, Yotaphone, and the EOP. 1586 Joffe and Tech Company-I Employee-I intended to continue running certain ofthese queries after Trump's inauguration.Soon after the inauguration, however, Tech Company-I Employee-I and Joffe noticed that Tech Company-1 's access to the EOP's DNS traffic had ceased. Tech Company-I Employee-I and Joffe never learned why Tech Company-I no longer had access to the EOP's DNS data, but it was clear that Tech Company-5, the contractor that handled the EOP's DNS traffic and the company for which Tech Company-I maintained the EOP's DNS servers, was no longer handling the EOP's data. The Office was unable to determine the reason such data access ceased.
• During the time period, Joffe also continued to direct Tech Company-I Employee-] to run Trump-related searches over Tech Company-1 's data, and emails reflect the aforementioned end of Tech Company-1 's access to EOP data. • For example, on February 14, 2017-five days after Sussmann's meeting with the CIA-Joffe emailed Tech Company-I Employee-I with the subject line "for obvious reasons... ," and stated in the email: "Could you please run a search going back from Feb I to this moment (or later;-)) searching for all activity (not just RCODE 0) for wildcard *.yota.* in recursive? Thanks!" 1590
• That same day, Tech Company-I Employee-I uploaded data responsive to Joffe' s request to a file transfer site and emailed Joffe: "feb O1-14 uploaded to sftp site ... Note that these contain everything, including TLD queries."
• On the following day, Joffe replied: "[Tech Company-I Employee-I], looks like no activity for EOP, right? Odd. Could you redo all of Jan so we can see when it disappeared."
• Later that day, Tech Company-I Employee-I responded to Joffe: "yeah-I only looked at a couple of hours on the first day but I noticed the same thing. Most of the recursive traffic was from Comodo address. I think I need to look at overall EOP volumes since Jan 20 to see if there have been significant volume changes."
• On February 16, 2017 Tech Company-I Employee-I emailed Joffe, analyzing location information for three IP addresses that Tech Company-I Employee-I had found communicated with Yotaphone IP addresses between January 6, 2017 and January 19, 20 I 7. Tech Company-1 Employee-I stated, in part:
The resolver address in the queries is the address that is dedicated to [Tech Company-5] and was used for EOP traffic. Only the first client address maps to EOP. The others are: [IP address] - Haifa, Israel [IP address] - Madison, Wisconsin [IP address] - amazonaws The timestamps on the records are a bit confusing as well - two queries from two different addresses for the same qname as the exact same second in two different nodes (Chicago and Frankfurt). May be an error in processing but still odd.
As of approximately five months later, Tech Company-I Employee-I was continuing to run Trump-related searches over Tech Company-1 's DNS traffic. In particular, on July 18, 2018, Tech Company-I Employee-I emailed Joffe: I have 4 jobs that look specifically for Trump data.
• clnt_ip='217.12.97.15' or clnt_ip='217.12.96.15' or clnt_ip='167.73.l l0.8'
• name = 'trump I .contact-client.com' • qname = 'mail! .trump-email.com' • a query that looks for a bunch of alfa bank rout domains.
In sum, it appears that efforts to gather and mine data concerning Trump from Tech Company-I's DNS data continued for many months after the 2016 Presidential election.
Efforts by Research Executive-1 and others
The Office also gathered information reflecting that, soon after the 2016 election, a number of individuals with ties to the Clinton campaign or Democratic politics met, organized, and executed additional efforts through which they intended to ensure that research and dissemination of materials concerning election interference, including Trump's possible illicit ties to Russia, would continue. These efforts included continued work regarding the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations. As described in further detail below, participants in these activities continued to provide materials to the FBI in an effort to trigger further investigations of Trump's ties to Russia.
In the days immediately after the election, former Clinton campaign Chair Podesta began speaking with associates about a specific potential research project, namely, to create a non-profit organization that would conduct research regarding election interference and would assist the u.S. government and the media in gathering information on this issue. Podesta spoke and met with Glenn Simpson, Research Executive-1, and others regarding his idea. (Podesta told investigators that he was unaware at that time, or at any time prior to October 2017, that Glenn Simpson and Fusion OPS had carried out opposition work on the Steele Dossier and related matters on behalf of Podesta's prior employer, the Clinton campaign. According to Podesta, he knew during the campaign that Perkins Coie was conducting opposition research for the campaign, but did not know who had been actually conducting that research until October 2017 when he learned specifically that Fusion GPS had been paid by both the campaign and the DNC.)
In approximately the late 2016 time period, former U.S. Senator Tom Daschle brokered an introduction between Podesta and Research Executive-1-who previously had worked as an FBI analyst, as a Senate Armed Services Committee staffer, and at a private firm founded by Daschle, the Daschle Group. By that time, Research Executive-I had founded and was running Research Organization-I, which conducted research for private clients. Podesta assisted Research Executive-I by helping him contact and vet numerous potential donors on the West Coast who would ultimately fund Research Executive-1 's research on election interference.
lso, at around this time, Glenn Simpson called Research Executive-I and sought his/her assistance on Podesta's proposed election interference project. Research Executive- I and Simpson initially met for coffee in Washington, D.C. In December 2016, Simpson briefed Research Executive-I on the work he had been doing concerning Trump's purported ties to Russia and expressed concern for his own safety. 1600 According to Research Executive-I, Simpson did not mention - and Research Executive-! did not know at this time - that Simpson had been doing work for Perkins Coie or the Clinton campaign.
In January 2017, Simpson and Research Executive-I again met to discuss the potential research project. Also in January 2017, and as a result ofthese discussions, Research Executive-I formed Research Organization-2, a non-profit organization th~t would continue researching election interference issues, including Trump's potential ties to Russia.
Following its formation, Research Organization-2 entered into a contract with Fusion GPS and hired a number of specialists to assist its research. Research Organization- 2 also maintained a contract with Steele's firm, Orbis Business Intelligence, a/k/a "Walsingham Partners."
As noted above, among the research that Research Organization-2 conducted, and provided to the FBI, was an analysis ofthe Alfa Bank allegations. According to Research Executive-I, he first became aware ofthese allegations when Senator Reed's office contacted him in 2017 to inform him of them. Research Executive-1 learned from a staffer for Senator Reed, ("Reed Staffer-2") - whom Research Executive-I knew from his time on the Senate staff- that there was a particular "client" who used the name "Max" and who was behind the allegations. Research Executive-I also learned that Reed had requested further information from the FBI about its efforts to investigate this matter because multiple Senators were reportedly frustrated that, in their view, the FBI was not investigating the Alfa Bank ailegations. Research Executive-I agreed to research the issue through Research Organization-2. In conducting work on the Alfa Bank matter, Research Executive-I isolated Fusion GPS from the project for reasons unknown to the Office.
As a result of receiving this information from the Senate Armed Services Committee, Research Executive-I met in early 2017 with Sussmann at Perkins Coie' s office.
At the meeting, Sussmann discussed the allegations, including media reports concerning them. According to Research Executive-I, Sussmann did not identify his "client" by name, but stated that he (Sussmann) was dealing with the government on the issue; that he was persuaded by the data; and that he was frustrated by the FBI's dismissal of it. Sussmann also described to Research Executive-I his interactions with the media and his frustration with their coverage of it.
Later that year, Research Executive-I again met Sussmann at Perkins Coie regarding the Alfa Bank allegations. Sussmann's client, Joffe, was also present at this meeting. During their discussions, Sussmann and Joffe stated that they believed the FBI had sent the Alfa Bank allegations to the wrong investigative team. Research Executive-I was told that Joffe was part of a multi-million-dollar program that collected DNS data, which was the source ofthe data underlying the Alfa Bank allegations.
During the same time period, Research Executive-I had assembled an investigative team to examine the Alfa Bank allegations, including a number of DNS experts who had previously worked for multiple U.S. intelligence agencies. Research Executive-1 'steam tested Joffe's data and conducted their own analysis. The team was skeptical ofthe Alfa Bank data and found no evidence of a secret channel of communications, but Research Executive-I said, "it was something."
Research Executi ve-1 also learned of the Y otaphone allegations from Sussmann. Research Executive-1 'steam did some, but not a lot of, work on these allegations. Research Executive-I told our investigators that he was '·totally" skeptical ofthe Yotaphone assertions. Research Executive-I understood that the EOP's computer network was run by the Department of Homeland Security, which contracted out the services to an unknown vendor with access to the data that formed the basis ofthe Yotaphone allegations.
Meetings between DARPA and University-I
In connection with its consideration of the Alfa Bank issue, the Office also gathered information about meetings between certain of the aforementioned University-I employees and staff members of both the Senate Armed Services Committee and HPSCI. During at least one ofthese meetings, the participants discussed the Alfa Bank allegations, including the possibility that researchers under DARPA's Enhanced Attribution ("EA") program might assist HPSCI in investigating the allegations. The Office considered whether these activities might be relevant to a prosecution for contract fraud or abuse of government resources.
In early October 2018, a representative of the Senate Armed Services Committee requested via University-1 's Government Affairs representative that researchers affiliated with the EA program provide a briefing to Committee staff members in Washington, D.C. Personnel at University-1 agreed to facilitate such a briefing.
In late October 2018, another University-I researcher ("University-I Researcher- 3") and a DARPA Program Manager, ("DARPA Program Manager-I") traveled to Washington, D.C. to provide the briefing. Upon their arrival, University-I Researcher-3 and DARPA Program Manager-I met with Reed Staffer-2 and another Committee staffer in the Russell Senate Office Building. At the meeting, which lasted only a short time, University- 1 Researcher-3 and DARPA Program Manager-I provided a broad and brief overview of the EA program - which they understood to be the purpose ofthe meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting, which had been cut short due to scheduling conflicts, Reed Staffer-2 indicated to University-I Researcher-3 that he would like to schedule a follow-up meeting with University-I researchers in attendance so that the Committee staff could receive a more comprehensive briefing on the EA program.
The following month, in November 2018, University-I Researcher-3 and University-I Researcher-2 traveled to Washington, D.C. to provide a second briefing on EA for staffers for the Senate Armed Services Committee. University-I Researcher-2 recalled that the night before the meeting, he spoke with Joffe, who told him that after the Senate briefing, there was going to be another meeting Joffe wanted him to attend. Joffe told University-1 Researcher-2 that there would be someone to meet him and take him to this other meeting.
The November 2018 meeting occurred in the Hart Senate Office Building with Reed Staffer-2 and two staffers present. At the meeting, University-I Researcher-3 and The November 2018 meeting occurred in the Hart Senate Office Building with Reed Staffer-2 and two staffers present. At the meeting, University-I Researcher-3 and University-I Researcher-2 gave an unclassified presentation regarding the EA program and the history of DNS.
Following the meeting in the Senate space, Reed Staffer-2 informed University-! Researcher-3 and University-I Researcher-2 that some other people were interested in speaking with them. University-I Researcher-3 and University-I Researcher-2 agreed to meet with these other people, who turned out to be HPSCI staffers, but the meeting needed to be quick due to University-I Researcher-3 's schedule. Reed Staffer-2 then brought them into the secure space of the HPSCI. Before the meeting, University-I Researcher-3 told Reed Staffer-2 that University-I Researcher-2 did not possess a security clearance, to which Reed Staffer-2 stated that the briefing would be unclassified.
fter arriving in the HPSCI secure conference room, Reed Staffer-2 introduced University-I Researcher-3 and University-I Researcher-2 to several HPSCI staffers. During the meeting, University-! Researcher-3 and University-I Researcher-2 began to provide a similar presentation to that which they had given to the Senate staffers. Soon after the start ofthe presentation, however, the Committee staffers cut University-I Researcher-3 off and showed him and University-I Researcher-2 a news article about Trump, Russia, and Alfa Bank that University-I Researcher-3 had not seen previously.The staffers asked University-I Researcher-3 to read the article and said they wanted University-1 's help with the matter, and Reed Staffer-2 said University-I Researcher-3 "... could make it easier.
University-I Researcher-3 said he responded by saying that it would be inappropriate for a public university to do that, and he suggested they contact DARPA. University-I Researcher-3 told investigators that Reed Staffer-2 then said, "We are now in charge," and one of the HPSCI staffers said that their boss (Congressman Adam Schiff) would soon take over leadership of HPSCI. 1627 University-I Researcher-3 took the comment as a mild threat. University-I Researcher-3 said he then "dragged" University-I Researcher-2 out of the meeting. University-I Researcher-2 similarly recalled that University-I Researcher-3 had quickly ended the meeting. 1628 University-! Researcher-3 told investigators that he told University-! Researcher-2, "Don't touch this with a ten foot pole, stay away from this."University-I Researcher-3 said he had no recollection of University-I Researcher-3 said he responded by saying that it would be inappropriate for a public university to do that, and he suggested they contact DARPA. University-I Researcher-3 told investigators that Reed Staffer-2 then said, "We are now in charge," and one of the HPSCI staffers said that their boss (Congressman Adam Schiff) would soon take over leadership of HPSCI. University-I Researcher-3 took the comment as a mild threat. University-I Researcher-3 said he then "dragged" University-I Researcher-2 out of the meeting. University-I Researcher-2 similarly recalled that University-I Researcher-3 had quickly ended the meeting. 1628 University-! Researcher-3 told investigators that he told University-! Researcher-2, "Don't touch this with a ten foot pole, stay away from this." University-I Researcher-3 said he had no recollection of University-I Researcher-2 mentioning the work and research he (University-I Researcher-2) already had done at University-I regarding the Alfa Bank-related allegations.
University-I Researcher-3 recalled that he informed DARPA Program Manager-I ofthis request from the HPSCI staffers, including his objections to the nature ofthe request. 1631 University-I Researcher-3 recalls that DARPA Program Manager-I listened but did not react substantively to the information. When interviewed by the Office, DARPA Program Manager-I denied learning of the Alfa Bank allegations other than through media reports. DARPA Program Manager-I maintained that he was unaware of any role that University-I personnel played in the Alfa Bank allegations.
The relevant Trump Organization email domain and Yotaphone data
This subsection first describes what our investigation found with respect to the allegation that there was a covert communications channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank. It includes the information we obtained from interviews of Listrak and Cendyn employees. It then turns to the allegation that there was an unusual Russian phone operating on the Trump Organization networks and in the Executive Office of the President. We tasked subject matter experts from the FBI's Cyber Technical Analysis and Operations Section to evaluate both of these allegations.
This subsection first describes what our investigation found with respect to the allegation that there was a covert communications channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank. It includes the information we obtained from interviews of Listrak and Cendyn employees. It then turns to the allegation that there was an unusual Russian phone operating on the Trump Organization networks and in the Executive Office of the President. We tasked subject matter experts from the FBI's Cyber Technical Analysis and Operations Section to evaluate both of these allegations.of Cendyn. Listrak provides marketing automation services, including sending bulk email.
Listrak personnel stated that the Trump Organization's IP address was one of numerous IP addresses assigned to a cluster of four to eight physical servers that handle all outbound email for thousands of Listrak clients. Significantly, Listrak informed us that the IP address and domain used for the Trump Organization were configured to only send outbound email. Moreover, Listrak explained that, as is customary for such services, no one in the Trump Organization had direct technical or system administrator access to Listrak servers. Indeed, the very notion of a "Trump Server" is a misnomer in that the servers involved did not belong to and were not controlled by the Trump Organization. To the contrary, the servers belonged to and were controlled by Listrak at all times. Listrak further stated that it never had, during this time period, a dedicated server (physical or virtual) to handle Trump Organization communications. Rather, the server that hosted the Trump Organization housed hundreds of other clients and that each server sent millions of emails out for clients.
Cendyn personnel told us that the Trump Organization's contract with Cendyn for digital and email marketing ended in 20 I5, but the domain name continued to be registered and pointed to the same IP address. Moreover, after Cendyn's contract with the Trump Organization expired in 2015, Cendyn continued to use the IP address to send emails out on behalf ofother Cendyn clients. However, there was no data provided at the time, nor is such currently available, that shows which clients were sending email from the IP address during the May through September 2016 time period examined in the white paper. Cendyn, however, maintained technical control of the domain until March 2017. Similarly, Listrak maintained complete technical control of its servers during the same May through September 2016 time period.
Because the Trump Organization had no access to the server or any of the systems involved, Listrak personnel told us that the only way any alleged covert communications channel could have existed would be if Listrak employees deliberately modified their mission critical servers with non-standard software or configurations. But they pointed out that making such changes would risk the integrity, reliability or availability of their systems. Moreover, Listrak told us that changing its servers to accommodate incoming messages would completely alter the core structure of its business operations, which is primarily to send outgoing mass marketing emails.Listrak employees responsible for the design and administration of these servers categorically stated this did not happen and that it would be impossible for it to have happened without their knowledge and without affecting other clients' account functions and operations.
In addition to investigating the actual ownership and control ofthe IP address, the Office tasked FBI cyber experts with analyzing the technical claims made in the white paper. This endeavor included their examination of the list of email addresses and send times for all emails sent from the Listrak email server from May through September 2016, which is the time period the white paper purportedly examined. The FBI experts also conducted a review of the historical TOR exit node data.
The technical analysis done by the FBI experts revealed that the data provided by Sussmann to the FBI and used to support Joffe and the cyber researchers' claim that a '"very unusual distribution of source IP addresses" was making queries for mail l.trump-email.com was incomplete. Specifically, the FBI experts determined that there had been a substantial amount of email traffic from the IP address that resulted in a significantly larger volume of DNS queries for the mail I.trump-email.com domain than what Joffe, University I Researcher-2 and the cyber researchers reported in the white paper or included on the thumb drives accompanying it. The FBI experts reviewed all ofthe outbound email transmissions, including address and send time for all emails sent from the Listrak server from May through September 2016, and determined that there had been a total of 134,142 emai I messages sent between May and August 2016, with the majority sent on May 24 and June 23. 1655 The recipients included a wide range of commercial email services, including Google and Yahoo, as well as corporate email accounts for multiple corporations.
Similarly, the FBI experts told us that the collection of passive DNS data used to support the claims made in the white paper was also significantly incomplete. 1657 They explained that, given the documented email transmissions from IP address 66.216.133.29 during the covered period, the representative sampling of passive DNS would have necessarily included a much larger volume and distribution of queries from source IP addresses across the internet. In light of this fact, they stated that the passive DNS data that Joffe and his cyber researchers compiled and that Sussmann passed onto the FBI was significantly incomplete, as it included no A-record (hostname to IP address) resolutions corresponding to the outgoing messages from the IP address. Without further information from those who compiled the white paper data, the FBI experts stated that it is impossible to determine whether the absence ofadditional A record resolutions is due to the visibility afforded by the passive DNS operator, the result of the specific queries that the compiling analyst used to query the dataset, or intentional filtering applied by the analyst after retrieval.
The FBI experts also examined the white paper's claim that a particular "Spectrum Health IP address is a TOR exit node used exclusively by Alfa Bank, i.e., Alfa Bank communications enter a TOR node somewhere in the world and those communications exit, presumably untraceable, at Spectrum Health." However, the FBI experts assisting us noted that TOR publishes a comprehensive list ofexit nodes dating back to February 22, 2010. The FBI examined this data for dates between February 22,2010 and September I, 2021. No instances of IP addresses in the range of 167.73 .x.x (assigned to Spectrum Health) were ever indexed as TOR exit nodes.
The FBI experts who examined this issue for us stated that historical TOR exit node data conclusively disproves this white paper's allegation in its entirety. 1664 Moreover, the FBI experts further explained that the construction ofthe TOR network makes the arrangement described in the white paper impossible. Indeed, they added that even if true or possible, using the TOR network in the manner alleged in the white paper would result in worse anonymization and security than simply using TOR in its default configuration. Rather than allowing for clandestine communication, the setup described in the white paper would create a static proxy with a known endpoint that could be more easily traced with traffic to the relatively small numb~r of guard nodes, and which would allow for the identification of the true source IP much more easily than using a randomly selected exit node for each connection as the TOR system is designed to do. In simpler terms, the FBI experts told us that using a TOR exit node in the manner described by the white paper would make a secret communication channel much easier to find, not harder. And, they further noted that although it is entirely likely that one or more users, at some time, connected to both Spectrum Health and Alfa Bank using TOR, and may have even come through the same exit node, this possibility in no way indicates any kind of correlation because of the deliberately random nature of TOR routing.
We also tasked the same FBI experts to review the white paper on Yotaphones that Sussmann provided to another government agency on behalf of Joffe. This white paper stated that there was "an unusual Russian phone" that was "operating on Trump Organization networks and in the Executive Office of the President."Its claims were based primarily on DNS resolution requests for the domains "client.yota.ru" and "wimax client.yota.ru" from July 23, 2016 through January 15, 2017 from Trump-affiliated networks, coupled with the assertion that such YotaPhone resolution request activity was rare in the United States.
However, the FBI experts examined historical DNS query data for the yota.ru domains for the same time period as that analyzed in the white paper. Indeed, they examined data that the white paper researchers also had access to. In doing so, the FBI experts determined that, contrary to the claims set forth in the white paper, the DNS query data actually indicated that resolution requests for these domains were not at all rare from U.S.-based IP addresses, as compared with other countries. These experts further observed that the DNS query data used to support the white paper claims was deliberately filtered to select only those organizations in the United States with ties to Trump.
In sum, as a result of our investigation, the FBI experts advised us that actual data and information on YotaPhone resolution requests directly undermined or refuted several conclusions and inferences included in the Yotaphone white paper.
Prosecution decisions
We identified evidence that certain individuals and entities promoted the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations to the Intelligence Community. We examined the validity ofthe allegations, conducted technical analyses, and assessed the data and information that was provided to the FBI and CIA. We examined this evidence in considering whether the activities by these individuals and entities, as well as government officials, violated any criminal statutes. In particular, the investigation examined whether these individuals and entities either on their own provided, or conspired with others to provide, false or misleading information to the Intelligence Community.
First, and as noted above, we identified certain statements that Sussmann made to the FBI and the CIA that the investigation revealed were false. Given the seriousness of the false statement and its effect on the FBI's investigation, a federal Grand Jury found probable cause to believe that Sussmann had lied to the FBI and charged him with making a false statement to the Bureau, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Ultimately, after a two-week trial, a jury acquitted Sussmann of the false statement charge. (Why? ~WW)
A jury acquitted Sussmann ofthe false statement charge. We also considered whether any criminal actions were taken by other persons or entities in furtherance of Sussmann's false statement to the FBI. The evidence gathered in the investigation did not establish that any such actions were taken. Second, our investigation uncovered evidence of actions taken by individuals and entities with ties to the Clinton campaign to promote the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations to the Intelligence Community and Congress. We evaluated whether any of these individuals made a false statement within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and whether admissible evidence would be sufficient to obtain a conviction for such an offense. We also considered whether actions taken by certain persons could have implicated federal election laws. We concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction.
We examined as well whether the actions and conduct of Sussmann and various other persons in advancing the Alfa Bank and Y otaphone allegations established a conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Ultimately, we concluded that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. We did not obtain admissible evidence likely to meet the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individuals acted "willfully," i.e., with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct. We faced significant obstacles in obtaining evidence because many of the individuals and entities involved invoked multiple privileges, including the attorney-client and Fifth Amendment privileges. Third, we examined the FBI' s actions in response to the Alfa Bank and Y otaphone allegations. We assessed whether any FBI or other federal official conspired with any other persons in promoting the Alfa Bank allegations to damage the Trump campaign or benefit the Clinton campaign. Our investigation did not find any evidence that any FBI official or employee knowingly and intentionally participated in some type of conspiracy with others to promote the Alfa Bank allegations or cause the FBI to open an investigation. Certain FBI officials, however, declined to be interviewed on the matter, and others professed a lack of recollection of it.
inally, we considered the conduct of third parties and other government officials regarding actions taken following the election that involved the continued promotion of the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations to law enforcement and other government bodies. We did not, however, develop sufficient evidence to charge false statements or conspiracy crimes in connection with any intentional misrepresentations in this regard because it was unclear, in numerous instances, when particular data searches involving the alleged activity at the EOP were run, and when specific data files came into possession of the relevant persons (i.e., whether such data was searched or identified before or after materials were received by the CIA or Congress). In addition, because ofthe protections of attorney-client privilege and other impediments, we were unable to determine with precision or certainty who authored each of the relevant white papers. Accordingly, we did not charge any individuals 1676 with knowingly providing false information to the government in connection with the Alfa Bank and Yotaphone allegations.
OBSERVATIONS
In making the observations that follow, we are mindful of the benefits hindsight provides and the hazards of possibly being unfair to individuals who were called upon to make decisions under real pressure and in unprecedented circumstances. That said, the objective facts show that the FBI's handling of important aspects of the Crossfire Hurricane matter were seriously deficient. Some FBI employees who were interviewed by our investigators advised that they had significant reservations about aspects of Crossfire Hurricane and tried to convey their misgivings to their superiors. Others had doubts about the investigation, but did not voice their concerns. In some cases, nothing was said because of a sense that there had to be more compelling information in the possession of those closest to the decision-making center of the case than had been made known to them. And there were still other current and former employees who maintained that they did the best they could to take reasonable investigative steps and acted within the FBI's various policies, procedures and guidelines.
As the more complete record now shows, there are specific areas of Crossfire Hurricane activity in which the FBI badly underperformed and failed, not only in its duties to the public, but also in preventing the severe reputational harm that has befallen the FBI as a consequence of Crossfire Hurricane. Importantly, had the Crossfire Hurricane actors faithfully followed their own principles regarding objectivity and integrity, there were clear opportunities to have avoided the mistakes and to have prevented the damage resulting from their embrace of seriously flawed information that they failed to analyze and assess properly.
As described in section IV, both the OIG and the FBI's Inspection Division have reviewed aspects of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation into possible collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign and the FISA applications targeting Carter Page. The OIG also conducted a more limited audit of the accuracy of 29 FISA applications that were not connected to Crossfire Hurricane.
In 2020, the Department and the FBI provided the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board ("PCLOB") 19 of the 29 applications reviewed by the OIG. The PCLOB is an independent agency within the Executive Branch that was established by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The Board's primary mission is to ensure that federal efforts to prevent terrorism are balanced with protecting privacy and civil liberties. The 19 applications were directed at counterterrorism targets and Adam Klein, the former Chairman of the PCLOB, reviewed the 19 applications.
Following the OIG's review and audit, both the Attorney General and the FISC directed that a number of changes be made. Outside commentators have also recommended numerous changes. In the FISA reform proposals put forth by various individuals and groups, there is division between those that would make all, or many, FISA surveillances more difficult or prohibit certain types of surveillances altogether and those that focus more specifically on the issues raised by the Page applications. In making our observations, the Office considered but did not include proposals that would curtail the scope or reach of FISA or the FBI' s investigative activities. We are concerned about the impact of such proposals in a time of aggressive and hostile terrorist groups and foreign powers. The FBI's priorities include protecting the United States against national security threats. Inevitably, that involves pursuing some targets and investigations that end up yielding few results. The OI G review of the September 11th attacks noted that "the FBI ... failed to use the FISA statute fully" and that, in its investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, a potential "19th hijacker," the deficiencies "included a narrow and conservative interpretation of FISA." More recently, for reasons that may include the COVID pandemic, the impact of the Page FISA applications, or changes in government priorities, the number of FISC orders using certain FISA authorities reportedly has declined sharply -- from 1184 to 430 -- over a recent four-year period.
Former Assistant Attorney General David Kris has said that, in amending FISA, "you're doing surgery on a very complicated thing." He went on to say, "[t]hat may sound trivial, but it's actually very important for national security." Moreover, if amendments are not approached from a long-term perspective:
I worry that in the not-too-distant-future we may find ourselves on the other end of the familiar national-security pendulum swing, reviewing a new inspector general or other report -- this time criticizing the Justice Department ... for the proliferation of red tape or other restrictions, and the failure to stop an attack or other grave, hostile acts committed against our national security.
Senator Graham expressed the same thought succinctly: ''I'd hate to lose the ability of the FISA court to operate at a time probably when we need it the most.
Thus, we first discuss below the prior review that the OIG conducted ofthe FBI's handling of the Robert Hanssen investigation, focusing on problems that appeared both in that investigation and Crossfire Hurricane. We then turn to measures to assist in the full and complete consideration of politically sensitive investigations and make FISA applications more understandable and complete for the officials and judges who review and approve them. We conclude with a discussion of bias and improper motivation and suggest one possible FBI reform for consideration by the Department. We do not try to review all the many changes that have already been made but rather seek to build on them.
The OIG's Prior Evaluation of Systemic Problems in the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (Robert Hanssen)
Robert Hanssen was "the most damaging spy in FBI history." For more than 20 years while he was assigned to the FBI's counterintelligence program, Hanssen betrayed the United States and gave the KGB enormous amounts of highly sensitive information, including the identities of dozens of human sources, some of whom were subsequently executed by the Soviet Union. The OIG conducted an extensive review of the FBI's failure to deter and detect Hanssen as a mole and concluded that Hanssen did not escape detection "because he was a 'master spy"' or "was extraordinarily clever and crafty" but rather because of "longstanding systemic problems in the FBI's counterintelligence program." For many years, the FBI focused on a specific CIA employee as the potential mole.Although its initial focus may have been reasonable, as time went on:
The FBI should have seriously questioned its conclusion that the CIA suspect was a KGB spy and considered opening different lines of investigation. The squad responsible for the case, however, was so committed to the belief that the CIA suspect was a mole that it lost a measure of objectivity . . . . [W]hile FBI management pressed for the investigation to be completed, it did not question the factual premises underlying it.
The FBI should have seriously questioned its conclusion that the CIA suspect was a KGB spy and considered opening different lines of investigation. The squad responsible for the case, however, was so committed to the belief that the CIA suspect was a mole that it lost a measure of objectivity . . . . While FBI management pressed for the investigation to be completed, it did not question the factual premises underlying it."One of the OIG's recommendations for the FBI's counterintelligence program in the Hanssen matter was that "supervisors must guard against excessively deferring to line personnel ... and ... must ensure that the Department ... is properly briefed on the strengths and weaknesses of potential espionage prosecutions."
A more cooperative relationship between the Counterintelligence Division and the Department, the OIG explained later, would make it "more likely case agents' analytical and investigative judgments in counterespionage cases will be adequately scrutinized." Other recommendations similarly concerned greater involvement for Department attorneys, including "a larger oversight role in ensuring the accuracy and fairness of factual assertions in FISA applications and ... direct access to the case agent and the source information relied on in the application."
When considering Crossfire Hurricane, some of the OIG's recommendations continue to be relevant, particularly by analogy. Numerous reports clearly state that Russia was trying to influence the 2016 presidential election. This was also the prevailing view of the media and it was widely accepted throughout open source reporting at the time that Russia was to blame for the unlawful intrusion into the DNC servers.
One ofthe chief errors from the start of Crossfire Hurricane was the poor analysis the FBI brought to bear on the critical pieces of information that it had gathered, as well as an over reliance on flawed or incomplete human intelligence that only later was found to be plainly unreliable. In July 2016, the FBI received the most damaging of the Steele Reports but, mysteriously and unfortunately, these reports do not appear to have made their way to the Counterintelligence Division for analysis until after mid-September. Later in July, Australia provided the information from Papadopoulos to U.S. authorities. The FBI then appears to have formulated a hypothesis that the Trump campaign, or someone associated with it, was working with the Russians. Neither the Crossfire Hurricane Opening EC nor those responsible for the investigation in the Counterintelligence Division or upper management, however, appear to have recognized the crucial need to analyze and then assess the actual ambiguities in Papadopoulos's statements to the Australian diplomats. Instead, the FBI immediately opened a full investigation, an investigation that clearly had the ability to affect an approaching presidential election. Indeed, executive management of the FBI and its Counterintelligence Division appear to have taken the Paragraph Five information at face value in opening the matter as evidenced by the Opening EC citing the Paragraph Five information as essentially the sole basis for opening a full investigation on unnamed members of an ongoing presidential campaign. Then, when the Steele reporting finally was received by Crossfire Hurricane personnel in September 2016, it was immediately exploited, with no verification of its sensational allegations, and used in support of its initial request for FISA authority. The Steele reporting would eventually fall apart, but not before it had been continuously adopted by the FBI as supportive of its underlying theory regarding collusion.
The Intelligence Community's Analytic Standards say that analysts "must perform their functions with objectivity" and "employ reasoning techniques and practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate bias." In the Hanssen investigation, the squad "responsible for the case ... was so committed to the belief that the CIA suspect was a mole that it iost a measure ofobjectivity and failed to give adequate consideration to other possibilities.The SSC/ Russia Report observed that the FBI's analysts should endeavor "to check assumptions underpinning FBI operations, to apply the rigor of intelligence analysis to assessments and confidential human sources, and to create a culture where questioning previously held assumptions is acceptable and encouraged." The Office concurs with this recommendation.
Apart from analytic integrity, in seeking FISA authority in Crossfire Hurricane, investigators withheld key pieces of information from the OI attorneys. The OI attorneys are responsible for ensuring the accuracy and fairness of the information presented to the FISC, an impossible task without being provided with relevant information. Both the OIG's review and this review highlight the omissions, errors, and misstatements by FBI personnel, including the withholding ofsignificant exculpatory statements, that should not have occurred had the Crossfire Hurricane investigators considered and treated the Department lawyers as full partners. Rather, Crossfire Hurricane reflects a struggle by OI to obtain straightforward answers about Steele's possible bias and leaks to the media and Page's relationship with another government agency. Nor was OI told about the significant differences between the Steele Reports and the statements Danchenko made to the FBI.
In the follow-on Hanssen Progress Review, the OIG quoted a Department official as saying that the Department "still has the occasional fight with the FBI to get full access to information, particularly information pertinent to the reliability of sources relied on in the FISA applications." The Crossfire Hurricane investigation shows that regrettably these struggles for accuracy and transparency were still occurring in 2016. Moreover, it is certainly to be hoped that, with the new post-Page requirements of the Sensitive Investigations Memorandum, the new guidelines governing the FBI' s use of human sources, and other significant policy changes, there will not be a recurrence ofthe serious errors identified by the OIG, the Inspection Division, and our investigation. Absent continual reinforcement by FBI leadership ofthe need for integrity , accuracy, and objectivity in follo½ing these requirements, however, such is not a certainty.
FBI Investigations
1. The New York counterintelligence investigation
When the NYFO opened a counterintelligence investigation of Page in April 2016, at a time when he was a foreign policy adviser to the Trump campaign, the investigation likely should have been treated as a sensitive investigative matter because of Page's role in the campaign. The Attorney General has since addressed this issue in a desirable, though slightly different, way. The Attorney General must approve any investigation ofa "senior presidential campaign staff member or advisor." A footnote explains that "this includes any person who has been publicly announced by a campaign as a staffer or member ofan official campaign advisory committee or group."
2. Predication of Crossfire Hurricane
The FBI opened the Crossfire Hurricane investigation as a full investigation "to determine whether individual(s) associated with the Trump campaign are witting of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of Russia." As described in section III, the standard for opening a full investigation is "an articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates that ... an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security ... is or may be occurring ... and the investigation may obtain information relating to the activity."
The information that the FBI learned in July 2016 was that a Trump campaign advisor had suggested to the Australian diplomats that the campaign "had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist" the campaign. The OIG Review found that the FBI met the requirements of the AGG-Dom because the "articulable factual basis" standard for opening the investigation is a "low" one and the information from Australia, at least when considered along with what was known about Russia's efforts to interfere with the 2016 U.S. elections, met that standard. We are not confident, however, that this is the case. Our investigation gathered evidence that showed that a number of those closest to the investigation believed that the standard arguably had not been met. For example, both Supervisory Special Agent-1 and UK ALA T-1 described the predication for the investigation as "thin."Even Strzok, who both drafted and approved the Opening EC, said that "there's nothing to this, but we have to run it to ground." Strzok' s view would seem to dictate the opening of the matter as an assessment or, at most, as a preliminary investigation. In any event, there are a number of other reasons to be concerned about the predication of Crossfire Hurricane.
Apart from the need to meet the standard in the AGG-Dom for opening a full investigation, Executive Order 12333 requires the use of "the least intrusive collection techniques feasible." FBI policy says that "when First Amendment rights are at stake" - which they clearly were in a major-party political campaign - "the choice and use of investigative methods should be focused in a manner that minimizes potential infringement of those rights." Moreover, the FBI will "[a]pply best judgment" necessary to achieve an objective. To assist FBI agents with their judgments, decision-making and the need to employ the least intrusive means, the DIOG includes precautions when opening and conducting investigations in order to, among other things, encourage careful evaluation of facts and circumstances, as well as to assess risk, before proceeding with any investigative activity.
In implementing these standards, the FBI could have taken one or more of the following sensible steps:
• Under the least intrusive standard, rather than opening an investigation with a broad scope ("to determine whether individual(s) associated with the Trump campaign are witting of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of Russia"), the FBI should have focused, at least at the beginning, on Papadopoulos, the alleged source of the information from Australia. On the other hand, the Paragraph Five information was not only connected to Papadopoulos, but also to the campaign as an alleged recipient of "some kind of suggestion from Russia."
• Under the FBI's guidelines, the investigation could have been opened more appropriately as an assessment or preliminary investigation. FBI investigations opened as preliminary investigations, short offull investigations, include time limits and a narrower range of authorized techniques to mitigate risk and avoid unnecessary intrusion. If necessary and appropriate, a lower level of investigative activity may be escalated under the guidelines by converting to a full investigation with supervisory approval.
• In the subsequent investigation of Page under the Crossfire Hurricane umbrella, the FBI could have used additional, less intrusive techniques before seeking authority to conduct electronic surveillance under FISA. The paucity of information collected on key aspects of Page's activities would support such an approach.
Regardless of an investigator's preference for any of these steps, there are now additional requirements that apply to the opening of an investigation like Crossfire Hurricane. The Sensitive Investigations lvlemorandum requires the Attorney General to approve the opening of such an investigation. That an investigation like Crossfire Hurricane should require a concurring decision by the Department, rather than any one component or entity, seems appropriate. We also believe that the proposal described below in E for an identified Department official to challenge all stages of a politically sensitive investigation would be another valuable way of addressing concerns about the opening, continuation and intrusiveness of an investigation like Crossfire Hurricane.
3. Opening ofindividual inve.fitigations
The FBI opened full investigations of Papadopoulos, Page, Flynn, and Manafort in August 2016, as part of Crossfire Hurricane. Again, in addition to the requirements of the AGG-Dom and the DIOG, the approval requirements in the Sensitive Investigations Afemorandum now would apply to these. The proposal in Section V.E would also potentially apply to them.
4. Compartmentation
Unlike most FBI investigations, which are managed from FBI field offices, Crossfire Hurricane was managed from FBI Headquarters. The information it collected was not shared with or available to others in the FBI, including, as described above, the Directorate of Intelligence. The OIG Review says that:
Because the information being investigated related to an ongoing presidential election campaign, the Crossfire Hurricane case file was designated as "prohibited" meaning that access to the file was restricted and viewable to only those individuals assigned to work on the investigation. Agents and analysts ... used covert investigative techniques to ensure information about the investigation remained known only to the team and FBI and Department officials.
Moreover, at least at times, even those participating in the investigation had limited information available. Supervisory Special Agent-3, who was tasked to supervise the Crossfire Hurricane investigators as a successor to Supervisory Special Agent-I, stated:
Contributing to the difficulties ... was how compartmentalized the ... investigation was, specifically the lack of information sharing between the intelligence analysts and the operational component .... Even as the team lead, I only had access to limited information, and from the start of my [temporary duty], I did not have a clear picture of everything going on in the investigation .... I was managing the day to day operations ofthe case without having complete information.
The investigation's compartmentation, and its unusual structure as a Headquarters investigation, may have limited the amount of oversight that it received. In the past, NSA's collection ofthe international communications of U.S. citizens and groups was also highly compartmented. A Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church investigated this activity. It reported:
In 1969, NSA formalized the watch list program under the codename MINARET. The program applied not only to alleged foreign influence on domestic dissent, but also to American groups and individuals whose activities "may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security ofthe U.S." At the same time, NSA instructed its personnel to "restrict the knowledge" that NSA was collecting such information and to keep its name offthe disseminated "product. "
The report found that "NSA placed more restrictive security controls on MINARET material than it placed on other highly classified foreign intercepts in order to conceal its involvement in activities which were beyond its regular mission.''
ement in activities which were beyond its regular mission.'' In possible contrast to the FBI, the CIA may not have compartmented some of the information that it had. The Office learned at one point from Director Brennan that "[t]here was no effort at the CIA to restrict information because it was potentially embarrassing for Hillary Clinton.... Obama just wanted the right people involved." In combination, an unusually compartmented investigation bearing on politics will always involve risk, especially when it is the subject of significant media attention. In any event, in opening and conducting a sensitive investigation, the FBI should consider ways to balance the need for secrecy against the need to have a full and informed evaluation ofthe case. Leaks can cause great harm, but so can a failure to understand the information collected or to take appropriate investigative steps.
5. Interaction with the Trump campaign
On August I I, 2016, the FBI met with CHS-I who, as described earlier, was a longstanding FBI source. CHS-I had decided not to join the Trump campaign but told the FBI that he/she was willing to refrain from notifying the campaign about this decision. The Crossfire Hurricane investigators were pleased or relieved that the source did not want to join the campaign. But as to whether the FBI encouraged or directed the source to avoid notifying the campaign, the OIG Review is less clear. Not notifying the campaign, of course, could in and of itself affect the campaign's staffing decisions or other activities. On September 1, 2016, CHS-I met with a high-level Trump campaign official who was not a subject ofthe Crossfire Hurricane investigation. This meeting was consensually monitored. The OIG notes that "FBI and Department policy did not require that the FBI obtain Department approval to consensually monitor this conversation."
Also in September 2016, CHS-I met with Papadopoulos. The OIG Review says that, "[t]he OGC Unit Chieftold the OIG that because the operation targeted Papadopoulos individually and wasn't directed at anything related to the campaign, she thought that it was appropriate. If the purpose of CHS-1 's meeting with Papadopoulos was not to find out if the campaign or anyone on its behalf was conspiring or colluding with Russia, it is hard to know what the purpose was.
Defensive briefings
The OIG Review discusses the FBI's decision not to give candidate Trump or his campaign a defensive briefing concerning the allegations that the Crossfire Hurricane team was investigating. The Review does not discuss whether the decision was consistent with other decisions that the FBI has made about defensive briefings for political candidates. There are of course numerous investigations over the years that involve presidential and congressional candidates or campaigns, including allegations of foreign contributions, improper foreign influence, or other activities. Each one has unique facts. In 2020, the Department declassified some documents related to a 2015 investigation of possible illegal campaign contributions. In that inst~nce, the FBI provided a defensive briefing to the Clinton campaign. Some have argued that the decisions to provide a defensive briefing in that investigation but not in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation were inconsistent. President Obama may also have thought that a defensive briefing for the Trump campaign was desirable, but his views may not have related to Crossfire Hurricane.
As described in section III, the FBI has now established a board, the FIDBB, to address defensive briefings; the Attorney General has directed the FBI to promulgate procedures on this subject; and the Attorney General has imposed additional, specific requirements in connection with politically sensitive FISA applications. These requirements, particularly the last one, require a serious consideration of the need for a defensive briefing, and we support them.
C. FISA Issues
1. Clarity ofapplications
In 2020, the FBI and the Department provided 19 complete FlSA applications to the PCLOB for review. Adam Klein, the Chairman of the PCLOB, commented that:
The applications present the reader (most notably, the FISA court judge) with a great deal of factual information .... This information, however, is sometimes repetitive, and the organization does not necessarily facilitate critical analysis. The applications recite many facts related to the target's potential involvement with terrorism. But each fact's relative importance emerges only after very close reading. Overall, these applications provide a great deal of relevant information and generally aim to highlight potential question marks for the court. However, their clarity and organization could be improved ....
Former Chairman Klein has also written that "steps to improve the clarity of applications . . . would help drafters think rigorously about which facts are essential to probable cause, which are merely supportive and why the surveillance is necessary in the first place." Similarly, the FBI's public strategy says that it will "improve data collection, accessibility, and analysis to better understand, anticipate, and mitigate threats." Although the PCLOB did not review the applications for surveillance of Page, as the applications did not involve terrorism, some of the White Paper's observations are relevant.
a. Transparency of sourcing information
In the Page applications, much of the probable cause information was based on multiple layers of unverified sub-sourcing.- Whenever that is the case, there is a greater possibility for bias or exaggerations to proliferate, even under ideal circumstances. We appreciate and support the effort the Department's O I Attorneys made, which may have prevented even larger problems, to describe the sourcing for the Page applications. In any application, the description of the sourcing information is offundamental importance and should be as transparent as possible. It should include the FBI's insight, or lack thereof, into the reliability of each layer. This is even more the case where what is described is the central contention ofthe application.
In addition, the source and sub-source information might have been easier to understand, and been seen as having more importance, if it had been described in the text of the application rather than in a footnote. Although former Assistant Attorney General Kris correctly notes that the FISC "reads the footnotes" and that "the government's disclosures enabled the court to take Steele's information with a grain of salt," we see no reason not to lay out sourcing information as clearly as possible, particularly when it contains subjective assessments.
b. Information from Congress
That a member of Congress is concerned about the activities of a political opponent or someone in another political party or may have written to the Attorney General or the Director of the FBI about those activities, would rarely seem relevant to a discussion of probable cause, unless the member provides specific and credible information that is not available from other sources.
c. Masking of information
In a FISA application, it is clearly important to protect the identity of sources. This is typically done by giving them a number rather than providing a name. It also may be important to minimize or mask private or derogatory information about someone who is not the target of the application. The broader use of minimized identities, such as describing someone as "Candidate # 1" or attributing a news report to "an identified news organization," may not conceal much and may instead make understanding the application more difficult. It may also ( even unintentionally) encourage a reader to think that because one possible step to ensure legality has been taken others have been too. In fact, whether information is minimized or masked has no effect on whether the information itself is accurate and supports a probable cause finding.
d. Use of news reports
Former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker has urged the FBI to avoid using media reports in FISA applications. The FBI has little knowledge of the reliability of the sources used by reporters, and reliance on press accounts risks shortcutting the process of establishing probable cause. If the FBI uses a media source, it should disclose the name of the source "and any credible claims of bias that have been leveled against the news outlet." It might also disclose what, if any, efforts it has taken to verify the allegations.
e. Need to share important information
In January 2017, the FBI interviewed Igor Danchenko, Steele's primary sub-source. Danchenko said that Steele "misstated or exaggerated" the sub-source· s statements "in multiple sections of the reporting." NSD, but not OI, was present at the interview. 1732 Because the interview involved an important sub-source used in a FISA application, OI should, at a minimum, have been informed of what the sub-source said.
2. Completeness ofapplications
The GIG Review concluded that FBI personnel "did not give appropriate attention to facts that cut against probable cause." The FBI has addressed this issue by requiring that both an agent and a supervisor must affirm that OI "has been apprised of all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information in the application or otherwise raise doubts about the requested probable cause findings or the theory ofthe case." The FBI has also pledged that it "will adhere to the rule of law through attention to detail." Finally, the Attorney General has directed both the FBI and 01 to conduct completeness reviews.
Implementation ofthe reviews may be difficult. An FBI CHS may have recorded dozens or hundreds of hours of conversations with the target or others engaged in related activities. For example, in the released transcripts of conversations among an FBI CHS, George Papadopoulos, and others, there is clearly a large amount of extraneous information, and it may not always be clear what is being discussed. Moreover, no one may have listened to all the recordings, or there may not be available transcripts. The FBI may also have a large volume of other raw records related to an investigation. Any of these factors may make it hard to identify information that "raise[s] doubts about the requested probable cause findings or the theory of the case."
One possible way to implement the new requirement, at least in part, may be by asking on the FISA verification form or elsewhere if the FBI is aware of particular kinds of derogatory information about the target. An example might be whether the FBI has information about financial transactions between the target and others associated with a foreign power. If the FBI is not aware of such information, the government may tell the FISC that the FBI either has no such information or that, if it may have such information, it is choosing not to include it. The FISC could then consider the absence of such incriminating information in its assessment of whether the target is an agent of a foreign power.
Moreover, in the circumstance where the FBI has unreviewed data relating to an investigation, or data that is still being evaluated, 01 may want to consider whether the FISA application should disclose that fact to the FISC.
3. Reliance on prior FISA applications
When the Page FISA applications were renewed, reviewing officials may have placed too much reliance on the prior authorization by the Attorney General and the FISC. Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein noted that at the time when the Page renewal application came to him many different Department officials had approved the prior applications and three different judges had found probable cause. At least some ofthe requirements found in the Supplemental Reforms Memorandum apply to both initiations and renewals of FISA surveillances. In addition, some kind of red-teaming, in cases with "partisan risk," might help here.
4. Timely renewal request
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Evans has observed that the FBI should submit a request to renew FISA authority approximately 45 days before its expiration. In practice, "renewal requests often come over from the FBI to a week, week and a half, before the expiration." If the requests came earlier, there would be more time for the "robust back and forth" needed to develop the applications. Implementing this proposal would require a significant commitment by Department and FBI leadership. Even if the FBI is not timely in submitting a renewal request, OI may be able to begin acquiring needed information by requesting it from the FBI (or possibly seeking it elsewhere) and asking to meet on a case 45 days before it expires. This may be worth the effort involved for a sensitive and important surveillance.
D. Bias or improper motivation
The OJG Review of Crossfire Hurricane says that"[w]e did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the FBI's decision to seek FISA authority on Carter Page." It also says that "[wjhile we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence of intentional misconduct on the part ofthe [FBI personnel], we also did not receive satisfactory explanations for the errors or problems we identified." David Kris has catalogued statements in the OJG Review like those above and discussed the tension between the statements about the lack of evident bias and the lack of explanation for the problems found.
In this report we have referred to the possible impact of "confirmation bias" on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Confirmation bias is widely understood as a phenomenon describing how information is processed by individuals and groups. It stands for the general proposition that there is a common human tendency - mostly unintentional - for people to accept information and evidence that is consistent with what they believe to be true, while ignoring or rejecting information that challenges those beliefs. In short, people tend to give more credence to information that supports what they already believe. The effects of confirmation bias can be amplified in groups operating in situations of high stress and under time pressures.
hroughout the duration of Crossfire Hurricane, facts and circumstances that were inconsistent with the premise that Trump and/or persons associated with the Trump campaign were involved in a collusive or conspiratorial relationship with the Russian government were ignored or simply assessed away. Indeed, as set forth in Sections IV A.2 and 3, from even before the opening of Crossfire Hurricane, some of those most directly involved in the subsequent investigation had (i) expressed their open disdain for Trump, (ii) asked about when they would open an investigation on Trump, and (iii) asserted that they would prevent Trump from becoming President. As discussed throughout this report, our investigation revealed that the stated basis for opening a full investigation "to determine whether individual(s) associated with the Trump campaign [were] witting of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of Russia" was seriously flawed. Again, the FBI's failure to critically analyze information that ran counter to the narrative of a Trump/Russia collusive relationship exhibited throughout Crossfire Hurricane is extremely troublesome. The evidence of the FBI's confirmation bias in the matter, includes, at a minimum, the following information that was simply ignored or in some fashion rationalized away:
• The Australian diplomats told Crossfire Hurricane investigators that Papadopoulos never stated that he had any direct contact with the Russians nor did he provide any explicit information about an offer of assistance.
• There was a complete lack of information from the Intelligence Community that corroborated the hypothesis upon which the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was predicated.
• The FBI generally ignored the significant exculpatory information provided by Carter Page, George Papadopoulos, and Trump Senior Foreign Policy Advisor-! during recorded conversations with FBI CHSs.
• The FBI failed to pursue investigative leads that were inconsistent with their theory of the case (e.g., Page's recorded denials of having any relationship with Paul Manafort, a fact about which there was available evidence).
• The FBI failed to take Page up on the written offer he made to Director Corney to be interviewed about the allegations contained in Michael Isikoff s Yahoo 1 News article and instead opted to seek FISA surveillance of Page.
• The FBI was willing to make use of the completely unvetted and uncorroborated Steele reporting in multiple FISA applications targeting a U.S. citizen, even after the Crossfire Hurricane investigators had determined that there were major conflicts between the reporting of Steele and his primary sub-source, Igor Danchenko - conflicts the FBI incredibly failed to resolve.
• The Crossfire Hurricane investigators did not even ask Steele about his role in providing information to Michael Isikoff as contained in the September 23, 2016 Yahoo! News article - information that essentially accused Carter Page of colluding with the Russians. And thereafter the same investigators demonstrated a willingness to contort the plain language of the article to suggest it was not Steele but Steele's employers who had given the information to Isikoff.
• The FBI ignored the fact that at no time before, during or after Crossfire Hurricane were investigators able to corroborate a single substantive allegation in the Steele dossier reporting. • There was a complete failure on the part of the FBI to even examine - never mind resolve - the serious counterespionage issues surrounding Steele's primary sub source, Igor Danchenko.
• The FBI leadership essentially disregarded the Clinton Plan intelligence, which it received at almost the exact same time as the Australian Paragraph Five information. This was despite the fact that at precisely the same time as the Clinton Plan intelligence was received (i) the Clinton campaign made public statements tying the DNC computer hack to Russian attempts to help Trump get elected, (ii) the FBI was receiving the Clinton campaign-funded Steele Reports, and (iii) the Clinton campaign-funded Alfa Bank allegations were being prepared for delivery to the media and the FBI.
• The Crossfire Hurricane investigators essentially ignored information they had received as early as October 2016 regarding Charles Dolan, a longtime Democratic operative with ties to the Clintons who also possessed significant ties to Russian government figures who would appear in the Steele reporting, and never interviewed him.
• The Crossfire Hurricane investigators provided only partial, and in some instances misleading, information to Department attorneys working on the Page FISA applications while withholding other highly relevant information from those attorneys and the FISC that might cast real doubt on their probable cause assertions.
Finally, the results of the OIG's Audit of 29 Applications also establish significant problems in the Page FISA applications, problems that point to bias and other factors. Following the Audit, the Department and the FBI "notified the FISC that the 29 applications contained a total of 209 errors, 4 of which they deemed to be material." We note that because the Audit did not look for omitted information - a major issue in the Page applications - the results of the Audit and the review ofthe Page applications are not directly comparable. Nonetheless, at least on the surface, the difference is notable: in the four Page applications, there were a total of 17 material errors and omissions, far more than the four material errors found in the larger group of 29 non-Page applications.
Given the foregoing, and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Crossfire Hurricane investigators, it seems highly likely that, at a minimum, confirmation bias played a significant role in the FBI's acceptance of extraordinarily serious allegations derived from uncorroborated information that had not been subjected to the typical exacting analysis employed by the FBI and other members of the Intelligence Community. In short, it is the Office's assessment that the FBI discounted or willfully ignored material information that did not support the narrative of a collusive relationship between Trump and Russia. Similarly, the FBI Inspection Division Report says that the investigators "repeatedly ignore[ d] or explain[ ed] away evidence contrary to the theory the Trump campaign ... had conspired with Russia .... It appeared that ... there was a pattern of assuming nefarious intent." An objective and honest assessment ofthese strands of information should have caused the FBI to question not only the predication for Crossfire Hurricane, but also to reflect on whether the FBI was being manipulated for political or other purposes. Unfortunately, it did not.
E. Possible FBI reform
One possible way to provide additional scrutiny of politically sensitive investigations would be to identify, in advance, an official who is responsible for challenging the steps taken in the investigation. Stewart Baker proposes having a "career position for a nonpartisan FBI agent or lawyer to challenge the FISA application and every other stage of the investigation." This would be done in investigations that "pose partisan risk." In Baker's view, the Attorney General, through the Supplemental Reforms Memorandum, has already taken "a good step in this direction by requiring that politically sensitive surveillance and search applications be reviewed by a special agent from a field office not involved in the investigation." Similarly, Adam Klein said that "DOJ and FBI leaders should consider whether a regularized practice of internal redteaming in the most sensitive cases, whether within the FBI or in collaboration with attorneys at the National Security Division, could serve as an effective check on confirmation bias without unduly delaying time-sensitive applications." As a way to ensure full consideration of the issues in applications that may present very difficult - and vitally important - issues, we recommend that the Department seriously consider Baker's proposal for an official to challenge both a politically sensitive FISA application and other stages of the investigation. 1752 "Nothing," former Attorney General Levi warned, "can more weaken the quality oflife or more imperil the realization of the goals we all hold dear than our failure to make clear by words and deed that our law is not the instrument of partisan purpose.
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23813490-durham-report
Note: Source notes and index are not included, see original PDF for these.